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THE

CAMPAIGN

OF

MDCCCXV;

OR, A

NARRATIVE OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS

WHICH TOOK PLACE

IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

DURING

THE HUNDRED DAYS.

WRITTEN AT ST. HELENA

BY GENERAL GOURGAUD.

Illustrated with a Map of the principal Theatre of the War.

Tout ce que peut faire un grand homme d'etat et un grand capitaine, Annibal le fit pour sauver la patrie : n'ayant pu porter Scipion à la paix, il donna une bataille où la fortune sembla prender plaisir à confondre son habilité, son experience, et son bon sens. Carthage reçut la paix, non d'un ennemi, mais d'un maitre.

MONTESQUIEU.

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PREFACE.

THE Emperor Napoleon having been pleased to communicate to me his opinion on the principal events of the Campaign of MDCCCXV, I have, in writing the following Narrative, availed myself of that favourable circumstance, and also of my own recollections of the great catastrophe, of which I was an eyewitness.

I have read a great number of publications on the same subject, since I returned to Europe; but most of the authors appear to have been governed by anger or animosity, and others to have been blinded by overweening national partialities: few

have studied to give a true picture of the events as they occurred.

Error often repeated assumes at last the appearance of reality; but being in this instance possessed of the means of removing it, I feel that a longer silence on my part would be inexcusable. No other reason could have overcome my repugnance to expose myself to literary criticism.

Writing as a military man, I have only alluded to political events in order to explain how it happened, that a single battle sufficed to subjugate the French nation, governed by the first Captain of modern times. It is not for me to attempt to discuss these great questions:—Has the battle of Waterloo consolidated or shaken every throne?—Has it secured the tranquillity of Europe or undermined all its foundations? Time will determine.

The Public will find in this Work a

simple but faithful recital of facts; the military reader, the information necessary to enable him to estimate the faults which were committed, and the talents which were unfolded; the French, a new proof, that, notwithstanding their misfortunes, their warlike reputation was not tarnished in the field of Waterloo.

Perhaps the ministers of the powers hostile to France will tremble on perceiving the danger they incurred, and how nearly all their plans and projects had been defeated. Every thing depended on a single battle; and what general can be certain of success? Cæsar, after twenty years of victory, was at Munda, as in his first battle, compelled to run all the chances of fortune.

Chance has far less influence on the operations which precede and lead to a battle; and by them all the superiority of a General is established. Thus we find

Napoleon, with an army alarmingly inferior in numbers, met his enemy, in this fatal campaign, with almost equal forces on every point of contest. By his ability alone he everywhere established an equilibrium: the enemy, surprised in his cantonments, with his troops scattered over a circuit of twenty leagues, was compelled to engage before his forces were united; and finally, to fight the last battle in a position in which his total ruin was inevitable had he been beaten.

All the probabilities of victory were in favour of the French. The combinations were excellent, and every event appeared to have been provided for: but what can the greatest genius perform against destiny? Napoleon was conquered * * * * * *

Melancholy example of human vicissitude! Fortune, which had formerly been so propitious, seemed now to take a delight in crushing him. Betrayed by the

men, on whom he had the best right to rely, abandoned by those whom he had loaded with favours, he left France. He expected, that his greatest enemy would be the most generous * Ah! Napoleon, why didst thou not die at Waterloo!

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CAMPAIGN

OF

MDCCCXV.

CHAPTER I.

Situation of the Armies of the Powers leagued against France.

In the month of April, 1815, the Russian armies were beyond the Niemen, and those of Prussia and Austria were partly on the peace establishment: most of the Prussian corps had passed the Elbe, and a part of the Austrian army was still in the kingdom of Naples; the English had the greater part of their troops in America. It was therefore calculated, that the armies of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England could not be completed to one hundred and fifty thousand men each, which was the force these powers were bound to

furnish by the treaty of April, and marched to the frontiers of France before the end of July. As the force of the English army, including the Hanoverians, was to be only eighty thousand men, the British government had to pay subsidies for seventy thousand additional troops. The corps of Holland, Nassau, Denmark, Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, Baden, and Wirtembergh, were so distributed, that part served to complete the English contingent, and the rest to reinforce the armies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Spain, having formed no part of the leauge, acted separately. She had declared war against France, but such was her internal situation, that there was little to be apprehended from the hostile disposition of her court. Portugal, though at war with France, declined to furnish any contingent to the coalition; and Sweden, having obtained what she wanted, namely Norway, also withheld her aid.

The allied forces began to march towards the frontiers of France in the month of May: meanwhile the English and Prussian armies, which had remained in Bel-

gium, were in perpetual alarm. They expected every moment to be attacked, and were not in a situation to maintain themselves in that country. Wellington, who was at Vienna, and Blucher, who was at Berlin, proceeded in all haste to Brussels. Antwerp and Ostend were, during the whole of the month of May, encumbered with troops arriving from England; and, in the beginning of June, the Duke of Wellington had under his command more than one hundred thousand men, including the troops of Belgium, Holland, Nassau, and Brunswick. Blucher, at the same date, had, including the Saxon troops, an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. The eighty thousand, which were wanting to complete the two contingents, were expected by the month of July. There were forty thousand men, belonging to the Austrian army, posted along the Rhine, and in front of the lines of the Queich; these consisted chiefly of troops of the German confederation. The Austrian troops were on their march for the Rhine, in order to penetrate into France by mount Cenis and the Simplon.

The Russian forces were still at a distance from the French frontiers.

Thus France was to be attacked in the course of July by six hundred thousand enemies; but, at the beginning of June, only the armies of Generals Blucher and Wellington could be considered as prepared for action. After deducting the troops, which it was necessary they should leave in their fortresses, they presented a disposable force of two hundred thousand men on the frontiers.

CHAPTER II.

Situation of the French Armies in April, May, and June. Preparations for Defence.

The Emperor arrived at Paris on the 20th of March. The three coloured flag was not hoisted in Marseilles before the 12th of April, and the Duke of Angouleme did not embark until the 16th of the same month. The country, in fact, was not completely pacified, and in all respects placed under the authority of the Imperial Government until the beginning of May. France had then one hundred and five regiments of infantry, three of which were in the colonies: some had three battalions organized, but in general they had only two. The average effective number of each regiment was nine hundred men; of these only about six hundred per regiment were actually under arms, and could be brought into the field. The whole of the infantry however might be estimated at ninety

thousand men. The engineer corps, formed into three fine regiments, amounted to between five and six thousand men. There were eight regiments of foot, and four of horse artillery; the strength of the former regiments was about fifteen hundred men, the latter had at most one hundred mounted cannoniers. The train battalions had been merged in other corps; scarcely any thing but their skeletons remained, and they had a very small number of draught horses. The corps of artillery and engineers were however, as to their personal composition, sufficient for the greatest armies; and with respect to their arms and equipments, notwithstanding the great loss which had been sustained by the cession of the equipages of artillery in Antwerp, Wesel, Mentz, and Alexandria, there still remained the means of supplying all the losses that might be sustained in several campaigns. There were, in the magazines, about one hundred and fifty thousand new muskets, in addition to the pieces in the hands of the soldiers, and those furnished to the national guard; and there existed besides three hundred

thousand pieces, consisting either of muskets kept in reserve, or to be repaired.

The cavalry was in a most wretched state. Reduced to fifty-seven regiments (two of carabineers, twelve of cuirassiers, thirty of dragoons and chasseurs, and seven of hussars), not fourteen thousand men could be mounted. The number of men was indeed much more considerable, but the necessary horses, saddles, and equipments were wanting. The two regiments of carabineers had only eighty horses each ready to take the field. All the regiments, and their depots, could at the most only supply a total of sixteen or seventeen thousand horses.

During the whole of the year 1814, the clothing of the troops, some privileged regiments excepted, had been completely neglected. The army was almost naked; the manufactories, which had been established for supplying it, were broken up, and there was not a yard of cloth in the magazines.

So low had the military situation of France been reduced, that, in the month of April, it would have been scarcely pos-

sible to assemble an army of one hundred thousand men, a force barely sufficient to supply garrisons for our fortresses. Nothing remained disposable to form an army for the field.

The Emperor restored to the regiments the numbers to which they had given celebrity in so many battles. Third, fourth, and fifth battalions were re-created in each regiment, and thus employment was given to the half pay officers. All, who were on furlough, were recalled, all old soldiers were summoned to rejoin their colours, and the conscription of 1815 was called out. Two hundred battalions of chasseurs and grenadiers of the national guard were raised, which presented a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men. These battalions, immediately on being formed, without waiting for clothing or arms, were marched to the fortresses they were to garrison. There they were armed, and their organization rendered complete. Measures were taken for clothing them, but that could not be fully accomplished before July or August. All the fortresses and the coasts were put in a proper state

of defence with the greatest promptitude. Six thousand cannoniers were organized for the defence of the coasts. Twenty regiments of marine infantry, each consisting of two battalions, and recruited with sailors, who had served in the navy, were ordered to be raised. They were formed by the department of the marine, and their officers were captains, lieutenants, and ensignes de vaisseau. These regiments assembled at Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. They were destined to guard our coasts, ports, and naval establishments, and it was calculated that one half of their number might, in the course of August, be applied to reinforce the army in active service. Twenty battalions were formed of retired officers and soldiers, and assembled in places of strength to instruct the national guards, superintend the service, and encourage the inhabitants. They were stationed in Marseilles, Bourdeaux, and other great towns, where they were thought useful for electrifying the public spirit. All the regimental depots were moved into the interior, in the directions of Paris and Lyons.

The reorganization of the cavalry presented many obstacles. Contracts were made for horses, and they were raised by levies on the departments. The excellent plan was also adopted of drafting twelve thousand horses from the gendarmerie, and paying down their price to the gendarmes, who remounted themselves in a fortnight. In this way the army obtained a great number of horses, ready trained for service.

The infantry of the imperial guard was doubled, and its cavalry tripled. Its artillery, which had been disbanded, was reorganised, and consisted of one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, with their horses. The equipments for the bridge department, the engineers, and the commissariat, were prepared. Neither the Emperor, the ministry, nor the nation could be reproached with any delay. Every thing was done as it were by enchantment, and by the beginning of June the whole of the army of the line was ready to act on the offensive. All our great establishments and all our fortresses were guarded by numerous and picked

battalions of the national guard in pay. At this period the number of infantry amounted to two hundred and fifty thousand, but only one hundred and twenty thousand of them were clothed, equipped, and disposable. The remainder could only be got ready in the course of June, July, and August. The number of mounted cavalry was fifty thousand, of which only thirty thousand were in a state to take the field; the remainder were expected to be prepared successively in the course of the same months. The artillery already consisted of between six and seven hundred pieces of cannon, with their horses, and a double supply of accoutrements. There was a sufficient number of excellent cannoniers to serve them, independently of the artillery companies of the line, distributed through all our fortresses. Upon the whole, there was an army of more than three hundred and fifty thousand effective troops, one hundred and eighty thousand of whom were ready for active service, and one hundred and sixty thousand remained in the fortresses. Finally, arrangements were made for a new

levy and armament of three hundred thousand men. The proposition was to be brought forward in the chambers about the end of June, and the men thus raised would have been successively disposable in August and September*.

The numerous armouries established in Paris produced one thousand five hundred muskets per day, and were to furnish between three and four thousand before the 12th of July. It required some time to train the cabinet makers of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine to the mounting of guns, and render them ready at work so new to them. The arms furnished by these workshops consisted of muskets entirely new, old muskets repaired, and others fitted up from pieces which had been laid up in reserve. All the manufactories of arms in the empire doubled their supply. Muskets of different sorts were allowed to be received.

* FORCE IN JUNE:—

INFANTRY: two hundred and fifty thousand, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand were fit for active service.

CAVALRY: fifty thousand; fit for active service, thirty thousand.

ARTILLERY: from six to seven hundred pieces of cannon.

Mounting plates, far more simple than the ordinary kind, were invented; and all the workers in copper, watchmakers, chisselers, &c. made them as well as the best platers. Besides this kind of manufacture, the works for stamped plates had been re-established. All these resources united left no ground for uneasiness on this important object.

The defence of the fortresses being provided for, Paris and Lyons were chosen as grand centres of resistance. Four hundred field pieces, and three hundred of large calibre were assembled at Paris. At Lyons there was an equipage of one hundred pieces of large calibre, and one hundred of field artillery. Two immense depots of ammunition of every kind were formed in these cities. A great number of artillery officers of the army and navy, and several battalions belonging to these two services were exclusively attached to the depots. Several companies of volunteer artillery were also formed in these cities.

The defence of Paris was entrusted to twelve legions of the national guard, forming thirty thousand men, embodied, and

perfectly well armed; and fifteen thousand federals, who were named *tirailleurs* of the national guard. The latter were workmen, most of whom had served in the army. They were commanded by officers of the line; and, for the defence of the city, these tirailleurs were equal to troops of the line.

The defence of Lyons, with respect to troops, depended on the national guard, which had been completed to ten thousand men; but orders had been given for the formation of several battalions of tirailleurs, after the manner of those of Paris.

A plan of fortification was adopted for both these cities, and the greatest activity was employed in executing it. At Paris, the works were begun by fortifying the heights of Montmartre, and all the ground from the Butte Chaumont and the cemetery of the Pere Lachaise to the Barrier of the Throne. All these heights were occupied by a series of works laid down by General Haxo of the engineers. The village of St. Denis was fortified, and surrounded with inundations. The canal, already two-thirds formed, was completed,

and a communication opened between the canal of the Ourcq and the Seine at St. Denis. Half moons were constructed to cover the bridges which crossed the canal. The earth dug out of the canal of St. Denis was thrown on both banks, so as to form a rampart on the left bank, and a kind of covered way on the right bank. On the road, which leads from the Barrier of the Throne to Vincennes, there was constructed a kind of double entrenchment, extending to within half gunshot of the castle: this completely flanked the works of the cemetery of Lachaise on the left, and on the right those which had been thrown up in the park of Bercy. This work was easily formed, for the road is high, has a command of the environs, and is supported by two good walls, built with stone. At the extremity of this double entrenchment there was erected a strong redoubt, which crossed its fire with that of Vincennes, and was even flanked by the latter. All these works were completed, palisaded, and armed by the beginning of June.

The works were also traced out on the

left of the Seine, and at this period a great number of labourers were employed in constructing them. The boundary line on this side of the river is only one third of that on the right bank, and the works on the left bank were to be terminated before the 15th of July: this would have completed the whole circuit of the defensive works of Paris. On the right bank, the right and left of the line rested on the Seine, at St. Denis and behind Vincennes. On the left bank, its right and left also rested on the river, the one near Bicetre, the other in front of the barrier of Grenelle. The line of defence afterwards followed the right bank of the Seine opposite to Sevres, St. Cloud, Neuilly, and joined St. Denis. Orders had been given for the formation of a second line, which it was intended should be appuied on the right of the Seine as high as the barrier of Grenelle, comprehend the heights of l'Etoile, and finally rest its right on Montmartre, which was already in the first line. Works closed at the gorge were to be constructed in the rear of those of the Butte Chaumont and the cemetery of

Lachaise, in order to protect the troops if the first entrenchments should be forced. This plan, besides, secured to the besieged the possession of the last summits of those heights. It was calculated, that the latter works would be terminated before the 1st of August.

The park of artillery destined for the service of the right bank was established at Vincennes, and that for the left bank at the Invalids. In distributing the cannon, with respect to calibre, the right bank had six, twelve, and twenty-four pounders; the left bank four, eight, sixteen, and twenty-four pounders; and the works were so constructed, that field artillery could everywhere be placed in battery. One hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, with their horses, were organized, and ready to move on any point which might be menaced. The fortifications of Soissons, Laon, and Chateau Thiery had been re-established, as forming part of the great system of the defence of the capital.

At Lyons a bridge-head was constructed at the Broteaux, a drawbridge at the Pont

de la Guillotière, and the circumvallation between the Rhone and the Saone was re-established, as well as that on the right bank of the Saone by the heights of Pierre-en-cise. The part included between the Saone and the Rhone, which is considered as the true point of attack, was strengthened by the construction of a number of good field works on the heights. These works being finished, it was resolved to occupy, as long as possible, the Faubourg de la Guillotière, by covering it with a series of redoubts—a plan to which the nature of the ground was very favourable.

By the beginning of June, all the troops of the empire were formed into seven army-corps, four corps of observation, and a body called the army of La Vendée.

The first army-corps was at Lille. It consisted of sixteen regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, forming four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry; in all eighteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, under the command of General Erlong. The second corps, which was

composed in a similar manner, and of a nearly equal force, occupied Valenciennes, under the orders of General Reille. The third, commanded by General Vandamme, was at Mesieres; it had only three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The fourth corps, which was commanded by General Gerard, was at Metz, and garrisoned the Moselle; its composition was similar to that of the third, but it had one regiment less, and the troops were inferior. The fifth corps, which had General Rapp for its chief, was in Alsace; it had three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The sixth, commanded by General Lobau, consisted of nine regiments of infantry and three of cavalry; it occupied Laon, but the fourth regiment of each division was in La Vendée. The seventh corps, which was at Chambery, under the command of Marshal Suchet, was formed of two divisions of infantry, one of cavalry, and two divisions of the national guard of Dauphiny and the Lyonese. The corps of observation of the Var, commanded by Marshal Brune, had three regiments of infantry

and one of cavalry. General Lecourbe commanded, at Befort, a corps of observation, consisting of three regiments of infantry and three of cavalry. He was supported by a great number of battalions of the paid national guard of Franche Comté. He had to watch Basle and Huninguen, and to defend the Jura. Two corps of observation, one at Bourdeaux under General Clausel, the other at Toulouse, under General Decaen, had three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry in each of those towns, and they were reinforced by all the levies of the national guard of Languedoc under pay; but it was found necessary to detach one regiment from each of them. These two regiments were sent to La Vendée. The army of La Vendée, commanded by General Lamarque, comprehended eight regiments of infantry of the line, two of the young guard, two of cavalry, and ten squadrons of gendarmerie, part infantry and part cavalry, forming more than three thousand gendarmes.

In all the different army-corps, the ave-

rage force of each regiment of infantry amounted to eleven or twelve hundred men under arms; and the force of the cavalry regiments to four or five hundred.

Of the two hundred battalions of national guards organised and under pay, thirty were destined to form a reserve of infantry on the Loire. The reserve of cavalry consisted of four corps, each of two divisions, and each division having three regiments, which made about three thousand horses to every corps. They were cantoned between the Aisne, the Meuse, and the Sambre. The first, commanded by General Pajol, consisted of light cavalry. The second, under the orders of General Excelmans, was composed of dragoons. The third and fourth corps, commanded by Generals Milhaut and Kellerman, were entirely cuirassiers.

The artillery of each corps consisted of a battery of eight pieces of cannon for each division of infantry, a horse battery of six pieces of cannon for each division of cavalry, and a reserve battery of

eight twelve pounders to each army-corps.

Such was the military situation of France in June.

CHAPTER III.

The Emperor determines to assume the Offensive, and to enter Belgium. His Reasons for adopting this Course.

Military men had formed various opinions respecting the plan of operations, which it would be most advisable to follow. Some wished, that at the end of April the Emperor should have entered Belgium, beaten and dispersed the English army, and armed the population of the country, of whose disposition no doubt could be entertained. The fact is, that in April, and the beginning of May, France would have had to oppose only one hundred thousand enemies in Belgium, instead of the two hundred thousand who were there in June; and that too whilst the imprudent attack, which the King of Naples had just made upon the Austrian troops, directed the whole attention of Austria towards Italy. This plan would certainly

have been the best of all, had it been practicable; but before the commencement of hostilities it was necessary to arm and provision the strong places, and to levy the battalions of the national guard which were to garrison them, and thus render disposable the troops of the line to form the army. Whatever degree of activity might have been employed in fulfilling this twofold object, the desired results could not have been obtained before the 1st of June. Besides, even at the beginning of May, hopes of maintaining peace were still entertained, and public opinion would have disapproved the commencement of a war before every chance of preserving peace had vanished*.

* When the conduct of the King of Naples, during the years 1814 and 1815, is considered, it cannot be denied, that that unfortunate prince, by his bad policy, contributed more than any other individual to the first and second overthrow of Napoleon. If in 1814 he had not abandoned the cause of France for that of Austria, France would not have been invaded; and if in 1815 he had not declared war against Austria, France in all probability would not have bowed a second time under a foreign yoke. The Emperor of Austria, seeing his son-in-law again seated on the throne of France, appeared disposed to negociate with him; but the attack of Murat led him to suppose, that it was the

Others, on the contrary, were of opinion, that the offensive ought not to be assumed on any point; that all the fortresses should be well armed and provisioned for six months, and garrisoned by numerous battalions of the national guard; and, finally, that all the troops of the line, formed into army-corps as they were in June, should be directed to fall back slowly before the enemy, and to concentrate themselves near Paris and Lyons, where immense magazines were prepared. "The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth army-corps," they observed, "and the imperial guard, will unite together before the capital; and, allowing that the allies should commence hostilities on the 15th of July, they cannot arrive within the district of Paris before the 15th of August. Our army-corps will then have two months more to recruit; the depots will furnish them with considerable reinforcements; the war of La Vendée will be at an end; and, instead of one hundred and twenty

result of a plan concerted with Napoleon, and he broke off the negociations, saying, *How can I treat with Napoleon, when he makes Murat attack me?*

thousand disposable troops, which these corps may present on the 15th of June, they will afford two hundred thousand by the 15th of August. The depots round Paris and Lyons will every week furnish new resources. As the enemy approaches, the state of circumstances will render every measure lawful, and the means of organization and equipment will become boundless. On the other hand, the fortifications of Paris will be entirely completed, the works on the left bank of the Seine will be finished, and the second system of defence established, which will enable us to negociate, and to save the city, even though the first should have been forced. We shall likewise have time to fortify all the important points in the vicinity of the capital, such as the positions at Nogent, Montereau, and Meaux, and to prepare all that may favour the celerity of the movements of our corps on the banks of the Marne and the Seine. The Emperor being at Paris with a great part of the army for two months, will afford time and means, not only for increasing the essential measures of defence, but likewise for changing the organization of

the national guard. The thirty thousand national guards are useless for what is properly called the guard of the capital, and they hold muskets which might be useful elsewhere. There will then be time for properly organizing the national guard, reducing it to five or six thousand men (all heads of families, or old men, which will be sufficient for the police), and employing all the rest in battalions, the skeletons of which will have been previously formed by officers of the line. In a month we may organize from fourteen to fifteen thousand volunteer federals, whilst the danger is yet remote, and great moderation still observed: in the two succeeding months, the approach of danger will give a suitable impulse to public spirit, and their number may be increased to forty thousand. Officers are not wanting for the skeletons, so that before August we may have sixty thousand men, led by officers accustomed to service, to cover the whole line of defence of the city: by this means we shall have a disposable army of two hundred thousand men, with a numerous train of artillery. This army may

manœuvre round the capital, covered by its fortifications, and defended by a considerable garrison. Under such circumstances it will be impossible for the enemy, with four or five hundred thousand men, to blockade our system of defence, without exposing himself to certain destruction, and the communications with every part of France will therefore remain free. On the other hand, the same system may be adopted at Lyons. The seventh corps (Suchet's), and the corps of observation of Befort (Lecourbe's), may be concentrated there, as well as all the Dauphiny, Franche Comté, and Lyonese corps of national guards. Thus fifty thousand men of all descriptions may be combined there, a force which will be capable of opposing the whole Austrian army. The enemy, advancing on the two grand points of resistance, Paris and Lyons, will be under the necessity of leaving corps to mask all our fortresses, Dunkirk, Lille, Arras, Condé, Bouchain, Le Quesnoy, Landrecies, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Avesnes, Philippeville, Givet, Rocroy, Mésières, Sedan, Montmedi, Verdun, Thion-

ville, Longwi, Sarre Louis, Metz, Sarguemines, Bitch, Landau, Hagueneau, Phalsbourg, Strasburg, Schetestadt, Brisack, Huninguen, Béfort, Besançon, Auxonne, Joux, Montmeillan, Grénoble, Montdauphin, Embrun, Briançon, Sistéron, Antibes, Toulon, &c. He will moreover be obliged to maintain a great number of detached corps to oppose our corps of partizans, to repress the hostilities of our peasantry, and to secure his communications: thus the six hundred thousand men of the allied armies will be found insufficient. In this state of things, all that is great and generous in the French character will be roused, and there will be no question throughout France but to conquer or die. A population of twenty-eight millions animated by such sentiments becomes invincible: the sovereigns of Europe must necessarily be convinced of this, and peace will probably be the result."

The third plan was to anticipate the enemy. Day by day it was ascertained where the Russian and Austrian armies were, and the period of the arrival of the

English army from America was known. These armies could not be in readiness to act simultaneously until July. It was proposed to concentrate as many troops as possible by the 15th of June, and it was calculated that from one hundred and thirty to one hundred and forty thousand men might be concentrated on the northern frontier, to attack and disperse the English, and drive the Prussians beyond the Rhine. This point being gained, all would be at an end; a revolution would take place in the English administration: Belgium would rise in mass, and all the Belgian troops would enrol themselves under their old banners: the troops of the left bank of the Rhine, of Saxony, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, &c., tired of the heavy yoke of Prussia and Austria, would join the forces of France. During these great movements, the troops, equipping in the depots, and all the battalions of the national guard under pay, in our fortresses, would become disposable, and the French army would appear on the Rhine equal in force to those of Austria and Russia.

We might thus ensure ourselves of Belgium and the barrier of the Rhine, and might then hope to obtain, by a solid peace, those natural limits of France which the Emperor would never willingly resign.

The Emperor adopted the two last mentioned plans, the one being the consequence of the other. He made every necessary preparation for rendering Paris and Lyons the two grand points of resistance, and collected all the disposable troops in Flanders to assume the offensive. In case this offensive operation should not produce the hoped for success, all was prepared for falling back upon Paris and Lyons, and executing the second plan. *The Emperor could not endure the thought of abandoning, without defence, to the ravages of the enemy, at the very commencement of the campaign, the provinces most devoted to the national cause; namely, Alsace, Lorraine, Burgundy, the Franche Comté, the departments of the Meuse, Dauphiny, Picardy, and all the neighbourhood of Paris.*

A recurrence to the second plan, after the failure of the offensive operation,

would doubtless have been attended with some disadvantage; but that disadvantage could not be put in balance with the hope of dissolving the coalition, as if by a thunderbolt, of destroying the English army, and establishing a regular war on our frontiers.

Events have defeated these calculations; but the plan fixed upon was so perfectly conformable to all military rules, that, in spite of its failure, every sensible man must acknowledge, that, under such circumstances, it was the only one that ought to have been adopted.

CHAPTER IV

Disposable French Army. Passage of the Sambre.

In the beginning of May, Napoleon fixed upon his plan of campaign. From that period, he determined to assume the offensive on the 15th of June, and to pass the Sambre at Charleroi. On this operation he could only employ the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth army-corps, the imperial guard, and the reserves of the cavalry*.

* DISPOSABLE FRENCH ARMY.

	Men.	*Pieces of Cannon.*
First Corps	18,420	46
Second	23,420	46
Third	15,260	38
Fourth	14,260	38
Sixth	11,260	38
Guard:		
Infantry	12,940	72
Cavalry	4,480	24
Reserve cavalry	11,260	48
Sappers, miners, &c.	3,700	
Total	115,000	350

The fifth corps was indispensable in Alsace, to keep in check the enemy's troops, who were on the left bank of the Rhine and the Sarre. The corps of observation of Befort, as has already been stated, served as a nucleus to a great number of chosen battalions of the national guard; and to have called it to the army of the north would have been to render ineffective twenty of these battalions, which whilst supported by this corps of observation might have rendered the most important services. Besides, the three infantry regiments of that corps scarcely amounted to two thousand men, and according to the general plan, it was destined to fall back upon Lyons. The seventh corps, which covered Lyons, and gave consistence to the national guards of Dauphiny and the Lyonese, amounted only to eight regiments, and could not be diminished. The corps of observation of the Var was absolutely necessary to watch over Marseilles and the coasts of Provence, and had to concentrate itself at Toulon, one of the most important points of the empire. The two corps of observation of

Bourdeaux and Toulouse were in themselves very weak; but they rendered the force of a vast number of corps of the national guard available, and maintained tranquillity in those two great cities.

It is therefore plain, that, after drawing a cordon along all our frontiers, only the five corps above-mentioned could be assembled in the north. These five army-corps, with the imperial guard, and the reserves of cavalry, instead of one hundred and thirty thousand men, at which they were calculated in May, presented only one hundred and fifteen thousand in June*. The war of la Vendée, which broke out on the 15th of May, occasioned a deduction of fifteen thousand men from the army of the north, among whom were three regiments of dragoons, two of the young guard, and a great number of detachments and third battalions: they were stopped in their passage across the Loire to join the army of la Vendée.

The fourth corps, commanded by General Gerard, marched from Metz on the 6th of June, and proceeded towards the

* See Appendix.

Meuse and Philippeville, where it arrived on the 14th. At Metz, General Belliard took the command of the line of the Mozelle, and masked the movement of the fourth corps, occupying all the outlets of the Sarre by detachments from the garrisons of Metz, Longwi, &c., and stationing on the extreme frontier all the volunteer corps which had been levied in those parts; so that the enemy, when the fourth corps quitted the Sarre, finding all the posts of that river reinforced, supposed he was threatened on that side. The imperial guard quitted Paris on the 8th, the day after the opening of the two chambers, and proceeded by forced marches to Avesnes. All the corps of the army of the north were under march, and their movements were everywhere masked, like that of the fourth corps, by numerous detachments from the garrisons of all the towns on the line from Dunkirk to Maubeuge.

The Emperor departed from Paris on the morning of the 12th, breakfasted at Soissons, inspected that town and its garrison, and slept at Laon, where he gave the last orders for the defense of that im-

portant position. He arrived at Avesnes on the 13th, examined the fortifications, and held a conference with the marshals and commanders of corps*.

The army continued its march during the whole of the 14th, and, in the evening, encamped in three different positions. The left, consisting of the second and first corps, which had proceeded along the Sambre, by which they were covered, was bivouacked; the second corps before Laire, and the first at Solre, on the Sambre. All the passages and bridges on the river were carefully guarded, and the corps had established their bivouacs behind the woods and uneven tracts of ground, which concealed them from the observation of the enemy's videttes. In the centre, at Beaumont, were the head quarters, with the guard, the third and sixth corps, the reserves of cavalry, and the bridge equipages. The right, formed by the fourth corps and a division of cuirassiers (Delort's), was before Philippeville.

* See Appendix, Order of the Day.

The reports and returns of the evening produced the following result,

	Infantry.	*Cavalry.*	*Cannon.*
LEFT, 38,500 Men:			
First Corps	16,000	1,500	46
Second	19,500	1,500	46
CENTRE, 51,800 Men:			
Third Corps	13,000	1,500	38
Sixth	9,000	1,500	38
Imperial Guard	14,000	4,000	96
Reserve of Cavalry:			
First Corps		2,500	12
Second		2,500	12
Third		2,500	12
Fourth		1,300	6
RIGHT, 14,700 Men:			
Fourth Corps	12,000	1,500	38
Divison of Cuirassiers		1,200	6
Total	83,500	21,500	350

which, with the artillery, troops, and equipages, amounted altogether to one hundred and fifteen thousand men, of whom twenty-four thousand were cavalry.

The allied forces remained in perfect security in their cantonments. The Prussian army, commanded by Marshal Blucher,

amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand men, of whom eighteen thousand were cavalry: it had three hundred pieces of cannon, and was divided into four corps of thirty thousand men each*. The first, commanded by General Ziethen, had the English cantonments on its right, lined the Sambre in the neighbourhood of Charleroi, and had Fleurus for its point of concentration. The second, commanded by General Borstell, was cantoned on the frontier, in the neighbourhood of Namur, which was its point of centralization. The third, commanded by General Thielman, lined the Meuse, in the neighbourhood of Dinant, and was to be concentrated at Ciney. Finally, the fourth corps, under the orders of General Bulow, was cantoned behind the three others: its head quarters were at Liege, but it was to be united at Hannut. More than half a day would have been necessary for the union

* PRUSSIAN ARMY.

Infantry	102,000
Cavalry	18,000
Total	120,000

of each corps round the four points indicated, and to enable them to advance on the point of attack. The second corps had eight leagues to march from Namur; the third fourteen leagues from Ciney; and the fourth fifteen leagues from Hannut. Blucher's head quarters were at Namur, about sixteen leagues from those of the Duke of Wellington, who was at Brussels.

The Anglo-Belgic army*, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, consisting of English, Hanoverian, German, Belgian, Brunswick, and Dutch troops, amounted to upwards of one hundred thousand men, among whom were fifteen thousand cavalry. The trains of artillery amounted to two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. This army, which consisted of ten divisions of infantry (forming thirty brigades, of which ten were English troops, four Hanoverian, and two of the German Legion) and ten brigades of ca-

* ANGLO-BELGIC ARMY. (See Appendix.)

Cavalry	15,000
Infantry	85,000
Total	100,000

valry (of which seven were English and one Hanoverian), was divided into two grand corps of infantry and one of cavalry. The first, under the command of the Prince of Orange, whose head quarters were at Braine-le-Comte, consisted of two divisions of English, two divisions and one brigade of Belgians, and five battalions of Nassau troops, making altogether five divisions. The second corps, under the command of General Hill, who had fixed his head quarters at Grammont, comprised four divisions of English and one of Brunswick troops. The cavalry was commanded by Lord Uxbridge.

The concentrating points of the corps of this army were Ath, Enghein, Braine-le-Comte, Nivelle, Hall, Brussels, &c.; and two days at least must have elapsed before the whole could have been assembled at Charleroi or Fleurus.

On the night of the 14th, some spies returned to head quarters, and announced, that at Namur, Brussels, and even Charleroi, nothing appeared to be apprehended. This gave rise to the hope of separating the two hostile armies, and

giving them battle one after the other. One great advantage was already gained, namely, that the movements of the French army had, for two days, been concealed from the enemy, and that the latter was still in his cantonments. We soon ascertained, that the hussars of the enemy's outposts had no idea of what was passing in our army. It was, however, on the 14th, that General Bourmont, chief of the staff of the fourth corps, with Colonel Clouet of the engineers, and a staff officer, went over to the enemy. They might therefore have reached Namur the same day; but as they came from Metz with the fourth corps, they were ignorant of the intentions and proceedings of the other corps of the French army*. It was calculated, that at break of day on the 15th the first musquets

* On the 15th, when Marshal Ney joined the Emperor, his Majesty said, "Well, Marshal, *your protegé, Bourmont, for whom you vouched so confidently, and whom I appointed only on your solicitation, has gone over to the enemy.*" The Marshal, overwhelmed with confusion, endeavoured to utter some excuses, observing, that M. Bourmont appeared so devoted to his Majesty's interests, that he could have answered for him as for himself: but the Emperor interrupted him by saying, "Come, come, Marshal, THOSE WHO ARE BLUE ARE BLUE, AND THOSE WHO ARE WHITE ARE WHITE."

would be fired against the Prussian outposts: the operations of the French army would therefore be known at the Prussian head quarters at ten o'clock; whilst, at the English head quarters, no information of the events could be received until the close of the day.

The Prussian army, having intimation of the enemy's intentions eight or ten hours before the English, would accordingly be first concentrated. Hopes were even entertained of attacking the Prussians before their four corps were united, or of obliging them to fall back in the direction of Liege and the Rhine, which was the line of their operations; and by thus separating them from the English, to create an opportunity for new operations.

In these calculations, the characters of the enemy's commanders were much to be considered. The hussar habits of Marshal Blucher, his activity and decided character, formed a strong contrast with the cautious disposition, the deliberate and methodical manner of the Duke of Wellington. Thus it was easy to foresee, that the Prussian army would be first concen-

trated, and also that it would evince decision and promptitude in hastening to the aid of its ally. If Blucher had had only two battalions ready to act, he would have employed them in support of the English army; but there was reason to believe, that Wellington, unless his whole army was prepared for action, would not attack the French to assist Blucher. All these considerations rendered it desirable, that the attack should be commenced against the Prussian army; it necessarily followed, that it would be first concentrated, which was in reality the fact.

At break of day on the 15th, the three French columns began to march forward*. The vanguard of the left, formed of a division of the second corps, on quitting the bivouacs, came upon the vanguard of the Prussian corps, commanded by General Ziethen, drove it back, gained possession of the bridge of Marchiennes, and made three hundred prisoners. The rest of the Prussians fled to Charleroi, where the head quarters of this corps were established.

* See Appendix, Order of Movement.

With regard to the centre, General Vandamme had received orders to commence his march at three in the morning. There was no high road from his camp to Charleroi: his columns got into confusion among the cross paths, and instead of reaching Charleroi by nine o'clock, which it was of the utmost importance should have been the case, this corps did not arrive there till one o'clock in the afternoon. Napoleon, at the head of his guard, marched upon that town by another cross road, and entered it at twelve o'clock. General Pajol, with his light cavalry, had arrived there half an hour before, in pursuit of the enemy. The absence of Vandamme's corps for four hours was a serious disappointment.

The right, commanded by General Gerard, encountered bad roads. His advanced guard soon surprised the bridge of Chatelet, but it was not until the evening that the whole of the column arrived. On leaving Charleroi, a road, called the Brussels road, leads to the city of Brussels (which is fourteen leagues from Charleroi), passing through Gosselies, Frasnes, Gen-

nape, and Waterloo. Another road, to the right of the Brussels road, leads through Gilly to Namur, which is eight leagues from Charleroi. General Ziethen, being informed by his hussars of the movement of the French army, hastily evacuated Charleroi, by the Brussels and Namur roads. That part of the Prussian corps, which took the Brussels road, halted at Gosselies; that which took the Namur road halted at Gilly. General Pajol sent forward a regiment of hussars, commanded by General Clary, on the Brussels road, to pursue the Prussian rear guard, whilst, with the other troops of his division, he advanced on the Namur road.

There was skirmishing on both roads when the Emperor arrived. He was informed of General Pajol's arrangements, and supposing that General Clary had not a sufficient force, he sent General Lefebvre Desnouettes, with his division of cavalry and batteries, to support him. He placed Duhesme's division of infantry in order of battle in the rear of Pajol, and detached a regiment of infantry, with two pieces of artillery, to take a position half way be-

tween Charleroi and Gosselies. The Emperor now issued orders for waiting for the remainder of the guard and the third corps. He directed General Reille to hasten as speedily as possible to Marchiennes, to advance to Gosselies, and to attack vigorously any force he might find on the Brussels road. Count d' Erlong received the same instructions. Grouchy soon arrived with all the reserves of cavalry; he was followed by the third corps. The instant that Ziethen perceived this, he evacuted Gilly, which is situated at the intersection of two roads, one of which leads to Namur, and the other to Sombref, where it joins the road from Namur to Nivelles.

General Pajol immediately posted himself in Gilly, having in his front a numerous corps of the enemy.

Meanwhile General Reille, with the second corps, had crossed the Sambre at Marchiennes. He proceeded rapidly along the cross road, in order to cut off the Brussels road near Gosselies. The first corps was to follow the direction of the second. Marshal Ney now arrived on the

field of battle near Napoleon, who instantly ordered him to proceed to Gosselies, and take the command of the whole of the left, which consisted of the first and second corps, the division of light cavalry, and a brigade of Pajol's cavalry. This cavalry was to be replaced at night by General Kellerman's heavy cavalry. Napoleon directed Marshal Ney to attack vigorously whatever force he should come up with on the Brussels road, and to post himself with these corps, which amounted to upwards of forty thousand men, on the other side of Quatre Bras, stationing strong advanced guards on the roads to Brussels and Namur*. The Emperor at the same time dispatched one of his of-

* The Emperor, having given these instructions, added, "*Marshal, you are well acquainted with the position of Quatre Bras?*" "Yes, Sire," replied the Marshal, "how can it be otherwise? Twenty years ago I served in this country; the position of Quatre Bras is the key to all the rest." "*Well,*" said the Emperor, "*rally your two corps, and, if it be necessary, throw up some redoubts: hasten the march of Erlong, and let him recal all the detachments he has left on the bridges on the Sambre; all must be assembled before midnight.*" Ney instantly replied, "Depend on it, in two hours we shall be at Quatre Bras, unless all the enemy's army be there!"

ficers to inform the commanders of corps, that his Majesty had given the command of the whole of the left to Marshal Ney.

When the Marshal arrived at Gosselies, Clary's brigade, supported by the second corps, had already gained possession of that town, and driven out the Prussians, who were retiring upon Fleurus. General Reille dispatched Girard's division of infantry in pursuit of the enemy, and continued his march towards Brussels, in order to establish himself at Quatre Bras. Prince Bernard, of Saxony, commanding a brigade (of five battalions, four thousand men) of the third Belgic division of the Duke of Wellington's army, was cantoned at Gennape: hearing the cannonade at Charleroi, and being informed of the retreat of Ziethen's corps, he marched with his brigade to Frasnes, where he had one of his battalions with a Belgic battery; but the French light cavalry soon routed him from that village, and he retreated and posted himself at Quatre Bras. Our cavalry placed posts in the wood of Bossu, upon a level with that position, and Marshal Ney, hearing the cannonade

between Fleurus and Gilly, ordered Reille's corps to halt between Gosselies and Frasnes*.

As soon as the Emperor learned, that the left was in possession of Gosselies, and was marching on Quatre Bras, he proceeded to Fleurus. The corps of Vandamme and Grouchy were united at Gilly, but those Generals, deceived by false reports, did not march forward, as they supposed, that the whole of the Prussian army was in the woods of Fleurus. The Emperor went in person to reconnoitre the enemy's force, and seeing only a part of Ziethen's corps he gave

* It will naturally be asked, why Ney did not establish himself at Quatre Bras. It would appear, that the recollection of his conduct in 1814, and lastly in March 1815, had occasioned a kind of mental derangement, which manifested itself in all his actions. Though the bravest of men in battle, Marshal Ney frequently committed mistakes in his field dispositions. Being informed by his light cavalry, that the enemy had but a small force at Quatre Bras, he thought it most prudent to stop on a line with the cannonade, which he heard on his right, and dispatched Girard's division, as an advanced guard, to Fleurus. Wishing it however to appear, that he had executed his orders, he reported to his Majesty, that he was occupying Quatre Bras by an advanced guard, and that his main body was close behind.

orders for commencing a vigorous attack upon it; but it instantly retreated. The Emperor, mortified at seeing this corps escape him, ordered his aid de camp, Le Tort, to charge the rear guard at the head of the four squadrons, which composed his escort. They broke through two squares, and destroyed a regiment, but the brave Le Tort, an officer of the greatest merit, fell mortally wounded. The enemy retreated to Fleurus, through the woods of Trichenaye and De Lambusart, in which the corps of Grouchy and Vandamme took a position. The Emperor, after having obtained intelligence from his right wing, returned to Charleroi to receive all his reports.

On the night of the 15th, the respective positions of the three armies were as follow: the French head quarters at Charleroi, the Prussian at Namur, and the English at Brussels.

The left wing of the French army, commanded by Marshal Ney, had its head quarters at Gosselies, and its vanguard at Frasnes; General Reille's corps was stationed between Gosselies and Frasnes,

having one division (Girard's) at Vagnies, in the direction of Fleurus; General d'Erlong's corps was between Marchiennes and Julmet.

The centre, consisting of Vandamme's corps and Grouchy's reserves of cavalry, lined the woods opposite Fleurus.

General Gerard's corps, forming the right wing, had passed the Sambre, and was in front of Chatelet.

The imperial guard was escheloned, between Fleurus and Charleroi. The sixth corps in front of the latter town. Kellerman's corps of cuirassiers, with the great park of artillery, on the left bank of the Sambre, behind Charleroi.

The first corps of the Prussian army was assembled at Fleurus; the other three corps were proceeding to their points of concentration, intending afterwards to march to Sombref and Ligny.

The English army had just received orders to concentrate itself. During all the proceedings of the 15th, the Duke of Wellington had remained tranquilly at Brussels. About seven or eight o'clock in the evening he received a dispatch from

Blucher, informing him, that hostilities had commenced, and that a strong French reconnoissance had sabred some of his advanced posts. But the English General thought proper to wait until the movement should be more decided, and did not give orders for marching till midnight, when a second dispatch from Blucher informed him, whilst at a ball, that the French had taken Charleroi. The Duke then caused the generale to be beaten, and dispatched orders to the different cantonments for immediately assembling the troops. The corps of the Duke of Brunswick, and the division of General Picton, which were at Brussels, were first assembled; and, at break of day, they marched forward on Charleroi.

CHAPTER V.

Battle of Ligny.

On the morning of the 16th, Napoleon directed General Kellerman to proceed with his corps of cuirassiers from Charleroi to Quatre Bras, to reinforce the left under Marshal Ney*. He ordered the Marshal to advance with the whole of the left thus reinforced, which rendered the total amount of his force upwards of forty-five thousand men, and to take a good position on the other side of Quatre Bras, since he had not occupied that place on the preceding day; and in case the Prus-

* LEFT, UNDER MARSHAL NEY.

	Men.	*Cannon.*
Second Corps	23,420	46
First	18,420	46
Cuirassiers	2,700	12
Light Cavalry (Guard)	2,240	12
Total	46,780	116

sian army should, as there was every reason to suppose, be brought to action in the neighbourhood of Fleurus, or Gembloux, to send off a detachment, by the high road from Quatre Bras to Namur, to attack the right flank of the enemy.

Aide de Camp Flahaut was sent to Marshal Ney, to hasten and to follow this movement.

Napoleon marched on Fleurus with the whole of the centre, except the sixth corps (Lobau's), which was left at Charleroi. The right, under the command of General Gerard, quitted Chatelet, and joined the centre at one in the afternoon.

Our troops soon perceived a considerable Prussian corps, stationed on the heights of Bry. The army took a position. Vandamme's corps before Fleurus; Gerard's in the centre; the two corps of light cavalry, of Pajol and Excelmans, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, on the extreme right. The infantry and cavalry of the imperial guard, and all the reserves of artillery, in the second line behind Fleurus. The sixth corps received orders to proceed to the last mentioned village. Na-

poleon, with a very small escort, inspected the whole line of tirailleurs, ascended the heights, and entered the mills. He quickly reconnoitered the Prussian army, of which the left was at Sombref, the centre at Ligny, the right at St. Amand, and the reserves on the heights of Bry; the whole of the front was covered by a deep ravine, which connected the three villages together. This position, though very strong in itself, appeared at first sight somewhat extraordinary; for Quatre Bras was in the rear of the enemy, whose right was thus completely exposed.

The Emperor calculated, that this army might amount to about ninety thousand men*; and that it was, on the one hand,

* PRUSSIAN ARMY.

	Men.
Total	90,000

FRENCH ARMY.

Guard	15,180
Girard's Division	5,160
Third Corps	15,260
Fourth	14,260
Cavalry under Grouchy	8,420
Total	58,280

awaiting the arrival of Bulow's corps, and, on the other, that of the Anglo-Belgic army at Quatre Bras. Both these operations could not take place until the 17th. From the position which Marshal Blucher had just taken, it was evident, that he thought he could deceive the French army, and gain a day and a night, in order to afford time for his reserves to join him, and for the English army to form on his right; which would have placed in line an army of two hundred thousand men. Napoleon resolved immediately to commence the attack; the whole army changed front, the right wing in advance, and the extreme left forming the pivot of the operation. By this movement Vandamme's corps came in front of St. Amand, Gerard's opposite Ligny, and Grouchy's faced Sombref. The guard and cuirassiers of Milhaut were posted in a second line, five hundred paces in front of Fleurus, on the side of St. Amand.

Girard's division (of Reille's corps), which formed the extreme right of the force under Marshal Ney, was now the extreme left of Vandamme's corps.

Thus this division connected the two armies together.

Napoleon had repeatedly sent off orders directing Marshal Ney to attack with the utmost impetuosity all that part of the enemy's force that lay before him. At noon he expressed his dissatisfaction at the Marshal not having yet taken up arms, and being still in his bivouacs: he repeated his orders for attacking vigorously the position of Quatre Bras, where, according to the accounts he had received from Brussels, there were only a few Belgian forces, the English army not being yet assembled, and being at eleven o'clock on the night of the 15th still ignorant of all that was passing. His Majesty again directed, that as soon as Ney should have established his position in front of Quatre Bras, he should follow the orders he had already received, of sending off a detachment by the high road of Namur to attack the rear of the Prussian army, the situation of which the Emperor described. This movement would have occasioned the total ruin of the hostile army. The Emperor was so fully persuaded of this, that he

closed his instructions to Colonel Forbin Janson, whom he dispatched to Marshal Ney, with the words, "*Tell him, that the fate of France is in his hands!*"

Time was precious: it was necessary to act with the greatest promptitude. At three o'clock all the preparations were completed; Vandamme came up with the enemy's right at St. Amand, which Gerard's division was to turn. In a few minutes, Girard attacked the centre at Ligny, whilst Grouchy at the same time drove all the enemy's cavalry beyond the rivulet of Ligny, and forced the left of the Prussians to return to its position of Sombref. Napoleon was by no means satisfied with Vandamme's attack: the success was variable.

General Girard, a brave and skilful officer, performed more than could have been expected with a division consisting only of four thousand men. General Gerard, at the head of the fourth corps, in his attack on Ligny, evinced his wonted skill and bravery. The cannonade and fusillade were maintained along the whole line, and the firing became extremely

warm. The village of Ligny, which is very compact, lies on the other side of the ravine, which at that part is very deep. It was defended with great obstinacy, and was taken and retaken several times: at half past five Gerard was not entirely master of it. The aide de camp Gourgaud, who had followed this attack, came to give a report of it to the Emperor, and to inform him, that, though all the reserves of the fourth corps were engaged, the possession of the village was yet undecided. Napoleon then directed his guards to make several movements, intending himself to lead them on that important point, and to make a decisive attack, having all the cavalry in his rear. The most fortunate results were to be hoped for, when General Vandamme sent to inform the Emperor, that, at the distance of about a league on his left, a column of the enemy, twenty thousand strong, were debouching from the woods and turning us, whilst at the same time it appeared to be marching on Fleurus. The Emperor immediately ordered his guard to halt, and made preparations for receiving this column. The movement seemed in-

explicable: the enemy's corps must have penetrated between the corps of Marshal Ney and those of the Emperor. At half past six Aide de camp Dejean, whom the Emperor had sent to reconnoitre the column, returned, and intimated, that it was the first army-corps, commanded by General d'Erlong. Napoleon was unable to account for this movement.

The mistake being discovered, half an hour was spent in bringing up the reserves, and it was seven o'clock before Napoleon could march on Ligny. The attack took place as it had been planned, but it was retarded two hours by this unfortunate mistake.

Ligny was carried: the enemy beaten at all points; having his centre broken, and his right turned beyond St. Amand by Girard's division, he precipitately abandoned the field of battle, and retreated in various directions. Forty pieces of cannon, six standards, and a vast number of prisoners, fell into our hands. Owing to the darkness of the night, we did not obtain all the advantages which might have been expected from this victory. One

division of the sixth corps fired only a few muskets at the close of the battle. It may, indeed, be said, that this corps was not engaged. Thus the Prussian army, amounting to ninety thousand men (Bulow had not joined it) was beaten in the space of four hours by sixty thousand Frenchmen*.

Our loss amounted to between seven and eight thousand. The brave General Girard that day gloriously closed his career†. The enemy himself estimated his loss at twenty-five thousand. Marshal Blucher was thrown from his horse, and was for some minutes in the power of our cuirassiers. The Prussian army effected its retreat, the first and second corps to Tilly, and the third to Gembloux, where, during the night, it was joined by Bulow's corps (the fourth) which arrived from Liege.

Whilst the centre and right of the

* See Appendix.

† It was General Girard who, when wounded in the body by two balls, at the battle of Lutzen, would not suffer himself to be carried off the field until the close of the action, saying, "Now is the time for all true Frenchmen to conquer or die."

French army were gaining these advantages, some serious faults were committed by the left. Marshal Ney had not occupied the position of Quatre Bras. The Prince of Orange, whose head quarters were at Nivelles, marched at break of day on the 16th to Quatre Bras, and reinforced the brigade of Prince Bernard by another brigade: thus that important position, during a great part of the day, was occupied by only nine thousand men! Marshal Ney, who ought to have taken possession of it on the evening of the 15th, or, at least, at break of day on the 16th, had not, at two o'clock in the afternoon, made any attempt to effect that object. He did not even advance on the position, though he had been repeatedly ordered to do so, until he heard a heavy cannonade in the direction of Ligny. It is impossible to say what fatality prevented him from advancing all the troops under his command, and induced him to leave in the rear the light cavalry of the guard, and the whole of the first corps (d'Erlong's). He advanced with only three divisions of Reille's corps, which, with the cavalry and artillery,

amounted to twenty thousand men, leaving behind him two thousand picked cavalry troops, and the eighteen thousand infantry of the first corps, which shortly afterwards marched to Fleurus*.

The tirailleurs of the Prince of Orange were soon driven back, and the whole division must inevitably have been destroyed had not the Brunswick corps, and half an hour afterwards the English division, commanded by General Picton, who left Brussels that morning, arrived immediately on the field of battle. The enemy's force now amounted to more than thirty thousand men; but he had very little cavalry and artillery, the latter being unable to follow the rapid movements of the infantry, who, in coming from Brussels, had marched nine leagues. Meanwhile Marshal Ney, by his own intrepidity and the ardour of his troops, continued to gain

* FRENCH FORCE ENGAGED AT QUATRE BRAS.

Second Corps (without Girard's Division)	18,260
Cavalry of the first Corps	1,620
Cuirassiers	2,840
Total	22,720

ground, and repulsed an enemy superior in numbers. The Duke of Brunswick was killed; the cuirassiers, by repeated charges, penetrated the square of the forty-second Highland regiment, took its colours, and killed its colonel. The victory seemed to be decided in favour of the French, when the arrival of Cook's and Alten's divisions, about four in the afternoon, turned the scale in favour of the enemy. This reinforcement of eighteen thousand men increased the Duke of Wellington's force to fifty thousand, enabled him to maintain his position, and compelled the French army to fight only for the sake of preserving its own.

The French in this action lost about four thousand men: the enemy's loss amounted to double that number, as his numerous masses were exposed to the firing of all our artillery, without being able to answer it*.

No officer could have fought with more courage and ardour than Marshal Ney, with the small number of troops under his

* See Appendix.

command. Had he employed the cavalry of the guard, and the whole of d'Erlong's corps, which, from the preceding day, he ought to have kept in readiness for acting, that portion of the English army would have been completely destroyed and driven beyond the Dyle. By the great loss which Marshal Ney occasioned to the enemy with twenty-two thousand men, some idea may be formed of what he would have done with forty-five thousand.

During the night, the English artillery and cavalry, together with the other divisions, successively arrived. But on the morning of the 17th, the Duke of Wellington being informed of the loss of the battle of Ligny, and the retreat of Blucher, found it necessary to abandon Quatre Bras, leaving in that position his cavalry, and three or four batteries of horse artillery, to retard as long as possible the advance of the French army.

Marshal Ney committed the error of remaining too long at Marchiennes on the 15th, and not encamping before Quatre Bras. In his justification he alleged, that seeing Fleurus occupied in force by the

enemy, and understanding that the whole of the Prussian army was there, he feared that by marching to Quatre Bras he should find himself outflanked on his right. For a similar reason he did not, on the following day, the 16th, execute the instructions he had received by proceeding at break of day to Quatre Bras, which was then occupied only by light troops, and afterwards, from noon till the arrival of the English divisions at four o'clock, by a Dutch division. Thus the occupation of that important position, an operation to the performance of which no obstacle presented itself from day-break till noon, and which might have been effected without much difficulty from noon till four o'clock, became totally impracticable after that time. If Marshal Ney had established himself at Quatre Bras, at ten in the morning, the great road of Nivelles would have been cut off, and all the English troops stationed in the environs of Nivelles must have been obliged to concentrate at Gennape. It would have been impossible for the Duke of Wellington to have attacked an army in position when he had neither artillery nor

cavalry, and his troops were harrassed by arriving successively. On the 16th, therefore, his grand object would have been to assemble his troops in some position in the rear of Gennape, in order to be prepared for acting on the 17th; and then Marshal Ney, by dispatching the first corps by the road of Quatre Bras to Marbois and Sombref, only two leagues distant, would have occasioned the total destruction of the Prussian army.

It is difficult to account for the movement of the first corps. An error was committed by suffering it to remain, during the night of the 15th, escheloned between Marchiennes and Julmet. It afterwards advanced on Fleurus, by the road from Charleroi to Brussels. Did Marshal Ney misunderstand the instructions he had received, and by which he was directed, as soon as he should be in possession of Quatre Bras, to make a diversion in the rear of the Prussian army? Or did Count d'Erlong, on arriving between Gosselies and Frasnes, and hearing a heavy cannonade on his right, whilst all was tranquil in the direction of Quatre Bras, consider it his duty to proceed towards the can-

nonade, which he would have left behind him had he continued his march along the high road? Another false movement of that corps took place on the evening of the 16th, when Count d' Erlong, being informed that the village of St. Amand was carried, he made a second flank march to return to Marshal Ney, whom however he did not join till nine in the evening. Thus this whole army-corps was nowhere effective.

In these actions, the French soldiers fought with as much courage and confidence in victory as they ever displayed in their most celebrated battles; but several of the Generals, and even Marshal Ney himself, were no longer the same men. They had lost that energy and that spirit of brilliant enterprise, which once distinguished them, and which had so materially contributed to the achievement of great triumphs. They had become timid and circumspect in all their operations; their personal bravery alone remained. The question with them now was, who should least compromise himself. Thus, on the 15th, General Vandamme arrived at Charleroi four hours later than he ought:

thus he stopped with Marshal Grouchy at Gilly, and lost time instead of making a brisk attack and advancing on Fleurus. The two divisions, already separated, appeared to be the whole of Blucher's army; but it was not, as has already been stated, until after Napoleon arrived at this point, and ascertained that the enemy was in small force, that an attack was made. The Emperor could not quit the interesting point of the Brussels and Namur roads until the second corps had arrived, by the way of Marchiennes, on the Brussels road, and had taken possession of Gosselies in order to secure the possession of Charleroi; and thus a loss of two hours took place. These faults afforded the enemy the opportunity of occupying Fleurus during the night, and this circumstance deterred Marshal Ney from advancing on Quatre Bras; a movement which in other times he would not have hesitated to make, after leaving a strong reserve in his rear. On the 16th at noon, when the army had taken a position in front of Fleurus, and the Prussian army was descried, nearly all the Generals were persuaded, that Wellington

and Blucher had formed a junction. As a proof of their opinion they referred to the position Blucher had taken, with his right in the direction of Marchiennes, leaving Quatre Bras considerably in his rear. This they observed rendered the position of the Prussian army most hazardous, unless the English army were in eschelon behind that line. Napoleon put an end to the discussion, by ordering the troops to advance, observing, at the same time, that there were no enemies except those then in sight, and that the position, which Blucher had taken, was a fault resulting from the character of that Marshal, and the hope he entertained of being joined, during the night, by his reserves and the English army.

That there were scattered through the different regiments of the French army some officers and soldiers, who took a pleasure in exaggerating the enemies' force, and reporting every moment, that we were turned, &c., cannot be doubted. It has already been mentioned, that, on the 14th, General Bourmont went over to the enemy with a colonel of engineers;

and several officers deserted during the battle of the 16th. In the heat of the action Napoleon received five or six alarming reports. One was from a General, announcing, that Vandamme, and the whole of his staff, had joined the enemy; another stated, that Marshal Soult was to be guarded against, for that he had given false orders for the movements. A quarter master of dragoons, with looks of complete despair, and exclaiming that he wanted to speak to the Emperor, approached him and said, "Sire, I come to inform your Majesty, that General Henain is at this moment haranguing the officers of his division to induce them to desert to the enemy." "How do you know that?" said Napoleon. "Where is he? Did you hear him?" And he learned, that the quarter master had neither seen nor heard General Henain, but that an officer had told him to make this report. The whole of these stories were false. Vandamme might, perhaps, have acted with more vigour, but he was far from having any idea of treachery. Henain, at the moment he was thus accused, had his thigh carried away by a bullet.

Such, however, was the state of the soldiers' minds, that they placed no confidence in any one except Napoleon. They were every moment ready to believe themselves betrayed. Several good officers, who had served in the troops of the King's household, had been appointed to regiments now in the field. Perhaps this was a wrong measure. Their conduct was irreproachable, but they were always objects of suspicion with the soldiers.

CHAPTER VI.

Battle of Waterloo.

It was eleven o'clock at night before the Emperor returned to Fleurus, where his head quarters were established. He received the report of what had taken place on the left during the attack of Quatre Bras, and immediately dispatched orders to Marshal Ney to have his troops under arms at break of day, and to pursue the English army vigorously, as soon as it should commence its retreat.

The Emperor informed the Marshal, that he intended to debouche on the position of Quatre Bras, by the highway of Namur, and that, in case the Duke of Wellington should continue to occupy that position, his army would thus be attacked in front and turned on its left flank.

At break of day, on the 17th, General Pajol, with his light cavalry, and a division

of infantry of the sixth corps, set out in pursuit of the Prussians: he made a great number of prisoners, and took a considerable quantity of caissons and baggage. The Emperor sent off reconnoissances to Quatre Bras to communicate with the left. He likewise reviewed the troops which had been engaged. Vandamme's corps had suffered but little: Gérard's had sustained greater loss, having been more warmly engaged. The imperial guard had only a few killed and wounded. The sixth corps had not lost a single man*. The Emperor next visited the field of battle, and ordered the wounded French and Prussian troops to be removed. The latter had

* LOSS SUSTAINED AT THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.

Third Corps:	
Three Divisions	1,800
Girard's Division	2,000
Fourth Corps:	
Three Divisions	2,000
Corps of Pajol's Cavalry	250
Corps of Excelman's	250
Milhaut's Cuirassiers	100
Cavalry of the Third and Fourth Corps	300
Guard	100
Total	6,800

sustained an enormous loss: there were among the killed five times as many Prussians as French troops. Even according to the reports of their own Generals, their loss amounted to twenty-five thousand men, a circumstance which is easily accounted for, when it is considered, that the Prussian masses, during the whole of the action, occupied the elevated plain between Ligny, St. Amand, and the mill of Bry, where they were absolutely unprotected, and exposed to all the firing of our artillery. And the reserve masses, being within the range of the attacks, not one of the French bullets was fired without effect; whilst, on the contrary, the French were constantly beyond the reach of the enemy's cannon. Even the reserves of the attacks could withdraw into hollows, where they were protected from the enemy's artillery.

About ten o'clock, the officer commanding the reconnoissance, which had been sent to Quatre Bras, returned and stated, that, instead of meeting with Marshal Ney's troops, he had found the English in that position, and that he had even been pursued by them. Not a moment was to be

lost. The Emperor immediately directed Count Lobau, with two divisions of his corps, and his cavalry, augmented by a division of Pajol's cavalry, to advance to that point by the high way, and by Marbois. He himself followed up this movement with the whole of his guard, and General Milhaut's corps of cuirassiers, leaving in reserve, as well as to guard Fleurus, and to carry off the wounded, General Girard's division (of the second corps), which had suffered considerably on the preceding day. He ordered Marshal Grouchy, with the third and fourth army-corps, the infantry division of the sixth, which was was with Pajol's cavalry, and General Excelman's corps of light cavalry, vigorously to pursue the Prussians, to attack their rear guard, and to keep constantly so close upon them, as never to lose sight of them. Marshal Grouchy's instructions were, in particular, to outflank the right wing of the Prussians, so that he might constantly maintain communications with the rest of the army.

The French army thus advanced on Brussels in two separate columns. The

left, commanded by the Emperor, was to take the road from Charleroi to Brussels, at Quatre Bras, and when united to Marshal Ney's corps would be sixty-six thousand strong, with two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, having in its front all the Anglo-Belgic army. The right, which was thirty-six thousand strong, with one hundred and ten pieces of artillery, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, was to pass the Dyle at Wavres, having before it the whole of the Prussian army in retreat*.

About eleven o'clock the couriers of the sixth corps having fallen in with the English cavalry, that corps took a position on the other side of Marbois. The Emperor proceeded thither immediately. An English suttling-woman, who had been taken by our hussars, communicated some particulars respecting the army of the Duke of Wellington, who, she said, had recrossed

* LEFT COLUMN, UNDER THE EMPEROR.

	Men.	*Cannon.*
Advancing on Waterloo	66,000	250

RIGHT COLUMN, UNDER GROUCHY.

	Men.	*Cannon.*
Advancing on Wavres.....	36,000	110

the Dyle. She stated, that the position of Quatre Bras was still occupied by a considerable corps of English cavalry, with artillery. This woman had no knowledge of the movements of Marshal Ney's corps; she supposed it had recrossed the Sambre. Our tirailleurs soon engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters. A firing of musketry was likewise kept up on our left flank: this appeared somewhat singular; but it was soon discovered, that our hussars had by mistake engaged with those of Marshal Ney. The French troops continued to march forward: the corps of English cavalry immediately began to retreat on perceiving, from the height of Quatre Bras, that the whole of the Namur road was covered with troops. The Emperor arrived at Quatre Bras at full gallop: the rain was falling in torrents: he instantly gave orders for placing in battery twelve pieces of horse artillery to cannonade the enemy's rear guard.

The Emperor was greatly astonished to find, that Marshal Ney's corps was still bivouacking before Frasnes. Irritated at this delay, he instantly ordered the troops to march forward and join him. He had

to wait upwards of an hour for them. At length Count d'Erlong's corps defiled at Quatre Bras. The sixth corps, which had just arrived by the high road of Namur, halted, and the first formed the advanced guard, supported by the horse artillery of the guard, and the cavalry of the sixth corps. Marshal Ney appeared — The Emperor expressed great surprise at his orders having been neglected. Ney endeavoured to exculpate himself, observing, that he had supposed the Anglo-Belgic army to have been still at Quatre Bras, appuyed on its left by the whole of the Prussian army; and that false reports had represented the enemy to have been victorious at Ligny. The second corps followed the first: next came the sixth; and afterwards the guard. General Milhaut's corps of cuirassiers flanked the road. The Emperor placed himself at the head of the troops. In the morning, his design had been to sleep at Brussels, or in the forest of Soignes; and in case the Anglo-Belgic army should be in position behind the Dyle, to attack it that very day. The unaccountable delay of Marshal Ney had

already occasioned a loss of several hours; however, the Emperor did not despair of coming up with the enemy's force: he marched forward with the brigade of advance guard, and the enemy was closely pursued sword in hand. Twenty-four pieces of horse artillery incessantly poured grape shot on the masses of the enemy's cavalry, driving them from one position to another: they sustained considerable loss. At half past six in the evening the advance guard arrived at the village of Planchenoit, opposite the entrance to the forest of Soignes; it was soon opposed by the fire of fifteen or twenty pieces of cannon; and from the manner in which these cannon were placed, there was reason to suppose, that a strong rear guard had been stationed there to protect the passage to the forest. Had this rear guard amounted to no more than fifteen thousand men, it would have been impossible to force it from its position that evening, as night would have set in before we could have completed our preparations for the attack. The rain still continued, and it was impossible to distinguish the enemy's line.

We endeavoured to impose on him by making Milhaut's cuirassiers with the horse artillery deploy. The enemy then unmasked himself, and there was no longer a doubt that the whole of the English army was there in position. The Emperor directed the different corps to establish their bivouacks, and fixed his head quarters at the farm of the Caillou.

The French army, sixty-seven thousand strong, was stationed in front of Planchenoit, on the road to Brussels, four leagues and a half from the latter city, facing the Anglo-Belgic army, whose head quarters were at Waterloo. Marshal Grouchy, with a corps of between thirty-five and forty thousand men, was on the right. He had marched on the 17th in the direction of Wavres, and he was supposed to have been encamped opposite that city, having before him the Prussian army in retreat.

The following Tables exhibit the composition and amount of the armies under the Emperor and Marshal Grouchy previously to the battle of Waterloo:—

THE EMPEROR'S ARMY BEFORE PLANCHENOIT,

Diminished by previous Losses.

	Infantry.	*Cavalry.*	*Artillery.*	
			Men.	Cannon.
First Corps (d'Erlong):				
Four Divisions, Infantry	16,220			
One Division, Cavalry...	.....	1,400		
Artillery	.....	.....	900	46
Second Corps (Reille):				
Three Divisions, Infantry	12,640			
One Division, Cavalry...	.....	1,300		
Artillery	.....	.....	710	38
Third Corps:				
One Division (Domont) attached to the Sixth Corps.....	.....	1,370		
Sixth Corps (Lobau):				
Two Divisions, Infantry	7,000			
Artillery	.....	.....	610	30
Imperial Guard:				
Young Guard (Duhesme)	3,800			
Middle Guard	4,200			
Old Guard.....	4,400			
Light Cavalry	.....	2,100		
Cavalry (Grenadiers and Dragoons)	.....	2,000		
Artillery	.....	.....	1,920	96
Kellerman's Cuirassiers:				
Two Divisions	.....	2,330		
Artillery	.....	.....	220	12
Milhaut's Cuirassiers:				
Two Divisions	.....	2,530		
Artillery	.....	.....	210	12
Pajol's Corps:				
One Divis^{n} (Subervick's)	.....	1,130		
Artillery	.....	.....	110	6
Total.....	48,260	14,160	4,680	240

	Men.	*Cannon.*
General Total, under the Emperor.....	67,100	240

MARSHAL GROUCHY'S ARMY,

Advancing on Wavres, on the 17th; diminished by previous Losses.

	Infantry.	*Cavalry.*	*Artillery.*	
			Men.	Cannon.
SECOND CORPS:				
One Division (Girard)..	3,060			
Artillery	.....	.....	160	8
THIRD CORPS (VANDAMME):				
Three Divisions, Infantry	11,336			
Artillery	.....	.....	660	38
FOURTH CORPS (GERARD):				
Three Divisions, Infantry	10,130			
One Division, Cavalry...	.....	1,330		
Artillery	.....	.....	610	38
SIXTH CORPS:				
One Division (Teste)...	4,000			
Artillery	.....	.....	160	8
PAJOL'S CORPS:				
One Division (Soult) ...	.....	1,150		
Artillery	.....	.....	100	6
EXCELMANS' CORPS:				
Two Divisions, Cavalry		2,390		
Artillery	.....	.....	200	12
Total	28,520	4,870	1,830	110

	Men.	*Cannon.*
General Total, under Marshal Grouchy...	35,220	110

GENERAL RECAPITULATION.

	Men.	*Cannon.*
Army with the Emperor	67,100	240
Army with Marshal Grouchy.....	35,220	110
Losses on the 16th, at Ligny	6,800	
Losses on the 16th, at Quatre Bras.....	4,140	
Amount of the French army, when it crossed the Sambre, on the 15th ...	113,260	350

At ten o'clock at night the Emperor dispatched an officer to Marshal Grouchy, to acquaint him, that he intended to fight a great battle on the following day: that the Anglo-Belgic army was in position before the forest of Soignes, with its left appuyed on the village of La Haye: that Marshal Blucher would doubtless move in one of the three following directions; first, retreat on Liege; secondly, fall back on Brussels; or, thirdly, remain in position at Wavres: that at all events it was necessary for Marshal Grouchy to manœuvre by St. Lambert, to outflank the left of the English army, and to join the French army on the right; but that in the two first cases the Marshal was to execute this movement with the majority of his combined forces, and that in the third case it was only to be performed with a detachment more or less strong, according to the nature of the position which he might occupy in front of the Prussian army. At two in the morning a dispatch from Marshal Grouchy announced, that he had fixed his head quarters at Gembloux, being ig-

norant of the course which Blucher had taken, and likewise whether the Prussians had proceeded to Brussels or Liege: that, consequently, he had stationed two advance guards, one between Gembloux and Wavres, and the other about a league from Gembloux, in the direction of Liege. Thus Blucher had escaped him; and Grouchy had advanced only two leagues in the course of the 17th. The Emperor immediately sent him a duplicate of the order which he had dispatched at ten o'clock on the preceding night, directing him to be under arms before break of day, and to pass the Dyle above Wavres, in order to proceed to St. Lambert. The officer who was the bearer of this dispatch departed before three in the morning: it was calculated, that he would reach Gembloux before six o'clock, as he had only five leagues to ride, and that without ever quitting the high road. At five in the morning a second dispatch from the Marshal was received at head quarters: he stated, that having at length learned that the enemy had proceeded to Wavres, he intended to depart at break of day to

pursue him in that direction. This letter was dated two o'clock in the morning. The road from Gembloux to Wavres, and from Gembloux to St. Lambert, was the same for the space of two leagues: there was therefore reason to hope, that the officer would overtake Marshal Grouchy, and that the latter, instead of reaching St. Lambert at noon, might arrive there at ten in the morning: and if, in consequence of the departure of the Marshal, the officer should not find him, it was still certain that he would arrive before Wavres at noon, and that he would have received the first order, which had been written at ten o'clock on the preceding night, and which informed him of the intended battle.

On the morning of the 18th the weather was extremely cloudy; it had rained throughout the whole of the night, and even at day-break the rain had not abated. The reports of the night, and the observations which were made, removed all doubt respecting the presence of the Anglo-Belgic army. Its force amounted to between eighty-five and ninety thousand men, and two hundred and fifty pieces of

artillery*. The French army, having only sixty-seven or sixty-eight thousand men, was of course inferior in numbers, though it was superior with regard to the quality of its troops. The Belgic and German soldiers could not be placed on an equality with the French; among the latter were the imperial guard and the four divisions of cuirassiers. The French artillery, including the reserve batteries of the guard, was nearly as numerous as the enemy's artillery; it amounted to two hundred and forty pieces of cannon. Victory appeared far from doubtful, and with that victory there was every reason to hope for the destruction of the English army, owing to the position it had assumed. At break of day, the Emperor, whilst at breakfast, observed, "We have eighty chances out of a hundred in our favour." At that moment Marshal Ney, who had come to inspect the line, presented himself: "*Na*

* ANGLO-BELGIC AND FRENCH ARMIES AT WATERLOO.

	Men.	*Cannon.*
Anglo-Belgic Army.....	85,000	250
French Army	67,000	240

doubt, Sire," said the Marshal, *" if Wellington had been simple enough to remain there; but I come to inform you, that they are actually retreating, and that, if you are not speedy in attacking them, they will escape us."* The Emperor did not attach much importance to this report: he thought it evident, that since the Duke of Wellington had not attempted his retreat before daybreak, he had determined to encounter the risk of a battle. About eight o'clock the weather began to brighten up: the Emperor reconnoitered the enemy's line: he was of opinion, that the troops might manœuvre in the surrounding grounds. He dispatched orders for the battle to the different commanders of the army-corps: all was now in motion.

The English army had, in its rear, the forest of Soignes, and only one high road for its communication with Brussels; this position rendered its retreat extremely difficult. It occupied a fine level height. Its right was appuyed on a ravine, on the other side of the Nivelles road, and extended as far as Braine-la-Leud: its left crowned the heights of La

Haie, and its centre, occupying on the left the farm of La Haie Sainte, and on the right that of Hougoumont, was in front of the village of Mont St. Jean, at the junction of the two roads leading to Nivelles and Charleroi, which this line cut. It was ascertained, that the enemy had raised no redoubts, or works of any other kind, and that there were few or no natural obstacles in his front. The height was slightly concave in the centre, and the ground, descending with a gentle declivity, terminated by a ravine of no great depth, which separated the two armies.

The French army was ranged in the following order. General Reille, with the second corps, his right on the road from Charleroi to Brussels, his left on the Nivelles road, having in his front the wood of Hougoumont, and his light cavalry stationed on the other side of the high road. General d'Erlong, with his left on the Charleroi road, and his right on a line with the left of the English, facing the village of La Haie; his light cavalry on his right, sending out parties on the Dyle. Géneral Kellerman's corps of cuirassiers, in second line,

behind the second corps: General Milhaut's behind the first corps. The sixth corps was Count de Lobau's, formed in close column on the right of the Charleroi road: by this means it was in reserve behind the left of the first corps, and in potence behind the centre of the first line. The imperial guard, in third line, formed a general reserve, having the infantry in the centre, General Lefebvre Desnouttes' division of cavalry on the right, and the division of horse grenadiers and dragoons on the left.

These arrangements sufficiently indicated the Emperor's design, which was to penetrate the centre of the English army, to force it back on the high road, and, on reaching the outlet of the forest, to cut off its retreat on the right and left of the line. The success of this attack would have rendered all retreat impracticable, and must have occasioned the destruction of the English army: at all events, it would have separated it from the Prussian force.

About eleven o'clock, General Reille commenced a cannonade to drive the enemy from the wood of Hougoumont.

The engagement soon became warm on that point. Prince Jerome with his division took possession of the wood: he was driven out; but a new attack once more rendered him master of it. The enemy had, however, kept possession of the large house in the centre of the wood. Battlements had been formed on it, which rendered it a post of tolerable strength, and at the same time secured it against a coup de main. The Emperor ordered General Reille to establish a battery of howitzers, and to set fire to the house. It was observed with satisfaction, that the best English troops were on that point; among the rest, General Cooke's division of the guards. At this moment a corps of five or six thousand troops, of various descriptions, was perceived in the distance, on the side of St. Lambert. This was at first supposed to be Marshal Grouchy's corps; but in a quarter of an hour after a party of hussars took prisoner a Prussian orderly officer with a dispatch, which proved that the troops which had been observed, were the advance guard of Bulow's corps. The Major General (Soult)

dispatched an officer to Marshal Grouchy to inform him of this circumstance; he even sent him the intercepted dispatch. The staff officer, who was fully sensible of the importance of his mission, was expected to reach the Marshal in less than two hours. Great advantages were anticipated from the Marshal's coming upon the rear of Bulow's corps. But, as that corps appeared to be not more than two short leagues from the field of battle, it became necessary to send off a force to oppose it. Marshal Grouchy might delay passing the Dyle, or might be prevented by unforeseen obstacles. Lieutenant General Domont was therefore sent forward with his light cavalry, and Subervick's division of Pajol's corps of cavalry, making altogether a force of nearly three thousand cavalry, to meet Bulow's advance guard; his instructions were to occupy all the passes, to prevent the enemy's hussars from attacking our flanks, and to send off couriers to meet Marshal Grouchy. Count de Lobau, with both divisions of his corps (seven thousand men), proceeded to reconnoitre his field of battle, in the rear of

General Domont's cavalry, so that, in case General Bulow's movement should not be stopped by Marshal Grouchy, he might advance against the Prussians, and protect our flanks. Thus the destination of this corps was changed.

The Emperor, having adopted every precaution for opposing Bulow's corps, directed Marshal Ney to commence the intended attack with the first corps, reinforced by batteries of reserve, and to take possession of La Haie Sainte, on the Charleroi road, which was the point of appuy for the enemy's centre. Attacked in his centre, the enemy would be induced to make counter movements on his wings, which would clearly explain the state of the battle, to deploy all his forces, and expose all his plans. A battle, like a drama, has a beginning, a middle, and a denouement. The beginning occasions counter movements on the part of the enemy, and gives rise to incidents, which must be surmounted, and which have an influence on the last movement by which the battle is decided.

The French troops were full of enthu-

siasm; the Emperor inspected the whole line, and such were the acclamations of joy, that they interrupted the manœuvres, and prevented the orders from being heard. The Emperor stationed himself on an eminence near the farm of La Belle Alliance, from whence he could command a view of every thing; the enemy's wings as well as those of the French army. He was therefore in a situation to form a judgment on all the movements, which the enemy might make on finding his centre threatened; and his Majesty had at hand all the reserves, in order that he might dispose of them with the utmost rapidity, or place himself at their head, and remedy any unexpected manœuvres on the part of the enemy.

It was noon, when eighty pieces of artillery commenced their fire. In about half an hour the enemy's batteries, which were opposed to us, fell back, and were reinforced by new batteries from different points of their line. All the enemy's sharpshooters withdrew from the bottom of the curtain. The enemy stationed his masses behind the crests of heights to pro-

tect them, and to diminish the loss occasioned by our artillery. Our infantry advanced. Some movement was now observed on the Brussels road; all the carriages and baggage waggons of the right and left, which were at a distance from the road, hurried in disorder into it, on the approach of the fire, with the view of reaching Brussels. The enemy's line however made no manœuvre; it maintained its immobility. His cavalry made several successful charges on the flank of one of the columns of the first corps, and about fifteen of our pieces of artillery, which were advancing, were driven back into a hollow road. One of Milhaut's brigades of cuirassiers advanced against this cavalry, and the field of battle was soon covered with their slain. When the Emperor perceived, that the enemy did not attempt to make any great movement on his right, and that some disorder prevailed on ours, he proceeded thither at full gallop. Milhaut's cuirassiers, and behind them in second line the cavalry of the guard, presented a formidable appearance. The Emperor soon restored order: the cannonade was main-

tained with fury, and a new attack on La Haie Sainte rendered us masters of that important point.

The enemy attached great importance to the post of Hougoumont on his right: he sent off fresh troops to reinforce the brigade of the guards. On the other hand, General Reille supported the attack of Jerome's division, by Foi's division. The howitzers had set fire to the house, and almost entirely destroyed it. Three fourths of the woods and orchards were in our possession. The field of battle was strewed with the English guards, the flower of the enemy's army. It was half past four o'clock, and the most vigorous fire was still kept up on every side. At this moment General Domont informed his Majesty, that he observed Bulow's corps in movement, and that a division of from eight to ten thousand Prussians was debouching from the woods of Frischenois: that no tidings had been received of Marshal Grouchy: and that the reconnoissances, which had been sent in the directions in which it was supposed he might be moving, had not met one of his couriers.

Count Lobau's corps* advanced in three columns to the positions which he had reconnoitred. By this movement this corps changed its front, and placed itself in potence on the extremity of our right. The first Prussian brigade, being vigorously attacked, was soon routed: but it was immediately supported by the second brigade, and in half an hour after the whole remains of Bulow's corps arrived and formed, constantly extending itself beyond the right of Count Lobau's corps; so that, though Bulow did not gain ground upon the latter, he still maintained his fire on our rear. The sixth corps was drawn up in order of battle, parallel with the road opposite to, and at gunshot distance from, La Belle Alliance. The Prussian bullets reached this road, which was used for all the movements of our army, and even extended to the point where the Emperor had stationed himself.

Napoleon, observing that the Prussians

* At half past four, Lobau's corps of seven thousand men advanced against the Prussians, which reduced the force opposed to the Anglo-Belgic army to sixty thousand men.

continued to outflank the right of the sixth corps, sent General Duhesme's division of the young guard, with two batteries, to that point. Thus our line was prolonged till it came even with the front troops of Bulow's left. At the same time a division of the first corps, which formed our right, and which was in reserve, advanced rapidly on the extreme left of the Anglo-Belgic line, took the village of La Haie, and thus cut off the communication between the Anglo-Belgic army and the fourth Prussian corps. We every moment hoped for, and impatiently awaited the arrival of Marshal Grouchy on the rear of this corps, which would then have been cut off from all means of retreat. It was six o'clock, and no account of the Marshal had yet been received. However, all our dispositions were attended with the greatest success. The impetuosity of the young guard had occasioned great loss to the enemy; and the capture of the village of La Haie, which turned Bulow's right, stopped his progress, and he ceased to act on the offensive: nothing more was to be feared from him. As soon as the Empe-

ror had perceived that Bulow's attack was actively proceeding, and that though it was nearly four o'clock this corps was not stopped by Marshal Grouchy, he ordered Marshal Ney to establish himself at La Haie Sainte, to fortify it and to station several battalions there; but to make no movement till he saw the issue of the manœuvres of the Prussians. Half an hour after, about five o'clock, at the moment when the Prussians were attacking us with the greatest vigour, the English attempted to retake La Haie Sainte. They were vigorously repulsed by the fire of our infantry, and by a charge of cavalry; but Marshal Ney, borne away by excess of ardour, lost sight of the orders he had received; he debouched on the level height, which was immediately crowned by two divisions of Milhaut's cuirassiers, and the light cavalry of the guard. The officers, who surrounded the Emperor, observing this movement, the success of the charges, the retreat of many of the English squares, and the cessation of the fire of part of the enemy's batteries, shouted victory, and made every demonstration of joy. The

Emperor did not share in this exultation: he observed to Marshal Soult, "*This is a premature movement, which may be attended by fatal consequences.*" Soult expressed himself with considerable warmth respecting Ney, and said, "*He is compromising us, as he did at Jena.*" The Emperor directed Kellerman's cuirassiers to support our cavalry on the height, lest it should be repulsed by the enemy's cavalry, which, in the present state of affairs, would have occasioned the loss of the battle: for it was one of those critical moments in which a very trivial incident may give rise to the most important result. This movement of the cavalry, who galloped forward exclaiming *Vive l'Empereur!* overawed the enemy, encouraged our troops, and prevented them from being alarmed by the Prussians continuing their fire on our rear.

About six o'clock we found that the Prussians had engaged their whole force: they ceased to act on the offensive, and their fire became stationary. Half an hour after they began to fall back, and our troops advanced. The balls of the Prussians no longer reached the high road, nor

even the first position which the troops of Duhesme and Count de Lobau had occupied: these troops had now advanced. The extreme left of the Prussians wheeled round on the rear, and proceeded to replace itself in line with the first brigade. Our cavalry maintained its station on the height, notwithstanding the fire to which it was exposed. They penetrated many of the enemy's squares, took three standards, and destroyed a great number of batteries, the guns of which, without their trains, fell into our hands. Consternation and stupor prevailed throughout the enemy's line: the fugitives had already reached Brussels: to retreat in good order was impossible; and their whole army seemed threatened with destruction. During the last half hour the situation of the French army had completely changed: the enemy was not threatening us on any point: we were masters of a part of his field of battle, and in an offensive position on his centre. We had gained the advantage, not only over the Anglo-Belgic army, of eighty-five thousand men, but likewise over Bulow's

corps of thirty thousand Prussians. Still no account had been received of Grouchy. Thus, between sixty-five and sixty-eight thousand French troops had beaten one hundred and fifteen thousand English, Belgians, Prussians, &c. At half past seven, Marshal Grouchy's cannonade was at length heard: he was supposed to be at the distance of about two leagues and a half on our right. The Emperor was of opinion, that this was the moment for making a decisive attack, and determining the fate of the day. For this purpose he ordered back several battalions and batteries of the guard, which had been dispatched towards Planchenoit. At this moment the enemy's army received intimation of the arrival of Marshal Blucher, with the first Prussian corps, which had left Wavres in the morning, and was coming by the way of Ohain to join the left of the Anglo-Belgic army. This was not the only reinforcement the enemy received; two brigades of English cavalry, amounting to six regiments, which had been placed in reserve on the Ohain road, and which were now rendered disposable

by the arrival of the Prussian troops, were observed to enter the line. These events revived the spirits of the Anglo-Belgic army; it gained courage, and resumed its position.

At this critical moment, three battalions of infantry of the second line of our right fell back in good order upon the imperial guard, which the Emperor had just been collecting. This movement, for which it is impossible to assign a cause, weakened our line. The Emperor hastened to inquire the reason of it: the men replied, that they had not been forced, but that that retrograde movement had been ordered. The Emperor addressed them, and they returned to their post.

The cavalry, which from the height on which it was stationed commanded a full view of the field of battle in front, on its right, and in its rear, observed this retrograde movement of the three battalions: they also perceived Blucher's first corps, which had just advanced on a line with the village of La Haie, and the two fresh brigades of cavalry, which were preparing for a charge: they imagined they

were about to be cut off, and several regiments fell back.

The Emperor was then forming his guard into columns, for the projected attack; but observing the hesitation of the cavalry, he concluded, that they had been overcome by circumstances, and that, without waiting until all the columns should be formed, it would be necessary immediately to support the cavalry, and to make some movement to rally the spirits of the troops, and to stop the inclination which they manifested to retreat. He marched with the four first battalions to the left of La Haie Sainte, and directed General Reille to concentrate the whole of his corps on his extreme left, and to form it into attacking columns. When the Emperor arrived at La Haie Sainte he found a part of Ney's troops retreating: he sent his aide de camp Labedoyère to inform them, with a view to restore their courage, that Marshal Grouchy's corps was approaching. At the same time he consigned to Marshal Ney the four battalions of the guard which he then had under his own direction, ordering the Marshal to march

forward and maintain the position of the height. This produced the desired effect; the troops halted, and returned to their former position. A quarter of an hour after, the other eight battalions arrived on the brink of the ravine: the Emperor formed them in the following order: one battalion in order of battle, having two in close column on its flanks, a formation which united the advantages of the narrow and the deep order. Two of these brigades thus ranged, and marching at battalion distance, formed a first line, behind which the third brigade was posted in reserve. The batteries were stationed in the intervals. General Reille, on his part, concentrated the whole of his corps in the vicinity of Hougoumont, crossed the ravine, and attacked the enemy's position.

Meanwhile the four battalions of the middle guard were engaged with the enemy; they repulsed all before them, and stood undaunted under the fire of a considerable portion of the enemy's line. General Friant, commander of the infantry of the guard, having received a wound in the hand, came to tell the Emperor, that every

thing was going well on the height, and that upon the arrival of the old guard we should be masters of the whole field of battle.

Between half past seven and eight o'clock, a cry of alarm was heard on our right. Blucher, with the whole of Zeithen's corps, had attacked the village of La Haie, which was instantly carried. A general feeling of astonishment pervaded the whole right: we were thus cut off from Count Lobau's corps. The traitors and malcontents who were in the army, together with the deserters, did every thing in their power to augment the confusion, which spread instantly throughout the whole line. The eight battalions of the guard, among which were those of the old guard, instead of marching forward as they did to support the four battalions engaged with the enemy, should have proceeded to the right, to serve as a reserve, and to rally the troops driven from La Haie: they might have formed barriers by each battalion resolving into a square: the whole extremity of our right might still have rallied behind them. The sun had set: there

was no reason to despair; when the two brigades of the enemy's cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, penetrated between La Haie Sainte and General Reille's corps. They might have been stopped by the eight squares of the guard; but perceiving the great disorder which prevailed in our right, they turned them. These three thousand fresh cavalry troops rendered all attempt to rally impossible. The Emperor ordered his four service squadrons to charge them. These squadrons were not sufficiently numerous: the whole division of the reserve cavalry of the guard would have been requisite; but by a misfortune, corresponding with the other fatalities of the day, that division, consisting of two thousand horse grenadiers and dragoons, all picked men, was engaged on the height, without the Emperor's orders. There was now no means of rallying the troops: the four squadrons were overwhelmed, and the confusion every moment increased.

The corps of cavalry and the four battalions of the guard, which, on the level height, had for several hours opposed

nearly the whole of the English army, were now overcome. Their artillery had expended all its ammunition: they beheld from the height the fire of our squares in their rear: they likewise began to retreat, and the victory was lost to us. The height being abandoned, all the Anglo-Belgic army moved forward, and posted itself in the position which we had so long occupied. In the state of disorder into which the French army was thrown, it happened, as it frequently does in such circumstances, that our infantry and cavalry troops engaged with each other by mistake. The eight battalions of the guard, which were in the centre, after having withstood for a long time all the attacks of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, and contended for every foot of ground, were finally completely disorganised by the mass of fugitives, and overwhelmed by the numbers of the enemy who surrounded them. These brave grenadiers fought to the last, and dearly sacrificed their lives. Cambrone, when called upon to surrender, made the following truly French reply: "*The guard dies, but does not surrender!*"

The Emperor proceeded to the left of Planchenoit, on a second position, where a regiment of the guard with two batteries was in reserve. He there renewed his endeavours to stop and rally the fugitives; but, on the one hand, the darkness of the night, which prevented the soldiers from seeing the Emperor, and, on the other, the extreme confusion, which everywhere prevailed, rendered it extremely difficult to restore order. At this moment the Prussian cavalry, supported by some battalions of light infantry, and the whole of Bulow's corps, resumed the offensive, and, advancing by the right of Planchenoit, so greatly encreased the confusion, that all thoughts of rallying were at an end. The Emperor, finding that all his efforts were vain, that the enemy was already on the high road, and that not the slightest hope remained, yielded to necessity. He took the road to Charleroi*, having previously

* When the Emperor arrived at the last position, near Planchenoit, he was accompanied by only three or four of his officers, all the rest being employed in bearing dispatches. Being convinced of the impossibility of rallying the fugitives, he directed me to place in battery some pieces

dispatched several officers to Marshal Grouchy to acquaint him with the loss of the battle, and to direct him to pass the Sambre at Namur and to proceed by Charlemont to Laon, in order to join the army.

The cannonade, which had been heard at sunset, about two leagues and a half to our right, really proceeded from Marshal Grouchy's troops; the Marshal had been engaged at Wavres, and one of his columns passed the Dyle at Limale, in the rear of St. Lambert. On the road between Gembloux and Wavres, he had heard since noon our dreadful cannonade. It could not be mistaken; it was evidently the cannonade of a general engagement. General Excelmans, with emotion, ob-

of cannon that were there, and to fire on the English cavalry, which was approaching rapidly. This was the last discharge of artillery that took place. A few moments after, as we were almost surrounded by the enemy, he formed the battalion of the guard into a square, and directed the fire himself. The Emperor appeared determined not to survive that fatal day: he wished to die with his grenadiers, and was on the point of entering the square, when Marshal Soult, who was near him, said, "*Sire, the enemy is fortunate enough already;*" and at the same time pulled the Emperor's horse into the road to Charleroi. —*Extract from the Journal of General Gourgaud.*

served to Marshal Grouchy, "*Marshal, the armies are engaged; the cannonade is so heavy, that the very ground trembles beneath us. Instead of marching upon Wavres, we should, I think, go straight towards the point whence the cannonade proceeds; we shall arrive soon enough to take part in the action.*" The Marshal hesitated; and, showing Excelmans his instructions, he observed that, if he followed his advice, Blucher might possibly march on Fleurus, and so turn all our right; and that he could not take such a responsibility on himself. General Gerard, who entirely coincided in the opinion of General Excelmans, then said, "*But, notwithstanding your instructions, you yesterday deemed it prudent not to march on Wavres, because you were uncertain of Blucher's movements: to-day it is evident that the Prussian army has gained half a march upon us, and while we march on Wavres it will proceed elsewhere; but should we march in the direction of the heavy fire, we shall be certain of rendering ourselves useful.*" The Marshal, who himself burnt with desire to take a part in the great battle, yielded to these arguments. He ordered

his infantry to halt, and made preparations for marching to St. Lambert, when his advance guard engaged with the enemy in the direction of Wavres. At the same time he received intimation that the whole of the Prussian army was before that town (however, only the third Prussian corps was there). General Gerard, nevertheless, urged the Marshal to proceed to St. Lambert, observing that it might be merely a Prussian rear guard, which would retreat before him, whilst the decisive action would be fought on the left; but the Marshal, dreading the responsibility which would rest upon him under such circumstances, unfortunately thought he was doing all for the best by resuming his march upon Wavres. Only four hours after he received a positive order to proceed to St. Lambert. The previous orders, which had been dispatched to the same effect, had not reached him.

Such was the fatal battle of Waterloo. The Emperor principally attributed the loss of it, on the one hand, 1st, to Marshal Grouchy's uncertainty on the 17th respecting the movements of the enemy:

had he been at Wavres on the evening of the 17th, in communication with the left of the army, Blucher would not have dared to break up before him; or, even allowing he had, Grouchy would have pursued him: 2dly, to the misunderstanding respecting the instructions given to Marshal Grouchy, and his not having received the orders, which his Majesty dispatched on the night of the 17th, and the morning of the 18th. On the other hand, to Marshal Ney's ill-timed attack with the cavalry, which was made two hours sooner than it ought to have been, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the Emperor.

Another circumstance, which had a fatal influence on the events of the day, was the want of a commanding general for the guard, which the composition of that force, formed as it was of many different corps, rendered an object of the utmost importance. The Duke of Treviso, who held that appointment, was, in consequence of illness, under the necessity of resigning it, on the 14th, at Beaumont. It will be recollected, that, when the Em-

peror wished the reserve division of the cavalry of the guard to charge, it was unluckily engaged at another point: this was a serious misfortune. The presence of this chosen cavalry would have overawed that of the enemy. All the other corps of our cavalry and infantry would have rallied, and we should have kept possession of the field of battle. Zeithen's corps was not in a state to press its attack impetuously: the men were exhausted, and many of them had been left in the rear. By the French army maintaining possession of the field of battle, notwithstanding the opposition of Bulow's and Zeithen's corps, with the whole of Grouchy's force in its rear, it might reasonably have been expected, that the enemy, who had suffered very great losses, would be under the necessity of retreating.

All the commanders of corps evinced the utmost bravery. Their intentions were pure and patriotic, as has already been observed; but a difference of opinion prevailed among them relative to the events of 1814, which had a most fatal effect. Marshal Ney, perhaps in conse-

quence of the state of his feelings, had undergone an aberration of mind from which he was never totally free, except in the heat of action, when the natural bravery of his character resumed its influence, and again restored him to the possession of his faculties. To have employed Marshal Ney, or at least to have entrusted him with so important a command, is one of the faults with which the Emperor reproaches himself.

CHAPTER VII.

Observations on the Battle of Waterloo.

MANY military men have blamed the arrangements made by the Emperor on the morning of the 17th. "Why," it is asked, "did he not march with his whole army on Waterloo?" The answer is easy: Napoleon knew, that the fourth corps (Bulow's) had joined the Prussian army on the night of the 16th; and that that army, thus reinforced, might advance on Fleurus and Charleroi. The greatest fault a general can commit, the day after he has gained a victory, is to neglect closely pursuing the beaten army, to prevent its rallying. The Emperor might have been blamed with reason, had he marched with an army of upwards of a hundred thousand men along the only high road from Quatre Bras to Brussels, leaving behind him, to rally at its leisure, an army which might

then fall upon his rear. He, therefore, caused the Prussian army to be pursued; but, according to his instructions, the corps charged with that pursuit was to maintain constant communications with him, and to keep itself between the Prussian army and the road leading from Quatre Bras to Fleurus. The zeal and ardour of Marshal Grouchy, Generals Gerard, Pajol, and Excelmans were well known to the Emperor; he doubted not but their troops would, on the evening of the 17th, reach Wavres, and the entrances of the forest of Soignes on that side. Grouchy's corps, before Wavres, was in line with the army of the Emperor. If, therefore, the Duke of Wellington should resolve to receive battle in front of the forest, the Emperor was, by Grouchy's movement, certain of having his right and his rear well appuyed: Grouchy's troops would, in that case, not only keep the Prussians in check, but could more easily join the Emperor than the Prussians could join Wellington. If, on the contrary, Wellington had evacuated Soignes and Brussels, and Blucher had retired either up-

on the latter city or upon Liege, Grouchy's movement would still have had every advantage.

It was not probable, that the Duke of Wellington, having the forest of Soignes and Brussels in his rear, would give battle. That would not have been likely, even though the contest had been wholly in Belgium; but it was absurd to suppose he would do so when the French army formed the whole of the disposable forces of the Emperor; whilst the hostile armies formed only one third of the forces leagued against France. Napoleon supposed, that Blucher would not have given battle at Ligny, nor the Duke of Wellington at Quatre Bras. Their armies ought to have united, and evacuated Belgium without loss, in order to wait for the arrival of the armies of Russia and Austria on the Meuse. He attributed the battle of Ligny to the decided character of Blucher, and that of Quatre Bras to the necessity under which Wellington was placed of supporting the Prussian army. It was natural to suppose that these two Generals would not have staked the fate of their cause on

a single battle, after the loss of which every chance was against them.

Others have admired the operations by which the Emperor kept the enemy ignorant of his plan; the movements, which he directed on the 17th, have been much approved, but his conduct on the morning of the 18th has been condemned. "Why," it is asked, "did Napoleon persist in giving battle when he learned that Marshal Grouchy had stopped at Gembloux instead of proceeding to Wavres?"

This question may be answered as follows: Though the battle was rendered necessary by the general state of affairs, the Emperor would not certainly have then fought it, if, immediately after receiving Grouchy's letter from Gembloux, a second letter from the Marshal had not informed him, that he was marching on Wavres. This dispatch had been written before daybreak: Gembloux is only two leagues distant from Wavres: the Emperor supposed, that Grouchy would reach the latter place at eight in the morning. In the course of the night he had dispatched orders directing him, though he might then

be at Wavres, to appuy with his left on St. Lambert. Thus it was to be expected that he would arive there about two in the afternoon.

Some would have wished, that the Emperor had countermanded the battle, after he discovered Bulow's corps near St. Lambert, and that he had ordered General Domont's cavalry, aud Count de Lobau's corps to march in that direction. Only a few pieces of cannon had been fired on Hougoumont; but, if the situation of France and of the French army be duly considered, it must be acknowledged, that in this instance, as in every other, Napoleon acted with that decision, which is the result of superior talent, and a thorough experience in war. He concluded, that from the quality of his troops, he had a sufficient chance of gaining the victory, even though Bulow's corps should have acted with the English army, and that if Grouchy, as there was no reason to doubt, should arrive at St. Lambert with the whole of his corps, or only a detachment, he would attack Bulow's rear: this would have rendered the

victory still more decisive. Even in case the fourth Prussian corps alone should have taken part in the battle, and that neither Grouchy nor the first, second, and third Prussian corps should have been engaged, the Emperor's army would then have been diminished only thirty-six thousand men, whilst the deduction from the hostile army would have amounted to sixty thousand, the force of the three Prussian corps.

On the other hand, if the Emperor had countermanded the battle, the Prussian and English armies would have united together, and then, on the 19th, his situation would have been far more critical: for, notwithstanding the losses sustained on the 16th, the Prussian army still amounted to ninety thousand men. The junction of these two armies would have presented a force so superior, that it would not have been prudent to engage with it.

When the Emperor, from his position near La Belle Alliance, discovered Bulow's movement, he remained fixed in his determination to give battle; but he hesitated for a few moments whether or not he should change his line of opera-

tions*, in order to place it on the Nivelles road, by outflanking the left of the English army instead of the right, and marching on Mont St. Jean by the Nivelles road, after having taken possession of Braine-la-Leud. By this means the Emperor's line of retreat would have been farther removed from the Prussians; but he reflected, that, if Grouchy should send a detachment on Bulow's rear, the latter might then turn upon the former, as there would not be any thing opposed to him in front: that the union of the Prussians with the English army would thus be the more speedily effected; and that

* Great advantages are frequently gained by changing the line of operations during a battle. By a manœuvre of this kind Napoleon proved victorious at Marengo. Towards the close of the battle, Melas, under the supposition that he was the conqueror, returned to Alexandria, leaving General Zach to pursue the French army. The latter, persuaded that the French would retire by the high road of Tortona, endeavoured, with a considerable corps, to gain that road behind San Juliano; but at the commencement of the battle Napoleon had changed his operation line, and had established it between Sale and Tortona; so that Zach was cut off from his own retreat, at the very moment when he supposed he was cutting off the line of retreat of the French army. He was taken prisoner with the whole of his corps; and the victory was thus decided in favour of the French.

they might even reach La Haie Sainte and La Belle Alliance about three in the afternoon. Besides, the ground between La Haie and Planchenoit, being intersected with woods and defiles, was more favourable than any other for the troops destined to stop Bulow's movement; and, finally, the Emperor regarded that part of the English line between La Haie Sainte and La Haie as weaker than any other.

Some military men, whilst they approve of all the operations up to the middle of the battle, could have wished that the Emperor, after having repulsed Bulow, had united all his guard, even the battalion sent to Planchenoit, and had retained it in position as a general reserve. But the Emperor was induced to engage his guard by the conviction, that, in the situation in which he was placed, some marked success was indispensable; and he had every reason to hope for a decisive victory from the charge of that chosen corps. The day was drawing to a close when the Emperor employed the guard, a circumstance which led him to hope, that

the attack would not be attended by any disaster, as indeed it would not had the division of reserve cavalry of the guard remained near him.

Some officers, who were present at the battle, are of opinion, that under such important circumstances the Emperor had done well to lead his first attack in person, as he led that of Montmirail, by forming his infantry on the perpendicular order, covering them by numerous tirailleurs, and rendering the movements of the artillery and cavalry suitably co-ordinate; a very delicate kind of tactic, but which the Emperor had frequently adopted in attacks which he had led himself with a small number of troops. Such indeed was his intention in the present instance; and this idea tended to keep up his confidence in the favourable issue of the battle; but on the discovery of Bulow's corps, he determined to maintain himself in a central position, so as to hold the troops in readiness to resist this new attack, with respect to which the slightest fault committed after four o'clock would have been sufficient to occasion the loss of the battle.

To recapitulate: When the dispositions on both sides are considered, it may be said, 1st, that had it not been for Bulow's movement the battle would have been gained at three in the afternoon, by sixty-seven thousand French opposed to ninety thousand Anglo-Belgic troops; for Count Lobau's corps, with the young guard, supported by the whole of the guard, was to have attacked the enemy's centre at two o'clock. The attack of the Prussians, which rendered it necessary to change the destination of Count de Lobau's corps and the young guard, likewise prevented the attack of the guard, the Emperor not wishing to engage that reserve before his right should be secured by the arrival of Grouchy: 2dly, sixty-seven thousand French troops would have gained a victory over one hundred and twenty thousand enemies (ninety thousand Anglo-Belgians, and thirty thousand Prussians), if Blucher had not arrived with the first Prussian corps: 3dly, notwithstanding the sixty thousand Prussians under Bulow and Blucher, and the ninety thousand troops under Wellington, the

result would merely have been that of an ordinary battle, in which the French would have maintained their position on the heights of Planchenoit, had not the division of reserve cavalry been improperly brought into action.

Every candid person, conversant in military affairs, must acknowledge, that such would have been the result of this battle; and that too with an army in which the malevolence and treason of some individuals exercised so fatal an influence.

Generals Blucher and Wellington have been blamed with some appearance of reason, for not having kept their troops encamped from the commencement of June; for not having ascertained the movements of the French army, which gained three marches without their knowledge; so that they were beaten detachedly, and never had the lead of the movements: they even incurred the risk of not being able to concentrate their troops, and of being beaten in detail on quitting their quarters.

Blucher has been censured for having assembled his army within the range of his enemy's position. The French army hav-

ing occupied Charleroi at noon on the 15th of June, and having passed the following night at the distance of a gunshot from Fleurus, Blucher, knowing the enemy whom he had to oppose, ought not to have chosen his rallying point so near Fleurus, where he exposed himself to the danger of being partially beaten. It is a fact, that though Blucher had under his command an army of nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men, he gave battle with only ninety thousand.

The Duke of Wellington has been blamed for remaining ignorant until one o'clock on the morning of the 16th, that the whole of the French army had crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, at noon on the preceding day, and that they were bivouacking at ten or twelve leagues from him. The first guns were fired before Charleroi at five o'clock on the morning of the 15th, and the Duke of Wellington, at the distance of fourteen leagues, was not informed of this until twenty hours after. The Duke of Wellington cannot be blamed for what occurred at Quatre Bras; it was the necessary result of the error which

Blucher committed, in determining to assemble his army at Ligny. The choice, however, of the field of battle of Waterloo, in front of a forest and a great city, when Blucher had been beaten, was a fault, which might have been attended by consequences most fatal to the English army, and the whole coalition. The nature of the roads, through which Blucher had to pass, rendered worse by the bad weather, which prevailed for two days, should have induced the Duke of Wellington to unite his army with Blucher's at the distance of one march in the rear of Waterloo; which could have been effected without difficulty. The two armies might easily have gained twelve or fifteen hours in advance, and have rallied on the same field of battle. They would then have presented a force of upwards of two hundred thousand troops. Some, as we have before observed, were still of opinion, that, even had this union been effected, it would have been conformable with the general rules of war to gain time, and to avoid the engagement until the armies of Russia and Austria reached the Meuse.

The surprise of the Prussian and Anglo-

Belgic armies in their cantonments is a proof of the superiority of the plan of campaign adopted by the French. The advantages, which were expected to arise from the complete success of this plan, appeared no longer doubtful, when the unfortunate battle of Waterloo, in spite of probability, defeated every calculation; such is the influence of chance on human actions!

Never did the French troops so well display their superiority over all the troops in Europe, as during this short campaign, in which they were so constantly inferior in numbers. It may be truly said, that if, in these great disasters, the French army lost all, it at least preserved its honour.

CHAPTER VIII.

Results of the Battle. Losses sustained by the French, and by the hostile Armies. Head Quarters at Laon. Orders dispatched to the other Armies.

Besides the bridge over the Dyle, at the village of Gennape, there were several in the neighbouring villages; but amidst the extrême confusion into which the army was thrown, all the fugitives directed their course to Gennape, which was soon quite encumbered. The Emperor halted for a few moments, in the hope of restoring order; but the tumult encreased with the darkness of night, and all his efforts proved vain. Perhaps, in the final result, the best course that could have been adopted would have been to make no resistance, and to retreat with the greatest possible speed. Troops of every arme were confounded together: infantry,

cavalry, and artillery, all pressed and crowded upon each other. Many carriages and caissons were overturned on the bridge, as well as in the streets. Several were even fastened together; which was a fresh proof of the malevolence that prevailed.

The greater part of the materiel of the artillery either remained on the field of battle, or was abandoned in this defile*.

The loss of the army in men may be estimated as follows: The French army, when it crossed the Sambre, on the 15th of June, amounted to one hundred and fifteen thousand men. It lost

On the 16th, at Ligny	Killed or Wounded	6,800
	at Quatre Bras	4,140
On the 17th, 18th, and 19th, ...		18,500
	Prisoners	7,000

making a total of 36,940 men lost to the

* On this occasion, the baggage and carriage, which the Emperor was accustomed to hold in readiness near the field of battle, were taken. It was not until several days after his arrival in Paris, that the Emperor was made acquainted with the loss of this carriage, which he had not used since his departure from Beaumont. It contained a hat, a sword, clothes, &c.; merely such articles as were requisite for a change.

army, for the wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. Among the prisoners were, Generals Count de Lobau, Cambrone, and Duhesme. The latter was slain in cold blood, on the road, the day after the battle! General Devaux, who commanded the artillery of the guard, an officer distinguished for talent and courage, was among the killed.

According to the reports of the enemy's generals, the English and Hanoverians lost,

On the 16th,	Killed or Wounded	2,884
On the 17th and 18th		10,854

To which have to be added the losses of

The German Legion	1,620
Artillery and Engineers of the German Legion	280
Brunswick Division	2,000
Dutch and Belgians	4,136
Nassau	3,100
Total, English, Hanoverians, Dutch, &c.	24,866
Loss of the Prussians during the Campaign, taken from the Official Reports	33,132
General Loss of the Allies*	58,006

* The following is a recapitulation of the loss of the

Between four and five, on the morning of the 19th, the Emperor arrived at Charleroi. He ordered the bridge and provision equipages, which had been left in the rear of the town, to be immediately conveyed to Philippeville and Avesnes, and from thence to Laon; he then set out for Philippeville, where he arrived at ten in the morning. He once more

Allies, as given by themselves, distinguishing the troops of each nation:—

Report of the Duke of Wellington:	
English	10,981
Hanoverians	2,757
From the Regimental Returns:	
German Legion	1,900
Brunswickers	2,000
Nassau	3,100
(Prince Bernard in his Report acknowledges the loss of two thousand eight hundred:)	
Report of the Prince of Orange:	
Dutch and Belgians	4,136
Prussian Official Reports:	
Prussians	33,132
Total Killed or Wounded	58,006

dispatched orders to Marshal Grouchy to retreat on Laon, by the way of Rhétel: and directed all the commanders of the fortresses on the Meuse to hold themselves prepared against an attack, and to defend themselves to the very last extremity. General Rapp, commanding the fifth corps in Alsace, General Lecourbe, commanding the corps of Befort, and General Lamarque, commanding the army of La Vendée, were ordered to proceed with all their troops, by forced marches, to Paris, and to adopt every possible means of accelerating their movements, such as conveying the infantry in carriages, and making requisitions for horses to drive the artillery.

Meanwhile the wreck of the army was repassing the Sambre by the bridges of Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Chatelet. From Gosselies the mass of fugitives of the first and second corps, who had passed at Marchiennes, directed their course along that side to repass the river. The imperial guard and the sixth corps retired on Charleroi. It became more and more difficult to rally the army, as it was

now retreating on several different points. Prince Jerome proceeded to Avesnes to assemble the corps which might take that direction.

Having dispatched all the orders, which circumstances rendered necessary, the Emperor quitted Philippeville at two in the afternoon, leaving Marshal Soult to assemble the grand head quarters, and the corps which might proceed to that place: the Emperor then repaired to Laon, whence he dispatched Aide de Camp Flahaut to Avesnes, to obtain new information. General Flahaut found at Avesnes a portion of the guard, and of the army which Prince Jerome had already assembled. Aide de Camp De Jean was sent to Guise, for the double purpose of examining that place, and rallying the troops who had taken that direction. Aide de Camp Bussy was left at Laon, to make preparations for the army which was about to assemble round that advantageous position. Napoleon then proceeded, with all possible speed, to Paris, accompanied by the Duke de Bassano, the Marshal du Palais, Bertrand, and his Aides de Camp Drouot,

Labedoyère, Bernard, and Gourgaud. At Paris he intended to remain forty-eight hours, in order to anticipate any political commotion, to which the news of the disaster might tend to give rise; to take the most prompt measures for completing the arrangements for the defence of the capital; to prepare the public mind for the grand crisis, in which France was about to be placed; to direct on Laon all the troops that could be withdrawn from the depots and fortified places: in a word, to adopt every measure for the execution of the second plan, to which we were now reduced. Napoleon's intention was immediately to rejoin his army at Laon.

CHAPTER IX.

Movements of Marshal Grouchy's Corps. It joins the Army at Laon.

From the report made by Marshal Grouchy it appeared, that on the 18th, at the very moment when he received orders to march on St. Lambert, he was warmly engaged; though master of a part of Wavres, he had not yet been able to debouch from thence. General Gerard, at the head of the fourth corps, had been seriously wounded in his attempt to force the passage of the river at Bielge. In this state of things, the Marshal directed Pajol's corps of light cavalry, and three divisions of infantry, to pass the Dyle at Limale, and to march against Bulow. This movement succeeded, and the opposite heights were carried; but night had set in, and the great battle was concluded. At break of day, on the

19th, the Prussians attacked in their turn, but they were repulsed at every point. General Penne, a most valuable officer, was killed in carrying the village of Bielge.

The heights of Wavres were likewise carried, and Marshal Grouchy was preparing to march on Brussels, when he received notice of the loss of the battle of Waterloo, and orders to retreat, which the Marshal immediately did in two columns, the one proceeding directly from Temploux on Namur, and the other by the high road from Charleroi to Namur.

The enemy attacked the rear of these columns, but he was vigorously repulsed, and lost several pieces of cannon. The Marshal thus arrived at Namur, whence he took the road to Dinant, leaving Vandamme's corps to destroy the bridge of Namur (which however could not be effected), to form the rear guard, and to keep the enemy in check. The Prussians endeavoured to force the passage of the bridge; but after a considerable loss, they renounced all hope of gaining that object. Vandamme's corps kept

possession of the town until eight in the evening, when it was found necessary to abandon it in order to continue the retreat. On the 24th the whole of Grouchy's corps arrived at Rhétel, and on the 26th joined the army at Laon.

CHAPTER X.

Military Resources, which France still possessed, after the Battle.

The loss of the battle of Waterloo placed France in a very critical situation; but the precautionary measures, which the Emperor had adopted previous to the commencement of the campaign, still presented resources of every kind. The remains of the French army, after having passed the Sambre and rallied at different points, were marched to Laon. On the 26th of June the army, which had assembled at that place, amounted to upwards of sixty-five thousand men. Only a few thousand troops had dispersed through the interior. Our loss was doubtless considerable, but the enemy's was still greater. All the regimental depots had arrived in the neighbourhood of the capital, and had

brought men enough to supply the deficiencies. The depots of the imperial guard alone presented six thousand disposable troops. A considerable portion of the artillery was lost; but the men belonging to the train had, for the most part, escaped with their horses. They were assembled at La Fere and Vincennes. In the latter place, and in Paris, there were five hundred pieces of field artillery; besides some other considerable parks on the Loire. We could easily have organised two hundred pieces of cannon, which would have rendered our materiel equivalent to what it had been previously to the defeat. The Emperor calculated, that, at the beginning of July, he could assemble an army of a hundred and thirty thousand men upon the Aisne, between Soissons and Laon. On the 24th of June, the Russians and Austrians had not yet passed the Rhine, therefore they could not be in force on the Marne before the 20th of July. The Anglo-Belgic and Prussian armies, which were much diminished by the late battles, could not advance upon the Aisne without leaving corps of obser-

vation before the fortresses of the northern frontier, such as Dunkirk, Valenciennes, Lille, Maubeuge, Conde, &c.; all of which were strongly garrisoned. It would moreover have been necessary to mask all the fortresses of the Somme. Blucher and Wellington therefore could only advance with about seventy thousand men; and Napoleon reckoned on being on the Aisne by the 26th of June with more than eighty thousand. In the course of ten days after, he could have assembled an army of from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty thousand men, and his force would have been successively increased to one hundred and fifty thousand. The Prussian and English Generals would consequently have been under the necessity of combining their operations with those of the Russian and Austrian armies. We should thus have gained a month, during which time the fortifications of Paris on the left bank of the Seine would have been completed and planted with cannon; those on the right bank were already finished. Arms were not wanting to supply the federal troops. The national

guard had already been augmented. Thus we should have had a corps of sixty thousand men; and before the enemy could have advanced in any great force upon the capital, we might, in addition to this corps, have assembled sixty thousand of the national guard of Bretagne, Normandy, the left bank of the Loire, and all parts of the empire; and even have brought up the twenty regiments of marines, which had been organised.

Marshal Suchet was successful in the south. He had possessed himself of Montmeillau, and driven the enemy beyond Mont Cenis. His corps assembled before Lyons, with the national guards destined for the defence of that central point, would have occupied the attention of all the Austrian army of Italy. The situation of things therefore naturally led to the adoption of the second plan.

The combination of the Anglo-Belgic and Prussian armies with those of the other allies would have given rise to military events, the result of which must have been advantageous to an army occupying the central position, and manœuvring with

one hundred and fifty thousand men round such a point of appui as Paris ; especially with that point well fortified and defended by five or six hundred pieces of cannon, and more than a hundred and twenty thousand men armed and organised.

Such were the military means, which still afforded the hope of carrying on the contest with an equal chance of success; when political events, which could not have been foreseen, paralysed all our efforts, and compelled the Emperor to abdicate in favour of his son. These events form the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER XI.

Arrival of the Emperor at Paris. Revolt of the Chambers. Only three Courses remain for the Emperor's adoption. The Reasons which determined his choice. He abdicates.

The Emperor, soon after his arrival at the Elysée palace, on the 21st of June, assembled a council of ministers, at which the measures proper to be adopted in the existing situation of affairs were discussed. It was determined to declare Paris in a state of seige; to convoke the Chambers at Tours, and to remove the seat of government to that city; to give Marshal Davoust the command of Paris; and to appoint General Clausel minister of war. The decrees for these different objects were undergoing the routine of official preparation, and orders were already issued for

doubling the number of the tirailleurs of the national guard, and giving them arms in the course of the day. It was proposed that the Emperor himself, in his travelling dress, without any retinue, should carry these resolutions to the Chambers, and a minute was even making of the speech it was thought fit he should deliver, when information was brought, that the greatest agitation had manifested itself in the Chamber of Deputies. About noon a message was received, by which it appeared, that that Chamber proclaimed itself permanent, no longer recognised the Imperial authority, and declared it treason against the country to propose to suspend its sittings. M. de Lafayette appeared to come forward at the head of a party, whose real intentions were not known. Some moments after the council learned, that the Chamber of Peers, following the example of the Deputies, had also placed itself in revolt against the Emperor.

These two events suspended all proceedings; it was no longer judged proper, that the Emperor should appear among the Deputies of the nation, after they had

declared themselves in insurrection against his authority. The ministers only repaired to the Chambers, where they announced the arrival of the Emperor at Paris, and the situation of affairs.

In the evening, the plan of the leaders of the two Chambers developed itself: it had ramifications even in the ministry, and the Duke of Otranto seemed to be one of the principal springs of its movements. The most disastrous news soon circulated everywhere. It was said, that Marshal Grouchy had not eight thousand men with him; that all the army was destroyed. The enemies of Napoleon, the friends of the King, the partizans of the foreign powers, were all in motion, and each party endeavoured to encrease the number of its proselytes in the national guard.

At night the ministers had a conference with a deputation from each of the Chambers. The spirit of the Chambers then displayed itself completely. The danger of the country no longer consisted merely in its foreign enemies, and in the approach of the victorious armies of Waterloo, but principally in its internal divisions. There

remained then only three courses for the Emperor to adopt.

The first was to proceed at day-break, on the 22d, to the palace of the Thuilleries; to assemble there all the troops of the line then in the capital; the six thousand men of the imperial guard, the federals, the national guard, the council of state, and the ministers; and to adjourn the Chambers. The sentiments of the troops and the federals, who would have influenced all the people of Paris, were to be relied on, as were also those of a part of the national guard; for a considerable portion of that body was not well disposed. There was reason to expect some opposition to the adjournment of the Chambers, since they had declared, that they would not recognise any power that might propose to suspend their sittings. No serious resistance was, however, to be apprehended. The Chamber of Deputies would have been compelled to return within its constitutional boundaries, and the adjournment would have taken place.

The second course was to flatter the faction that governed the Cham-

bers, to allow it to assume the authority of the state, and to negotiate directly with the allied Sovereigns, by sending deputies to them without the intervention of the Emperor. But was it not evident, that the leaders of the Chambers, who must have felt themselves compromised by the hostility they had displayed against the Emperor, and have feared that he would emancipate himself from their mediation as soon as he should collect a powerful force, would only endeavour to embarrass the acts of the administration? The Chambers would naturally view with suspicion the measures, which the imperious circumstances of such a crisis prescribed; in a word, instead of affording any assistance, they would have paralysed all the means of defence which yet remained. It was, besides, easy to foresee, that the allied Sovereigns, steady in their deceitful policy, would flatter the Deputies of the Chambers, and, certain of being no longer interrupted in their schemes of conquest and spoliation, if they could get rid of the only man still capable of opposing their designs, would promise every thing upon condition that

Napoleon should be removed from the helm of the state. To have adopted this course would then have been to revert at the end of five or six days to the same embarrassing situation, after the loss of so much time and self respect.

The third measure left for the election of Napoleon was, to abdicate in favour of his son, to deliver up all authority to the Chambers, and by a complete renunciation of his interests, to prevent their supposing, that he might one day seize upon the sceptre, which he had laid down, and employ his power against them. The Chambers, satisfied on this point, might then make every effort to second by all the means in their power, the reorganisation of the national forces ; in fine, devote themselves entirely to the welfare of the empire.

The Emperor, in fixing his choice, deliberated between the first and the third course, and he adopted the latter. The second appeared to him the worst of the three ; and now, after the events which have taken place, he is still doubtful whether the first would have been more

beneficial to France. Napoleon was perfectly sensible, that whatever hope remained of his being able to come out of the formidable contest in which France was engaged, after the battle of Waterloo, with honour, could only be realized by the assistance of the two Chambers, and the union of all the men of the revolution, to electrify the nation, and keep down its domestic enemies. He was of opinion, that to adjourn the Chambers by force would deprive the national party of its principal resources, increase the number of the discontented, furnish numerous pretexts, and give credit to the opinion, that the foreigners had no hostility to the nation; and that it was not for the re-establishment of the Bourbons they had taken up arms, but solely against the ambition of Napoleon. Having against him all Europe, all the royalists of France, and all the partisans of the foreign powers, after making, by the adjournment of the Chambers, a great portion of the friends of the revolution also his enemies, the probability of success would have been chimerical. Besides, in adopting such a course, he must have been pre-

pared to go the length of the most arbitrary and violent acts. As Dictator, he must have governed by the axe of the lictor, and by the impulse of a furious populace, whom it would have been necessary to unchain.

The last course, it is true, presented but little more probability of success for the national cause: when the Emperor abdicated the discontented army would lose all hope, and should it still preserve its spirit it would be too feebly seconded to enable it to extricate itself from such a terrible situation. Marshal Davoust and the other Generals were not accustomed to direct the operations of war on a large scale, nor did they sufficiently possess the confidence of the soldiers and the people to enable them to draw forth resources adequate to the circumstances in which they would be placed. It was even probable, that the Anglo-Belgic and Prussian armies would march rapidly on Paris, without regarding the French army at Laon, as soon as they were certain that Napoleon was no longer at its head. But if, by the course Napoleon took, he could do nothing for the nation,

he ceased at least to be an obstacle to its deliverance. In doing what appeared to be the wish of the Chambers he established a rallying point for the friends of the country, and left the representatives of the nation an opportunity for the free exercise of all their energy. It was possible, that some extraordinary talents might have sprung up in those assemblies: perhaps, as in the first days of the revolution, France was again to be seen hastening to answer the call to arms made from the tribune by the voice of patriotism.

Finally, although this last course should leave no more hope of success than the preceding, Napoleon owed it to his glory, and to the nation, which had twice confided its destinies to him, to exhibit in the fullest manner the purity of his intentions, and to prove to posterity, that if France should perish it was not at least for the interests of a single man that she was sacrificed.

CHAPTER XII.

The Emperor having abdicated, the Anglo-Belgic and Prussian Armies imprudently advance upon Paris. This Manœuvre, which ought to have led to their ruin, proved completely successful.

The declaration to the French people, by which Napoleon made known his abdication, was published on the 22d*. As soon as this news became known to the army, consternation and despair spread through the ranks; but the effect it produced in the hostile armies, by emboldening their commanders, was still more fatal. Blucher and Wellington appeared, by their first operations, to have determined not to pass the frontiers of France until the Austrian and Russian armies should arrive; but in the mean time to possess themselves of Avesnes, Maubeuge, and other fortresses on that frontier: to cover

* See Appendix.

all the country as far as the Somme with their light troops, and to endeavour to excite the people to insurrection. They preferred this plan to that of marching on Paris with an army which must have been considerably reduced by the great number of troops it would be necessary to leave behind, in order to mask and hold in check the different garrisons; which march would besides have exposed them to the liability of being taken in flank and beaten, as at Champ Aubert, Montmirail, &c. But as soon as these two Generals learned, that Napoleon had abdicated, and that he was no longer at the head of the French armies, they changed their plan, being of opinion, that they should commit a great fault, if they did not profit of the disorder and confusion, which such an event could not fail to create, by endeavouring to obtain immediate possession of the capital. Paying therefore no attention to the French army, concentrated between Laon and Soissons, they penetrated by La Fère and Compiègne, and marched rapidly on Paris. The French army, completely discouraged

by the news from Paris, thought only of retiring as fast as possible under the walls of the capital. It was even regarded as an advantage, that the army was able to arrive at St. Denis on the 28th of June, before the enemy.

The army being assembled before Paris, Marshal Davoust placed himself at its head, but he adopted no resolution. The allies carried their temerity so far as to march through the valley of Montmorency, and to advance to St. Germains and Versailles, leaving, during all this movement, their left flank entirely uncovered and exposed to the attack of the French army*. The advantage which might have been taken of this imprudent manœuvre was overlooked, and, instead of destroying the enemy by vi-

* While at Malmaison, preparing to leave France for ever, the Emperor was informed of the imprudent movement made by the enemy. He immediately sent, through General Becker, a proposal to the Provisional Government, to put himself at the head of the French army, as its General, to fall with its whole force on the enemy's flank and rear, and, by thus saving the capital for the moment, to obtain time and means for negotiating with more advantage. This object once accomplished, Napoleon would have resigned his command. The Provisional Government refused this offer, and he departed.

gorously attacking his flank and rear, the French General made the greater part of the army repass the Seine, and placed it in order of battle in the plain of Grenelle.

The armies were soon in presence of each other, and the Provisional Government signed a capitulation, in which nothing was stipulated either for the rights of the nation or the interests of the army; the latter was bound to evacuate Paris, and retire behind the Loire, thus abandoning the capital without resistance, to an army of equal force, for the Austrian and Russian armies were still at a distance of more than fifteen days march. This is without doubt one of the most shameful transactions, which history records. What worse could have happened after having fought and lost a battle, than thus to deliver up Paris without any stipulations? But the Provisional Government displayed neither talent, nor patriotism, nor energy.

When the enemy's army extended itself from St. Denis to St. Cloud, had its strength been double that of ours, its ruin was certain, as has before been observed, by debouching on it by St. Denis.

But after the moment for executing this manœuvre was past (a manœuvre which ought to have been obvious even to the lowest soldier), the possession of Paris might still have been retained with the federal troops and the national guard; which would have raised our force to upwards of one hundred and twenty thousand men: conditions advantageous for the army, and which would have guaranteed the rights of the people, might then have been obtained. But it may truly be said, that after the departure of Napoleon the army lost all its zeal; the Marshals were divided in opinion, and no one among them had sufficient preponderance for such a crisis. The Provisional Government and the Chambers had, through the whole proceedings, been betrayed by Fouché, and the party which maintained intelligence with the enemy. Carnot acted an upright part; but he allowed himself to be easily deceived.

Such was the infatuation of the Chambers, that at this important period they wasted their time in vain discussions on constitutional principles. Posterity will

scarcely credit, that they carried their blindness so far as to imagine that the execution of their decrees would be guaranteed and ensured by Prussian battalions. The national guard, inspired with the same blind confidence, declared, that they would maintain the national colours; and, in the meanwhile, the allies entered Paris.

All illusion was soon at an end: the day after this declaration the King ordered the dissolution of the two Chambers, which were already surrounded by Prussian bayonets, and on the 8th of July he made his entry into the capital. The members of the Chamber of Deputies, driven from their place of assembly, met at the house of their President Lanjuinais, and all ended in vain and powerless protests.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

Avesnes, June 13, 1815.

Position of the Army on the 14th.

THE grand head quarters at Beaumont. The infantry of the imperial guard is to be bivouacked at the distance of a quarter of a league before Beaumont, and to form three lines; the young guard, the chasseurs, and the grenadiers. The Duke of Treviso will reconnoitre the scite of this camp: he will take care, that every thing is in its place; artillery, trains, baggage, &c.

The first regiment of foot grenadiers is to proceed to Beaumont.

The cavalry of the imperial guard will be posted in the rear of Beaumont; but the most remote corps must be within the distance of a league from that city.

The second corps will take position at Laire, that is to say, as near as possible to the frontier without passing it. The four divisions of this

army corps will assemble and bivouac on two or four lines; the head quarters in the centre; the cavalry in advance, guarding all the debouches, also without passing the frontier, but causing it to be respected by the enemy's partizans, who might seem inclined to violate it.

The bivouacs are to be so stationed that their fires may not be seen by the enemy: the Generals must prevent the departure of any person from the camp; and must ascertain that each man is provided with fifty cartouches, four days allowance of bread, and half a pound of rice; that the artillery and trains are in good condition; and they must place them in order of battle. Thus the second corps will be in readiness at three in the morning of the 15th, to march on Charleroi, should it receive orders to that effect, and it may arrive there before nine o'clock.

The first corps is to take position at Solre-sur-Sambre, also to bivouac on several lines, taking, like the second corps, precautions to prevent the enemy from observing its fires, and suffering no one to leave the camp; the Generals must make themselves acquainted with the state of the ammunition and provisions, and the artillery and trains must be ranged in order of battle.

The first corps must likewise hold itself in readiness to follow the movement of the second

corps at three o'clock on the morning of the 15th; thus, on the day after to-morrow, these two corps may manœuvre in the same direction, and protect each other.

To-morrow the third corps will take a position at a league in advance of Beaumont, as near as possible to the frontier, without, however, passing it, or allowing it to be violated by any party of the enemy. General Vandamme will keep every one at his post, and will give orders for concealing the fires, so that the enemy may not observe them. His corps must also conform to the regulations prescribed to the second corps, with respect to the ammunition, provisions, artillery, and trains, and must hold itself in readiness to march at three o'clock on the morning of the 15th.

The sixth corps will proceed in advance of Beaumont, and bivouac on two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a league from the third corps. Count de Lobau is to choose the ground, observing the general arrangements prescribed by the present order.

Marshal Grouchy will move the first, second, third, and fourth corps of cavalry in front of Beaumont, and establish them in bivouac between that town and Walcourt, causing the frontier to be respected, prohibiting any one from passing it, or suffering themselves to be

seen, and taking measures to prevent the fires from being observed by the enemy; he will hold himself in readiness to march on Charleroi, at three o'clock on the morning of the 15th, in case he should receive orders to do so, and to form the advanced guard of the army.

He must direct the Generals to ascertain whether all the cavalry troops be provided with cartouches, whether their arms be in good condition, and whether they have each four days allowance of bread and half a pound of rice as has been ordered.

The bridge equipages are to be bivouacked behind the sixth corps, and in advance of the infantry of the imperial guard.

The central park of artillery in the rear of Beaumont.

The army of the Moselle will take position to-morrow in advance of Philippeville. Count Gerard will arrange it so, that it may be in readiness to march the day after to-morrow, the 15th, at three in the morning, to join the third corps, and support its movement on Charleroi, in conformity with the new order, which will be given to that effect. But General Gerard must carefully guard his right flank and his front, on all the roads from Charleroi and Namur. If the army of the Moselle has any pontoons in its train, General Gerard must keep them as far in ad-

vance as possible, that they may be employed if an opportunity should occur.

All the army corps will be preceded by the sappers, and the means of transport, which the Generals may have collected.

The sappers of the imperial guard, the marine artificers, and the reserve sappers, are to march after the sixth corps, and at the head of the guard.

All the corps must march in close order. In the movement on Charleroi, advantage must be taken of all the passes, to overwhelm those corps of the enemy who may be inclined to attack the army, or who may manœuvre against it.

The grand head quarters alone will be at Beaumont. No other must be established there, and the town must be free from all confusion. The old regulations respecting the head quarters and equipages, the order of march and the police of carriages and baggage, the laundresses and suttling women, must be enforced. A general order will be issued to that effect; but in the meanwhile, the Generals commanding the army corps must make the necessary arrangements, and the Grand Prevot must see that these regulations are executed. The Emperor commands, that all the arrangements contained in the present order shall be kept secret by the Generals.

By order of the Emperor,

The Marshal of the Empire, Major General,

(Signed) DUKE OF DALMATIA.

No. II.

Beaumont, June 14, 1815.

Order of Movement.

To-morrow, the 15th, at half past two in the morning, General Vandamme's division of light cavalry will mount their horses, and advance on the Charleroi road: it will dispatch parties in all directions to scour the country, and to carry the enemy's posts; but each of these parties must consist of at least fifty men. Before the division moves, General Vandamme will see that it is provided with cartouches.

At the same hour Lieutenant General Pajol must assemble the first corps of cavalry, and follow the movement of General Domont's division, which will be under the command of General Pajol. The divisions of the first corps of cavalry are not to supply any detachments; they will be taken from the third division. General Domont will leave his battery of artillery, to march after the first battalion of the third corps of infantry. Lieutenant General Vandamme will give him the necessary orders.

Lieutenant General Vandamme will order the reveille to be beaten at half past two in the morning; at three he will march with his army corps in the direction of Charleroi. The whole

of his baggage and followers must be posted in the rear, and must not commence their march until the sixth corps and the imperial guard shall have passed on. They will be under the command of the Commissary General, who will unite them to the baggage of the sixth corps of the imperial guard, and of the grand head quarters, and will give orders for their movement.

Each division of the third army corps will have along with it its battery and trains: every other carriage found in the ranks will be burnt.

Count de Lobau will cause the reveille to be beaten at half past three o'clock, and he will order the sixth army corps to march at four, to follow and support General Vandamme's movement. He will direct the troops, artillery, trains, and baggage, to observe the same order of march that is prescribed to the third corps.

The baggage of the sixth corps will be united to that of the third corps, under the orders of the Commissary General, as has been stated.

The young guard will beat the reveille at half past four, and will begin to march at five; it will follow the movement of the first corps on the Charleroi road.

The foot chasseurs of the guard will beat the reveille at five o'clock, and will begin to march at half past five, to follow the movement of the young guard.

The foot grenadiers of the guard will beat the reveille at half past five, and will march at six, to follow the movement of the foot chasseurs. The order of march for the artillery, trains, and baggage, prescribed for the third corps, must be observed by the imperial guard.

The baggage of the guard will be united to that of the third and sixth army corps, under the orders of the Commissary General, who will direct the movement of the whole.

At half past five in the morning, Marshal Grouchy will cause that corps of cavalry of the three which is nearest the road to mount and follow the movement on Charleroi. The two other corps will depart successively at the interval of one hour after each other; but Marshal Grouchy will be careful to make the cavalry march on the lateral roads, whilst the column of infantry will proceed along the principal road, to avoid confusion, and likewise that his cavalry may maintain better order than it otherwise would. He will direct the whole of the baggage to remain behind, parked and collected, until the Commissary General shall give orders for its advance.

Count Reille will cause the reveille to be beat at half past two in the morning, and order the second corps to march at three on Marchiennes-au-pont, and will make arrangements for its reaching that place before nine in the

morning. He must station guards on all the bridges over the Sambre, to prevent any one from passing them. The posts, which he evacuates, will be successively occupied by the first corps, but he must endeavour to anticipate the enemy on these bridges, that they may not be destroyed, especially the bridge of Marchiennes, by which he will probably find it necessary to debouch, and which, should it be damaged, he must cause to be immediately repaired.

At Thuin and Marchiennes, as well as at all the villages in his road, Count Reille must interrogate the inhabitants respecting the positions and strength of the hostile armies. He must also take possession of, and examine the letters in the post offices, and transmit to the Emperor such information as he may thereby obtain.

Count d' Erlong will put the first corps in march at three in the morning, and will also direct it on Charleroi, following the movement of the second corps, the left of which it will gain as soon as possible to support it if necessary. He will keep a brigade of cavalry in the rear, to cover himself, and to maintain, by small detatchments, his communication with Maubeuge. He will send parties in advance of that place, in the directions of Mons and Binch, as far as the frontier, to obtain accounts

of the enemy, and to communicate what information they may gain. These parties must be careful neither to expose themselves to danger, nor to pass the frontier.

Count d' Erlong will occupy Thuin, by a division; and, should the bridge of that town be destroyed, he must immediately restore it.

He must likewise plan and construct a bridge head on the left bank.

The order of march prescribed to the third corps for the artillery, trains, and baggage will be observed by the second and first corps, the baggage of which will be united, and will march on the left of the first corps, under the orders of the oldest Commissary General.

The fourth corps (the army of the Moselle) has received orders to take position this day in advance of Philippeville: if its movement be accomplished, and the divisions, which compose this army corps, be collected, Lieutenant General Gerard will put them in march at three o'clock to-morrow morning, and direct them on Charleroi*. He must be careful to keep on a line with the third corps, with which he will maintain communication, in order to ar-

* General Gerard subsequently received a new order, which directed him to pass the Sambre at Chatelet with his corps.

rive before Charleroi nearly at the same time; but General Gerard must clear his right, and scour all the debouches leading to Namur. He will march in close order of battle, leaving at Philippeville all the baggage and followers, so that his army corps, being unembarrassed, may be the better able to manœuvre.

General Gerard will order the fourteenth division of cavalry, which will arrive this day at Philippeville, to follow the movement of his army corps on Charleroi, where that division will join the fourth corps of cavalry.

Lieutenant Generals Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, and Pajol, will maintain communications by different parties, and will arrange their march so as to arrive in mass and together before Charleroi: they must place in the advance guard as many as possible of the officers, who speak Flemish, to interrogate the inhabitants, and obtain information; but these officers must represent themselves as being commanders of parties, without letting it be known that the army is in the rear.

Lieutenant Generals Reille, Vandamme, and Gerard, will direct all the sappers of their army corps (having along with them materials for repairing the bridges) to march after the first regiment of light infantry, and will direct the engineer officers to repair the bad passes, to open

lateral communications, and to throw bridges over those streams, which the infantry cannot conveniently ford.

The sailors, sappers of the guard, and sappers of the reserve, will march after the first regiment of the third corps: Lieutenant Generals Rogniat and Haxo will be at their head: they will take along with them only two or three carriages: the remainder of the park of engineers will march on the left of the third corps. If the enemy should be fallen in with these troops are not to be engaged, but Generals Rogniat and Haxo will employ them in the works for crossing rivers, the construction of bridge heads, repairing roads and openings, &c. The cavalry of the guard will follow the movment on Charleroi, and set out at eight o'clock.

The Emperor will be at the advanced guard on the Charleroi road. The Lieutenant Generals will be careful to send his Majesty frequent reports respecting their movements, and the information they may obtain; they are aware, that his Majesty's intention is to pass the Sambre before noon, and to transport the army to the left bank of that river.

The bridge equipages will be divided into two sections: the first section will be subdivided into three parts, each consisting of five pontoons and five advanced guard boats to throw three bridges

across the Sambre; to each of these subdivisions a company of pontooniers will be attached; the first section will march in the train of the park of engineers after the third corps.

The second section will remain with the reserve park of artillery, at the baggage column; it will have along with it the fourth company of pontooniers: the Emperor's equipages and the baggage of the great head quarters will be collected and put in march at ten o'clock. As soon as they shall be passed, the Commissary General will direct the equipage of the imperial guard and third and sixth corps to depart: at the same time he will order the column of equipages of the reserve of the cavalry to march, and to follow the direction which the cavalry has taken. The trains of the army will follow the head quarters, and march at the head of the baggage; but on no account must this baggage, the reserve parks of the artillery, or the second section of the bridge equipages, advance within three leagues of the army, without an order from the Major General, or pass the Sambre without orders to that effect.

The Commissary General will form divisions of this baggage, and appoint officers to command them, so that he may detach from them what may afterwards be required at head quarters, or for the service of the officers.

The Intendant General will unite to this column of equipage the whole of the baggage and transports of the administration, to which he will assign a rank in the column. The carriages, which may be behind, will take the left, and must not quit the rank in which they are placed except by order of the Quarter Master General.

The Emperor orders, that all the equipage carriages, which may be found in the columns of the infantry, cavalry, or artillery, shall be burnt, as well as the carriages of the equipage column, which may quit their rank, and derange their march, without the express permission of the Quarter Master General.

For this purpose a detachment of fifty gendarmes shall be placed at the disposal of the Quarter Master General, who, as well as the officers of the gendarmerie and the gendarmes, are responsible for the execution of these arrangements, on which the success of the campaign may depend.

By order of the Emperor,

The Marshal of the Empire, Major General,

(Signed) DUKE OF DALMATIA.

No. III.

TABLE, SHOWING THE COMPOSITION AND FORCE OF THE FRENCH ARMY DESTINED TO ACT IN FLANDERS, ON THE 15TH OF JUNE, 1815.

Designations.				Force of each Division in				Total Force of each Corps, in	
Army Corps.	Commanders.	Divisions.	Commanders.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery. Men.	Artillery. Guns.	Men.	Guns.
First Corps	General Count d'Erlong	First Division	General Alix	4,120		160	8	18,640	46
		Second	—— Douzelot	4,100		160	8		
		Third	—— Marcognet	4,000		160	8		
		Fourth	—— Durutte	4,000		160	8		
		First Division of Cavalry	—— Jacquinot		1,500	120	6		
		Reserve of Artillery				160	8		
Second Corps	General Count Reille	Fifth Division	General Bachelu	5,000		160	8	23,530	46
		Sixth	—— Prince Jerome	6,100		160	8		
		Seventh	—— Girard	5,000		160	8		
		Ninth	—— Foi	5,000		160	8		
		Second Division of Cavalry	—— Piré		1,500	120	6		
		Reserve of Artillery				170	8		
Third Corps	General Count Vandamme	Tenth Division	General Hubert	4,430		160	8	15,290	38
		Eleventh	—— Bothezene	4,300		160	8		
		Eighth	—— Lefol	4,300		160	8		
		Third Division of Cavalry	—— Domont		1,500	120	6		
		Reserve of Artillery				160	8		
Fourth Corps	General Count Gerard	Twelfth Division	General Pecheux	4,000		160	8	14,260	38
		Thirteenth	—— Vichery	4,000		160	8		
		Fourteenth	—— Hulot	4,000		160	8		
		Sixth Division of Cavalry	—— Morin		1,500	120	6		
		Reserve of Artillery				160	8		
Sixth Corps	General Count de Lobau	Nineteenth Division	General Simmer	3,500		170	8	11,770	38
		Twentieth	—— Jeanin	3,500		160	8		
		Twenty-first	—— Teste	4,000		160	8		
		Reserve of Artillery				280	14		
Imperial Guard		Young Guard	General Duhesme	3,800		320	16	18,520	96
		Chasseurs	—— Moraud	4,250		320	16		
		Grenadiers	—— Friant	4,420		320	16		
		Light Cavalry	—— Lefevre Desnouettes		2,120	240	12		
		Reserve Cavalry	—— Guyot		2,010	240	12		
		Reserve Artillery	—— Devaux			480	24		
Reserves of Cavalry, Marshal Grouchy. First Corps	General Count Pajol	Fourth Division	General Soult		1,280	120	6	2,760	
		Fifth	—— Subervick		1,240	120	6		
Second Corps	General Count Excelmans	Ninth	—— Strolz		1,300	120	6	2,840	
		Tenth	—— Chastel		1,300	120	6		
Third Corps	General Count Kellerman	Eleventh	—— L'Heritier		1,310	120	6	2,850	48
		Twelfth	—— Roussel		1,300	120	6		
Fourth Corps	General Count Milhaut	Thirteenth	—— Wathier		1,300	120	6	2,840	
		Fourteenth	—— Delort		1,300	120	6		
			Total	85,320	20,460	7,020	350	113,300	
			Bridge Equipages, Sappers, &c.					2,200	
			General Total of the Army					115,500	350

No. IV.

TABLE, SHOWING THE CORPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF THE EMPEROR, ON THE 16TH OF JUNE, 1815; THOSE WHICH WERE ENGAGED; AND THE LOSSES THEY SUSTAINED.

Designations.		Force of each Corps in				Total per Corps, in		Distribution of the Corps on the 16th of June.	Losses in Killed, Wounded, &c. on the 15th and 16th of June.	Total present on the Morning of the 17th.	
Army Corps.	Divisions.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.		Men.	Cannon.			Men.	Cannon.
				Men.	Cannon.						
Imperial Guard	Gen. Duhesme's Div. of Young Guard	3,600	.....	320	16	16,160	84	Between Fleurus and the village of St. Amand	100	16,060	84
	Division of Middle Guard	4,250	.....	320	16						
	Division of Old Guard	4,420	.....	320	16						
	Gen. Guyot's Div. Dragoons and Grenadiers	.....	2,010	240	12						
	Reserve of Artillery	.....	.....	480	24						
Detachment of the Second Corps	General Girard's Division	5,000	.....	160	8	5,160	8	On the left of St. Amand. Had bivouacked at Vagnies	2,000	3,160	8
Third Corps, Gen. Count Vandamme	Lefol's, Bertezone's, and Huhert's Div's	13,030	.....	480	24	15,290	38	Attacked the village of St. Amand	1,930	13,360	38
	Gen. Domont's Division of Cavalry	.....	1,500	120	6						
	Reserve of Artillery	.....	.....	160	8						
Fourth Corps, Gen. Count Gerard.	Pecheux', Vicheri's, and Hulot's Divisions	12,000	.....	480	24	14,260	38	Attacked the village of Ligny	2,170	1,290	38
	Gen. Morin's Div. of Cavalry	.....	1,500	120	6						
	Reserve of Artillery	.....	.....	160	8						
Sixth Corps, Gen. Count Lobau	Simmer's, Jeaunin's, and Teste's Divisions	11,000	.....	480	24	11,770	38	In reserve at Charleroi the chief part of the day, and did not arrive until the battle was gained	.....	11,770	38
	Reserve of Artillery	.....	.....	290	14						
Reserves of Cavalry, Marshal Count Grouchy: —											
First Corps, Gen. Count Pajol	Soult's and Subervick's Divisions	.....	2,520	240	12	2,760	12	Opposite the village of Sombref	250	2,510	12
Second Corps, Gen. Count Excelmans	Stroltz' and Chastel's Divisions	.....	2,600	240	12	2,840	12	Idem	250	2,590	12
Fourth Corps, Gen. Count Milhaut	Vathier's and Delort's Div's of Cuirassiers	.....	2,600	240	12	2,840	12	Idem	100	2,740	12
		53,500	12,730	4,850	242	71,080	242		6,800	64,280	242

RECAPITULATION.

Total Amount of the Troops under the immediate command of the Emperor, on the 16th of June: —

	Men.	Cannon.
Engaged at Ligny	59,310	204
In Reserve	11,770	38
	71,080	242
Losses sustained on the 15th and 16th	6,800	—
Present under arms on the morning of the 17th	64,280	242



No. V.

TABLE, SHOWING THE CORPS UNDER THE COMMAND OF MARSHAL NEY, ON THE 16TH OF JUNE, 1815; THOSE WHICH WERE ENGAGED; AND THE LOSSES THEY SUSTAINED.

Designations.		Force of each Corps in				Amount of each Corps in		Losses in Killed and Wounded on the 16th.	Amount of the Troops present under arms on themorning of the 17th.	Observations.
Army Corps.	Divisions.	Infantry	Cavalry.	Artillery. Men.	Artillery. Cannon.	Men.	Cannon.			
Corps engaged at Quatre Bras	Second Corps, Gen. Reille	Three Divisions of Infantry, Foi's, Prince Jerome's, and Bachelu's	16,100	.....	490	24	18,370	38	3,720	14,650	The Fourth Division of this Corps was detached to St. Amand.
		One Division of Cavalry, Gen. Piré's	.....	1,500	120	6					
		Reserve of Artillery	.....	.....	160	8					
	Kellerman's Cuirassiers	Two Divisions of Cuirassiers, L'Heritier's and Roussel's	.....	2,610	240	12	2,850	12	300	2,550	One of the Divisions of Cuirassiers did not proceed to Frasnes until the close of the Battle.
	First Corps, Gen. d'Erlong	One Division of Cavalry, Gen. Jacquinot's	.....	1,500	120	6	1,620	6	120	1,500	
Corps left in the Rear, and which were not engaged at Quatre Bras	First Corps, Gen. d'Erlong	Four Divisions of Infantry, Alix's, Douzelot's, Marcognet's, and Durutte's	16,220	.....	640	32	17,020	40	.....	17,020	The First Corps proceeded to Frasnes by St. Amand, and afterwards returned on Frasnes: it was not engaged either at Liguy or Quatre Bras.
		Reserve of Artillery	.....	.....	160	8					
	Imperial Guard	Division of Cavalry, Gen. Lefebvre Desnouettes	.....	2,100	240	12	2,340	12	.....	2,340	
		Total	32,320	7,710	2,170	103	42,200	108	4,140	38,060	

RECAPITULATION.

Total Amount of the Troops under the command of Marshal Ney, on the 16th of June.

	Men.	Cannon.
Engaged at Quatre Bras	22,840	56
Left in the Rear	19,360	52
	42,200	108
Losses sustained on the 16th	4,140	—
Present under arms on the morning of the 17th	38,060	108

No. VI.

TABLE, SHOWING APPROXIMATIVELY THE AMOUNT OF THE ANGLO-BELGIC ARMY, UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, ON THE 14TH OF JUNE, 1815.

Corps.	Divisions.	Commanders.	Brigades.	Commanders.	Regiments.	Total, per Brigade.
First Army Corps, commanded by the Prince of Orange.	First English	Major General Cooke	First English	Major General Maitland	1st Guards, 2d Battalion... / Idem... 3d Idem...	2,000
			Second Idem	Major General Byng	2d Guards, 3d Battalion / 3d Idem... Idem...	2,000
	Third Idem	Lieut. Gen. Alten	Fifth Idem	Major General Halket	30th, 35d, 69th, 73d	3,200
			Second of the German Legion	Colonel Ompteda	5th, 5th, 1st, 2d light	3,000
			First Hanoverian	Major General Kielmanseg	Duke of York's, Grugenhageo, Bremen, Luneberg, Verden	3,600
	First Belgic	Lieut. Gen. Chassé	Belgic	Major General R.		3,800
	Second Idem	Lieut. Gen Perponcher.	Idem	Idem		3,600
			Idem	Major General Van Byland		4,000
			Nassau	Prince Bernard	Nassau Orange, &c.	4,000
	Third Idem	Lieut. Gen. Collaert	Belgic	Major General N.		3,800
			Idem	Idem		3,400
			Third English	Major General Adams	52d, 71st, 95th (1st and 2d Battalions)	3,200
	Second English	Lieut. Gen. Clinton	First of the German Legion	Colonel Du Plat	1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th	3,100
			Third Hanoverian	Colonel Halket	Bremen, Vorde, Salzgitter, 2d and 3d Battalions Duke of York's	3,400
Second Army Corps, commanded by Lord Hill.	Fourth Idem	Lieut. Gen. Colville	Fourth English	Colonel Mitchel	14th, 23d, 51st	2,600
			Sixth Idem	Major General Johnstone	55th, 54th, 59th, 91st	3,100
			Sixth Hanoverian	Major General Lyon	Calemberg, Lauenberg, Hoya, Nienburg, Beutheim	3,500
	Fifth Idem	Lieut. Gen. Picton	Eighth English	Major General Kempt	28th, 32d, 79th, 95th	3,400
			Ninth Idem	Major General Pack	1st, 42d, 44th, 92d	3,200
			Fifth Hanoverian	Colonel Vincke	Hamelin, Hildesheim, Peina, Giffhorn.	3,100
	Sixth Idem	Lieut. Gen. Cole	Tenth English	Major General Lambert	4th, 27th, 40th, 81st	3,200
			Fourth Hanoverian	Colonel Best	Luneberg, Verden, Osterode, Munden	3,200
			Seventh English	Major General Mackenzie	25th, 37th, 78th	2,500
	First Foreign	Duke of Brunswick	Brunswick			3,500
Cavalry, commanded by Lord Uxbridge.			First English	Major General Lord Somerset	1st and 2d Body Guards, 1st Dragoon Guards, or Royal Horse Guards	1,600
			Second	Major General Ponsonby	1st, 2d, and 3d Dragoons	1,500
			Third	Major General Domeberg	1st, 2d, and 3d Light Dragoons	1,600
			Fourth	Major General Vandeleur	11th, 12th, 16th Idem	1,600
			Fifth	Major General Grant	2d, 7th, 15th Hussars	1,400
			Sixth	Major General Vivian	1st, 10th, 18th Idem	1,600
			Seventh	Colonel Areuschilt	3d Hussars, 13th Light Dragoons	1,100
			First Hanoverian	Colonel Estorff	Prince Regent's, Bremen, and Verden Hussars	1,200
			First Belgic	Colonel Grigni	1st, 2d, 3d Carabineers	1,500
			Second Idem	Colonel Van Merlen	1st, 2d, 3d Hussars	1,600
			First Brunswick	N.	Lancers and Dragoons	900
						95,000
Artillery, commanded by Colonel Woon			English, Thirty Brigades, (each Six Pieces of Cannon: total, 180 cannon)			4,500
Engineers, commanded by Colonel Smidt			Dutch, Belgic, &c. (78 cannon)			2,000
			Sappers, Miners, &c.			1,000
					Total, Men	102,500
					Cannon	258

RECAPITULATION.

	Men.	Guns.
Infantry	79,400	—
Cavalry	15,600	—
Artillery, Engineers, &c.	7,500	258
Total	102,500	258

No. VII.

LONDON GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY,
JUNE 22, 1815.

Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the War Department.

Waterloo, June 19, 1815.

My Lord;

Bonaparte having collected the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth corps of the French army, and the imperial guards, and nearly all the cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river and the Meuse, between the 10th and 14th of the month, advanced on the 15th, and attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobez, on the Sambre, at daylight in the morning.

I did not hear of these events till the evening of the 15th, and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march; and afterwards to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack.

The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on that day; and General Ziethen, who commanded the corps which had been at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus; and Marshal Prince Blucher concentrated the Prussian army

upon Sombref, holding the villages, in front of his position, of St. Amand and Ligny.

The enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi towards Brussels, and on the same evening, the 15th, attacked a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, under the Prince of Weimar, posted at Frasnes, and forced it back to the farm house on the same road, called Les Quatre Bras.

The Prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade with another of the same division, under General Perponcher, and in the morning early regained part of the ground which had been lost, so as to have the command of the communication leading from Nivelles and Brussels, with Marshal Blucher's position.

In the mean time I had directed the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras; and the fifth division, under Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Picton, arrived about half past two in the day, followed by the corps of troops under the Duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau.

At this time the enemy commenced an attack upon Prince Blucher with his whole force, excepting the first and second corps, and a corps of cavalry under General Kellerman, with which he attacked our posts at Les Quatre Bras.

The Prussian army maintained their position with their usual gallantry and perseverance,

against a great disparity of numbers, as the fourth corps of their army, under General Bulow, had not joined, and I was not able to assist them as I wished, as I was attacked myself, and the troops, the cavalry in particular, which had a long distance to march, had not arrived.

We maintained our position also, and completely defeated and repulsed all the enemy's attempts to get possession of it. The enemy repeatedly attacked us with a large body of infantry and cavalry, supported by a numerous and powerful artillery; he made several charges with the cavalry upon our infantry, but all were repulsed in the steadiest manner. In this affair, His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, the Duke of Brunswick, and Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Picton, and Major General Sir James Kempt and Sir Denis Pack, who were engaged from the commencement of the enemy's attack, highly distinguished themselves, as well as Lieutenant General Charles Baron Alten, Major General Sir C. Halket, Lieutenant General Cooke, and Major Generals Maitland and Byng, as they successively arrived. The troops of the fifth division, and those of the Brunswick corps, were long and severely engaged, and conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry. I must particularly mention the twenty-eighth, forty-second, seventy-ninth, and ninety-second regiments, and the battalions of Hanoverians.

Our loss was great, as your Lordship will perceive by the enclosed return, and I have particularly to regret his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick, who fell, fighting gallantly at the head of his troops.

Although Marshal Blucher had maintained his position at Sombref, he still found himself much weakened by the severity of the contest in which he had been engaged, and as the fourth corps had not arrived, he determined to fall back and concentrate his army upon Wavres; and he marched in the night after the action was over.

This movement of the Marshal's rendered necessary a corresponding one on my part, and I retired from the farm of Quatre Bras upon Gennape, and thence upon Waterloo the next morning, the 17th, at ten o'clock.

The enemy made no effort to pursue Marshal Blucher; on the contrary, a patrole, which I sent to Sombref in the morning, found all quiet, and the enemy's videttes fell back as the patrole advanced. Neither did he attempt to molest our march to the rear, although made in the middle of the day, excepting by following, with a large body of cavalry, brought from his right, the cavalry under the Earl of Uxbridge.

This gave Lord Uxbridge an opportunity of charging them with the first life guards, upon their debouche from the village of Gennape, upon which occasion his Lordship has

declared himself to be well satisfied with that regiment.

The position which I took up in the front of Waterloo, crossed the high roads from Charleroi and Nivelle, and had its right thrown back to a ravine near Merke Braine, which was occupied; and its left extended to a height above the hamlet Ter la Haye, which was likewise occupied. In front of the right centre, and near the Nivelle road, we occupied the house and garden of Hougoumont, which covered the return of that flank; and in front of the left centre we occupied the farm of La Haie Sainte. By our left we communicated with Marshal Prince Blucher at Wavres through Ohain; and the Marshal had promised me, that in case we should be attacked he would support me with one or more corps, as might be necessary.

The enemy collected his army, with the exception of the third corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Blucher, on a range of heights in our front, in the course of the night of the 17th, and yesterday morning: and at about ten o'clock he commenced a furious attack upon our post at Hougoumont. I had occupied that post with a detachment from General Byng's brigade of guards, which was in position in its rear; and it was for some time under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Macdonel, and afterwards of Colonel Home; and I am happy to add, that it

was maintained throughout the day with the utmost gallantry by these brave troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large bodies of the enemy to obtain possession of it.

This attack upon the right of our centre was accompanied by a very heavy cannonade upon our whole line, which was destined to support the repeated attacks of cavalry and infantry, occasionally mixed, but sometimes separate, which were made upon it. In one of these the enemy carried the farm house of La Haie Sainte, as the detachment of the light battalion of the legion which occupied it had expended all its ammunition, and the enemy occupied the only communication there was with them.

The enemy repeatedly charged our infantry with his cavalry, but these attacks were uniformly unsuccessful, and they afforded opportunities to our cavalry to charge, in one of which Lord E. Somerset's brigade, consisting of the life guards, royal horse guards, and first dragoon guards, highly distinguished themselves, as did that of Major General Sir W. Ponsonby, having taken many prisoners and an eagle.

These attacks were repeated till about seven in the evening, when the enemy made a desperate effort with the cavalry and infantry, supported by the fire of the artillery, to force our left centre near the farm of La Haie Sainte, which, after a severe contest, was defeated;

and having observed, that the troops retired from this attack in great confusion, and that the march of General Bulow's corps by Euschermont upon Planchenoit and La Belle Alliance had begun to take effect, and as I could perceive the fire of his cannon, and as Marshal Blucher had joined in person with a corps of his army to the left of our line by Ohain, I determined to attack the enemy, and immediately advanced the whole line of infantry, supported by the cavalry and artillery.

The attack succeeded in every point; the enemy was forced from his position on the heights, and fled in the utmost confusion, leaving behind him, as far as I could judge, one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, which fell into our hands. I continued the pursuit till long after dark, and then discontinued it only on account of the fatigue of our troops, who had been engaged during twelve hours, and because I found myself on the same road with Marshal Blucher, who assured me of his intention to follow the enemy throughout the night: he has sent me word this morning, that he has taken sixty pieces of cannon belonging to the imperial guard, and several carriages, baggage, &c., belonging to Bonaparte, in Genape.

I propose to move, this morning, upon Nivelles, and not to discontinue my operations.

Your Lordship will observe, that such a desperate action could not be fought, and such advantages could not be gained without great loss; and I am sorry to add that ours has been immense. In Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Picton his Majesty has sustained the loss of an officer, who has frequently distinguished himself in his service, and he fell gloriously leading his division to a charge with bayonets, by which one of the most serious attacks made by the enemy on our position was defeated. The Earl of Uxbridge, after having successfully got through this arduous day, received a wound by almost the last shot fired, which will, I am afraid, deprive his Majesty for some time of his services.

His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange distinguished himself by his gallantry and conduct, till he received a wound from a musket ball through the shoulder, which obliged him to quit the field.

It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lordship, that the army never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better. The division of guards, under Lieutenant General Cooke (who is severely wounded), Major General Maitland, and Major General Byng, set an example, which was followed by all; and there is no officer, nor description of troops, that did not behave well.

I must however particularly mention, for his

Royal Highness's approbation, Lieutenant General Sir H. Clinton; Major General Adam; Lieutenant General Charles Baron Alten, severely wounded; Major General Sir Colin Halket, severely wounded; Colonel Ompteda; Colonel Mitchell, commanding a brigade of the fourth division; Major General Sir James Kempt and Sir Denis Pack; Major General Lambert; Major General Lord E. Somerset; Major General Sir W. Ponsonby; Major General Sir C. Grant and Major General Sir H. Vivian; Major General Sir O. Vandeleur; Major General Count Dörnberg. I am also particularly indebted to General Lord Hill for his assistance and conduct upon this as upon all former occasions.

The artillery and engineer departments were conducted much to my satisfaction by Colonel Sir G. Wood and Colonel Smyth; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Adjutant General Major General Barnes, who was wounded; and of the Quarter Master General Colonel Delancey, who was killed by a cannon shot in the middle of the action. This officer is a serious loss to his Majesty's service, and to me at this moment. I was likewise much indebted to the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who was severely wounded, and of the officers composing my personal staff, who have suffered severely in this action. Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable

Sir Alexander Gordon, who has died of his wounds, was a most promising officer, and is a serious loss to His Majesty's service.

General Kruse, of the Nassau service, likewise conducted himself much to my satisfaction, as did General Trip, commanding the heavy brigade of cavalry, and General Vanhope, com manding a brigade of infantry of the King of the Netherlands.

General Pozzo di Borgo, General Baron Vincent, General Muffling, and General Alava, were in the field during the action, and rendered me every assistance in their power. Baron Vincent is wounded, but I hope not severely: and General Pozzo di Borgo received a contusion.

I should not do justice to my feelings, or to Marshal Blucher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them.

The operation of General Bulow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one, and even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire, if his attacks should have failed; and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded.

I send, with this dispatch, two eagles taken by the troops in this action, which Major Percy

will have the honour of laying at the feet of his Royal Highness. I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's protection.

I have the honour, &c.

WELLINGTON.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received a report that Major General Sir William Ponsonby is killed; and in announcing this intelligence to your Lordship, I have to add the expression of my grief for the fate of an officer, who had already rendered very brilliant and important services, and was an ornament to his profession.

Second P. S. I have not yet got the returns of killed and wounded; but I enclose a list of officers killed and wounded on the two days, as far as the same can be made out without the returns; and I am very happy to add, that Colonel Delancey is not dead, and that strong hopes of his recovery are entertained.

BRITISH OFFICERS KILLED.

Duke of Brunswick Oels.

Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Picton.

Four Colonels, four Lieutenant Colonels, Seven Majors, thirteen Captains, two Lieutenants, two Ensigns.

WOUNDED.

H. R. H. the Prince of Orange, severely.

Lieutenant General the Earl of Uxbridge, left leg amputated.

Lieutenant General Charles Alten, severely.

Six Major Generals, five Colonels, seventeen Lieutenant Colonels, thirteen Majors, twelve Captains, twenty-three Lieutenants.

No. VIII.

Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst.

Orville, June 29.

My Lord;

Being aware of the anxiety existing in England to receive the returns of killed and wounded in the late actions, I now send lists of the officers, and expect to be able to send this evening returns of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The amount of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, British and Hanoverian, killed, wounded, and missing, is between twelve and thirteen thousand.

Your Lordship will see in the enclosed lists the names of some most valuable officers lost to his Majesty's service: among them I cannot avoid to mention Colonel Cameron of the ninety-second, and Colonel Sir H. Ellis of the twenty-third regiments, to whose conduct I have frequently drawn your Lordship's attention, and

who at last fell distinguishing themselves at the head of the brave troops which they commanded.

Notwithstanding the glory of the occasion, it is impossible not to lament such men, both on account of the public and as friends.

I have the honour, &c.

WELLINGTON.

LIST OF THE KILLED, WOUNDED, &c. ON THE 16TH OF JUNE.

English.

Killed. One Officer of the General Staff, one Lieutenant Colonel, four Captains, eleven Lieutenants, nine Ensigns, one Staff Officer, seventeen Sergeants, three Drummers, two hundred and sixty-nine Privates, and nineteen Horses.

Total Men 316

Wounded. Four Lieutenant Colonels, seven Majors, thirty-six Captains, sixty-eight Lieutenants, twenty-three Ensigns, four Staff Officers, one hundred Sergeants, six Drummers, one thousand nine hundred and nine Privates, fourteen Horses.

Total Men 2,130

Missing. One Captain, two Sergeants, two Drummers, twenty-seven Privates.

Total 34

Hanoverians.

Killed. Two Lieutenants, two Sergeants, one Drummer, twenty-nine Privates.

Total 32

Wounded. Three Captains, six Lieutenants, five Ensigns, eleven Sergeants, one hundred and ninety-eight Privates.

Total..... 235

Missing. One Captain, two Ensigns, four Sergeants, one hundred and forty-two Privates..... 149

Total 2,884

Of whom, three hundred and fifty are killed, two thousand three hundred and fifty-three wounded, and one hundred and eighty-one missing.

ON THE 17TH OF JUNE.

English.

Killed. One Lieutenant, one Sergeant, fifty-four Privates..... 56

Wounded. One Captain, two Lieutenants, eight Sergeants, forty-one Privates..... 52

Missing. One Major, two Captains, one Lieutenant, two Sergeants, one Drummer, thirty Privates..... 37

Hanoverians.

Killed. Nine Privates..... 9

Wounded. One Major, one Captain, two Ensigns, five Sergeants, seventy-one Privates..... 80

Missing. One Drummer, one Sergeant, thirty-two Privates..... 34

Total..... 268

Of whom sixty-five are killed, one hundred and thirty-two wounded, and seventy-one missing.

ON THE 18TH OF JUNE.

English.

Killed. Two Generals, one Colonel, three Lieutenant Colonels, six Majors, forty-six Captains, twenty-six Lieutenants, nineteen Ensigns or Cornets, five Officers of the Staff, two Quarter Masters, one hundred Sergeants, thirteen Drummers, one thousand five hundred and thirty-six Privates, one thousand four hundred and twenty-six Horses.

Total Men,..... 1,759

Wounded. Ten Generals, four Colonels, twenty-one Lieutenant Colonels, twenty-eight Majors, one hundred and seven Captains, two hundred and two Lieutenants, forty-seven Ensigns or Cornets, seventeen Officers of the Staff, three Quarter Masters, three hundred and thirty Sergeants, thirty-six Drummers, five thousand and eighty-seven Privates, eighty-six Horses.

Total Men..... 5,792

Missing. One Lieutenant-Colonel, four Captains, five Lieutenants, two Cornets, seventeen Sergeants, fifteen Drummers, seven hunded and sixty-three Privates, seven hundred and sixty-two Horses.

Total Men..... 807

8,358

Hanoverians.

Killed. One Lieutenant Colonel, two Captains, two Lieutenants, 3 Cornets, seven Sergeants, two hundred and seventy three Privates..... 288

Wounded. Two Lieutenant Colonels, ten Majors, fifteen Captains, twenty-six Lieutenants, thirteen Ensigns or Cornets, two Officers of the Staff, thirty-one Sergeants, eleven Drummers, one thousand and fourteen Privates..... 1,124

Missing. One Major, one Lieutenant, one Ensign, five Officers of the Staff, twelve Sergeants, seventeen Drummers, seven hundred and seventy-nine Privates	816
Total	10,586

Of whom, two thousand and forty-seven are killed, six thousand nine hundred and sixteen wounded, and one thousand six hundred and twenty-three missing.

Recapitulation.

Killed on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June	2,462
Wounded	9,401
Missing	1,875
Total	13,738
The number of Horses killed amounts to about	3,500

No. IX.

Official Report of the Operations of the Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine.

On the 15th of the present month, Napoleon, who had on the preceding day assembled five corps of his army, and several corps of his guard, between Maubeuge and Beaumont, commenced hostilities. The points of concentration of the four Prussian corps were Fleurus, Namur, Ciney, and Hannut; the situation of which made it possible to unite the army on one of these points in twenty-four hours.

Napoleon advanced on the 15th by the way of Thuin along both banks of the Sambre, against Charleroi. General Ziethen had collected the

first corps near Fleurus, and had on that day a very warm action with the enemy, who, after having taken Charleroi, directed his march upon Fleurus. General Ziethen maintained himself in his position near that place.

Field Marshal Blucher intending to fight a great battle with the enemy as soon as possible, the three other corps of the Prussian army were consequently directed upon Sombref, a league and a half from Fleurus. The second and third corps arrived on the 15th; the fourth corps did not join until the 16th.

The Duke of Wellington united his army between Ath and Nivelles, which would have enabled him to support Field Marshal Blucher, even if the battle had been fought on the 15th.

Battle of Ligny, June 16.

The Prussian army was posted on the heights between Brie and Sombref, and around the latter place; it occupied with a large force the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, situate in its front. Meantime only three corps of the army had joined; the fourth, which was stationed between Liege and Hannut, had been delayed in its march by several circumstances, and was not yet come up. Nevertheless, Field Marshal Blucher resolved to give battle, the Duke of Wellington having already put in motion to support him a

strong division of his army, as well as his whole reserve, stationed in the environs of Brussels, and the fourth corps of the Prussian army being also on the point of arriving.

The battle began at three P. M. The enemy brought up above one hundred and thirty thousand men, the Prussian army was eighty thousand strong. The village of St. Amand was the first point attacked by the enemy, who carried it after a vigorous resistance. He then directed his efforts against Ligny; it is a large village, solidly built, situate on a rivulet of the same name. It was there that a contest began, which may be considered as one of the most obstinate recorded in history. Villages have often been taken and retaken; but here the battle continued for five hours in the village itself, and the movements forwards and backwards were confined to a very narrow space.

On both sides, fresh troops continually came up. Each army had, behind the part of the village which it occupied, great masses of infantry, which maintained the combat, and were continually renewed by the reinforcements which they received from their rear, as well as from the heights on the right and left. About two hundred cannon were directed from both sides against the village, which was set on fire in several places at once. From time to time, the

combat extended along the whole of the line, the enemy having engaged some troops with the third corps; however, the heat of the battle was always at Ligny. Things seemed to take a favourable turn for the Prussian troops; a part of the village of St. Amand having been retaken from the French by a battalion commanded by the Field Marshal in person, this advantage enabled us to reoccupy the height which had been abandoned after the loss of St. Amand. Still the contest at Ligny continued with the same fury. The issue seemed to depend on the arrival of the English troops, or on that of the fourth corps of the Prussian army: in fact, the arrival of this last division would have afforded the Field Marshal the means of immediately making an attack with his right wing, from which great success might have been expected; but news arrived that the English division destined to support us was violently attacked by a corps of the French army, and that it had difficulty in maintaining itself in its position at Quatre Bras. The fourth Prussian corps did not appear. So that we were forced to maintain alone the contest with an enemy greatly superior in numbers.

The evening was now far advanced, and the combat about Ligny continued with the same fury and the same equality of success; we invoked, but in vain, the arrival of those succours,

which were so necessary; the danger became every hour more and more urgent; all the divisions were engaged, or had already been so, and there was not any corps at hand able to support them. Suddenly a division of the enemy's infantry, which, by favour of the night, had made a circuit round the village without being observed, and some regiments of cuirassiers, who at the same time had forced the passage on the other side, took in the rear the main body of our army, which was posted behind the houses. This surprise, on the part of the enemy, was decisive, especially at the moment when our cavalry, also posted on a height behind the village, was repulsed by the enemy's repeated attacks.

Our infantry in the rear of Ligny did not however suffer itself to be discouraged, either by being surprised by the enemy in the dark, a circumstance which exaggerates in the mind of man the dangers to which he finds himself exposed, or by the idea of seeing itself surrounded on all sides: it formed in masses, coolly repulsed all the attacks of the cavalry, and retreated in good order upon the heights, whence it continued its retrograde movement upon Tilly. The sudden irruption of the enemy's cavalry having obliged our artillery to retreat with precipitation, several of our cannon took directions which led them

into defiles, in which disorder took place; in this manner fifteen pieces fell into the hands of the enemy.

At the distance of a quarter of a league from the field of battle, the army formed again. The enemy did not venture to pursue it. The village of Brie remained in our possession during the night, as well as Sombref, where General Thielman had fought with the third corps, and whence he at day-break slowly began to retreat towards Gembloux, where the fourth corps, under General Bulow, had at length arrived during the night. The first and second corps proceeded in the morning behind the defile of Mount St. Guibert. Our loss in killed and wounded was great; the enemy however took from us no prisoners, except the wounded.

The battle was lost, but not our honour. Our soldiers fought with a bravery, which surpassed every expectation: their fortitude remained unshaken, because every one retained his confidence in his own strength. On this day Field Marshal Blucher encountered the greatest dangers. A charge of cavalry, led on by himself, had failed, and the enemy's cavalry pursued him vigorously. A musket shot having struck the Field Marshal's horse, the animal, far from being stopped in his career, became irritated by the wound, and gallopped more furiously till it dropped down dead. The Field Marshal, stunned

by the violent fall, lay entangled under the horse. The enemy's cuirassiers, following up their advantage, advanced; our last horseman had already passed by the Field Marshal; an adjutant alone remained with him, and had just alighted, resolved to share his fate. The danger was great, but Heaven watched over us. The enemy, pursuing their charge, passed rapidly by the Field Marshal without perceiving him; the next moment, a second charge of our cavalry having repelled them, they again passed by him with the same precipitation, not perceiving him any more than they had done the first time. Then, but not without difficulty, the Field Marshal was disengaged from under his dead horse; he was immediately mounted on the horse of a dragoon.

On the 17th, in the evening, the Prussian army concentrated itself in the environs of Wavres. Napoleon put himself in motion against the Duke of Wellington, upon the great road leading from Charleroi to Brussels. An English division maintained, on the same day, near Quatre Bras, a very severe contest with the enemy. The Duke of Wellington had taken a position on the road to Brussels, having his right wing leaning on Braine-la-Leud, the centre near Mont St. Jean, and the left wing against La Haie Sainte. The Duke of Wellington wrote to the Field Marshal, that he was resolved to ac-

cept battle in this position, if the Field Marshal would support him with two corps. The Field Marshal promised to come with his whole army. He even proposed, in case Napoleon should not attack, that the allies themselves, with their whole united force, should attack him the next day.

This may serve to show how little the battle of the 16th had disorganised the Prussian army, or lowered its spirit.

Thus ended the day of the 17th.

Battle of La Belle Alliance (*Waterloo*).

At break of day the Prussian army again began to move. The fourth and second corps marched by St. Lambert, where they were to take a position, covered by the forest of Frechemont, with the view of following the enemy's rear, when the moment should appear favourable. The first corps was to operate by Ohain, on the right flank of the enemy. The third corps was to follow slowly, in order to afford succour in case of need. The battle began about ten A. M. The English army occupied the heights of Mont St. Jean, that of the French was on the heights before Planchenoit; the former was about eighty thousand strong, the enemy had above one hundred and thirty thousand. In a short time the battle became general along the whole line. It appeared to be Napoleon's design to throw the

left wing upon the centre, and thus to effect the separation of the English army from the Prussian, which he believed retreated upon Maestricht. For this purpose he had placed the greater part of his reserve in the centre, against his right wing, and upon this point he attacked with fury. The English fought with a valour, which it is impossible to surpass. The repeated charges of the old guard were baffled by the intrepidity of the Scotch regiments, and at every charge the French cavalry was overthrown by the English cavalry. But the superiority in numbers of the enemy was too great; Napoleon continually brought forward considerable masses; and with whatever firmness the English troops maintained themselves in their position, it was not possible but that such heroic exertions must have a limit.

It was half past four o'clock. The excessive difficulties of the passage by the defile of St. Lambert had considerably retarded the march of the Prussian columns, so that only two brigades of the fourth corps had arrived at the covered position, which was assigned them, The decisive moment was come; no time was to be lost. The Generals did not suffer it to escape. They resolved immediately to begin the attack with the troops which they had at hand. General Bulow, therefore, with two brigades and a corps

of cavalry, advanced rapidly along the rear of the enemy's right wing. The enemy did not lose his presence of mind; he instantly turned his reserve against us, and a murderous conflict began on that side. The event of this combat remained long uncertain, while the battle with the English army still continued with the same violence,

Towards six P. M. we were informed, that General Thielman with the third corps was attacked near Wavres by a very considerable enemy's corps, and that they were already disputing the possession of the town. The Field Marshal, however, did not suffer himself to be disturbed by this news; it was on the spot where he was, and nowhere else, that the affair was to be decided. A conflict continually supported with the same obstinacy, and kept up by fresh troops, could alone ensure the victory, and if it was obtained here, any reverse sustained near Wavres was of little consequence. The columns therefore continued their movement. It was half past seven, and the issue of the battle was still uncertain. The whole of the fourth corps, and a part of the second, under General Pwich, had been successively engaged. The French troops fought with all the fury of despair; however, some uncertainty was perceived in their movements, and it was observed, that some pieces of

cannon were retreating. At this moment the first columns of General Ziethen's corps arrived on the points of attack, near the village of Smouhen, on the enemy's right flank, and instantly charged. This movement decided the defeat of the enemy. His right wing was broken in three places, and he abandoned his positions. Our troops rushed forward to the charge, and attacked him on all sides, while, at the same time, the whole English line advanced.

Circumstances were extremely favourable for the attack formed by the Prussian army: the ground was elevated into an amphitheatre, so that our artillery could freely open its fire from the summit of a great many heights, which rose gradually above each other, and in the intervals of which the troops descended into the plain, and formed into brigades in the greatest order, while fresh troops, continually issuing from the forest, unfolded themselves on the height behind us. The enemy, however, still preserved means to retreat, till the village of Planchenoit, which he had on his rear, and which was defended by the guard, was, after several bloody attacks, carried by storm. From that time the retreat became a rout, which soon spread throughout the whole French army.

It was now half past nine: the Field Marshal assembled all the superior officers, and gave

orders to send the last horse and the last man in pursuit of the enemy. The van of the army accelerated its march. The French army, pursued without intermission, was absolutely disorganised. The highway presented the appearance of an immense shipwreck: it was covered with an innumerable quantity of cannon, caissons, carriages, baggage, arms, and wrecks of every kind. Such parties of the enemy as attempted to repose for a time, not expecting to be so quickly pursued, were driven successively from more than nine bivouacs. In some villages they attempted to maintain themselves; but as soon as they heard the beating of our drums, or the sound of the trumpet, they either fled or threw themselves into the houses, where they were cut down or made prisoners. The moonlight greatly favoured the pursuit; for the whole march was but a continued chase, either in the corn fields or in the houses.

At Gennape the enemy had entrenched himself with cannon and overturned carriages. At the entrance we were exposed to a brisk fire of musketry; we replied by some cannon shot, followed by a hurrah, and an instant after the town was ours. It was here, that among many other equipages the carriage of Napoleon was taken; he had left it to mount on horseback, and in his hurry had forgotten in it his sword and hat. Thus

affairs continued till break of day. About forty thousand men, in the most complete disorder, were all that the enemy saved in his retreat by Charleroi. Only twenty pieces were all of his numerous artillery that he carried off.

The enemy, in his flight, has left behind him all his fortresses, the only defence of his frontiers, which are now also passed by our armies.

At three o'clock Napoleon dispatched, from the field of battle, a courier to Paris, with the news that victory was no longer doubtful; a few hours afterwards he had no longer an army. We have not got any exact account of the enemy's loss; it is enough to know, that two thirds of the whole army are killed, wounded, or prisoners; among the latter are Generals Duhesme and Cambrone. Up to this time, about three hundred cannon, and five hundred caissons, are in our hands.

Few victories have been so complete; and there is certainly no example of an army, two days after losing a battle, engaged in such an action, and so gloriously maintaining it. Honour be to the troops capable of so much firmness and valour! In the middle of the position occupied by the French army, and exactly upon the height, is a farm called La Belle Alliance. The march of all the Prussian columns was directed towards this farm, which was visible from

every side. There Napoleon was during the battle; it was there that he gave his orders, that he flattered himself with the hopes of victory; and it was there that his ruin was decided. There too it was, that, by a happy chance, Field Marshal Blucher and the Duke of Wellington met in the dark, and mutually saluted each other as victors.

In commemoration of the alliance, which now subsists between the English and Prussian nations, of the union of the two armies, and their reciprocal confidence, the Field Marshal desired, that this battle should bear the name of La Belle Alliance.

By order of Field Marshal Blucher,

GENERAL GNEISENAU.

No. X.

Reports from his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange to his Majesty the King of the Netherlands.

Head Quarters, Nivelles, June 17, 1815,
Two in the Morning.

Very early on the morning of the 15th, the Prussian army was attacked in its position, which

it abandoned, and retired from Charleroi, by Gosselies, as far as the environs of Fleurus. As soon as I was apprised of this attack, I gave the necessary orders to the corps of troops under my command. In consequence of what took place in the Prussian army, the battalion of Orange Nassau, which, together with a battery of light artillery, occupied the village of Frasnes, were attacked at five o'clock in the evening of the 15th. These troops maintained themselves in their position on the heights of this village, not far from the cross road called Quatre Bras. The skirmishing ceased upon this point at eight o'clock in the evening.

As soon as I was informed of this attack, I gave orders for the third division, as well as two English divisions, to move upon Nivelles; and to the second to maintain the position of Quatre Bras. Only a part of the second division was enabled to move thither immediately, in consequence of the brigade under the orders of Major General Byland not being able to leave Nivelles prior to the arrival of other troops at that place.

The firing of the tirailleurs commenced at five o'clock yesterday morning on this point, and was kept up on both sides until mid-day, without any result. About two o'clock the attack became much more severe, especially on

the part of the cavalry and artillery. The brigade of light cavalry, under the command of General Van Merlen, was not able to come up before four o'clock; previous to which time I had no cavalry to oppose to the enemy. Seeing of how great importance it was to preserve the position on the heights, in front of the cross road called Quatre Bras, I was fortunate in maintaining myself against an enemy, who was in every respect superior to me in force.

Having been attacked by the two French corps commanded by Generals d' Erlong and Reille, and having succeeded in checking them, the Duke of Wellington had time to assemble a sufficient force to foil the projects of the enemy. The result of this attack has been, that, after a very obstinate contest, which lasted till nine o'clock in the evening, we not only checked the enemy, but even repulsed him.

The Prussian army, which was also attacked yesterday, maintained its principal position; and there is no doubt, that Napoleon, with very considerable forces, will direct an attack upon the whole line.

Our troops bivouacked upon the field of battle, whither I shall immediately proceed, in expectation of the probability, that Napoleon will endeavour to execute to-day the project of yesterday. The Duke of Wellington has concen-

trated upon this point as many troops as he was able to collect.

I experience a lively pleasure in being able to announce to your Majesty, that your troops, the infantry and artillery in particular, fought with great courage.

Circumstances having prevented my receiving the reports from the different corps concerning their loss, I am unable to acquaint you with it; but I shall have the honour of doing it as soon as possible.

(Signed) WILLIAM PRINCE OF ORANGE.

Brussels, June 22, 1815.

After the battle of the 16th, of which I had the honour of giving your Majesty an account on the 17th, at two in the morning, from the head quarters at Nivelles, the Duke of Wellington, in order to keep in line with the Prussian army, made a movement in the morning, the result of which was, that the army, at six o'clock in the evening, found itself in position upon the heights in front of Waterloo, where it bivouacked; the enemy's cavalry, which followed the movements of the army, was in different attacks repulsed with loss by the British cavalry.

On the 18th at day-break we discovered the

enemy in our front; at ten o'clock his dispositions for the attack commenced.

The army of Bonaparte was composed of the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth corps, the imperial guard, nearly the whole of his cavalry, and a train of artillery, consisting of many hundred pieces of cannon. About eleven o'clock, the enemy unmasked a small battery, under the cover of the fire of which, his tirailleurs advanced against our right wing, and, immediately after, his attack was directed against a farm surrounded with copse wood, which was situate a short way in front of this wing, and on the left of the road leading to Nivelles. The enemy made the most furious, but fruitless attacks, to possess himself of this farm. At noon, the cannonade became violent; and before half past twelve the battle was extended along the whole line. The French repeatedly attacked both our wings; but as their principal object was to pierce the right of our centre, they employed all their means to accomplish it. Some columns of the enemy's cavalry advanced boldly against us; but, notwithstanding the inconceivable violence with which they renewed their attacks, from three o'clock in the afternoon until the end of the battle, they never succeeded in making our line waver. The enemy was constantly repulsed, as well from the fire of the squares, as by the charges of our

cavalry: it is impossible to depict to your Majesty the fury with which they fought, especially during the last six hours.

I was unfortunate in not being able to see the end of this glorious and important battle, having received, half an hour before the defeat of the enemy, a ball through my left shoulder, which compelled me to quit the field of battle.

It is with the most lively satisfaction that I am able to inform your Majesty, that your troops, of every description, have fought with the greatest courage. In the charges of cavalry, the brigade of carabineers attracted particular notice.

Lieutenant General Chasse's division was not engaged until late; and, as I was not able personally to quit the centre, I had placed him for the day under the orders of General Lord Hill, commanding the second corps of the army. I have heard that this division likewise conducted itself with much bravery, and that Lieutenant General Chasse, as also the two commanders of brigades, very satisfactorily acquitted themselves of their duty.

I cannot, at this moment, make any detail to your Majesty of the loss we have sustained, not having received the returns. I am obliged nevertheless, with the most profound regret, to state that it is considerable. The Generals of Division are charged to report to me those who

have particularly distinguished themselves, and I must confine myself to mentioning to your Majesty the names of the officers whose conduct happened to come under my own observation, *viz* :—

Lieutenant Generals Collaert and Perponcher; the former is wounded.

General Van Merle, an able and brave officer, died on the field of battle. I seize this opportunity of recommending his widow and children to the tender consideration of your Majesty.

General Trip particularly distinguished himself, both by his talents and his courage.

Major General Grigny, and the commanders of the three regiments of carabineers, namely, Lieutenant Colonel Conegrave, dead of his wounds; Colonel Bruine and Lieutenant Colonel Lechleitner.

Lieutenant Colonel Westenberg, of the fifth battalion of the national militia, is a very good officer, and conducted, with much discernment, his battalion, which behaved most gallantly in the battle of the 16th.

Major Eyman, of the third battalion, wounded.

Majors Merion and Bryas, of the second regiment of carabineers; the latter wounded.

Major Lassaraz of the artillery.

The Quarter Master General, Major General Constant Rebecque conducted himself excellently, and was of great assistance to me.

In fine, I consider myself bound to express to

your Majesty my satisfaction at the conduct of my Adjutants; Major Linburg Stirme was wounded in the battle of the 16th; in the battle of the 18th, Colonel Du Caylar and Major Ampt had each a horse killed under him, and Lieutenant Colonel Krokenburgh had two.

I have charged my Adjutant Van Hooft, to transmit this report to your Majesty. I take the liberty of recommending him to your favourable consideration.

(Signed) WILLIAM PRINCE OF ORANGE.

LOSS OF THE TROOPS OF THE NETHERLANDS.

Officers killed or missing	27
Wounded	115
Non-commissioned officers and soldiers killed or missing	2,058
Wounded	1,936
Total	4,136
Horses killed	1,630

No. XI.

Marshal De Grouchy's Account of the Affair at Wavres.

Dinant, June 20, 1815.

It was not till after seven in the evening of the 18th of June that I received the letter of the Duke of Dalmatia, which directed me to

march on St. Lambert and attack General Bulow. I fell in with the enemy as I was marching on Wavres.

He was immediately driven into Wavres; and General Vandamme's corps attacked that town and was warmly engaged. The portion of Wavres on the right of the Dyle was carried; but much difficulty was experienced in debouching on the other side. General Gerard was wounded by a ball in the breast, while endeavouring to carry the mill of Bielge, in order to pass the river, but in which he did not succeed; fortunately his wound is not mortal. Lieutenant General Aix had been killed in the attack on the town. In this state of things, being impatient to debouch on Mont St. Lambert, and co-operate with your Majesty's army on that important day, I detached on Limale Pajol's cavalry, Teste's division, and two divisions of Gerard's corps to force the passage of the Dyle and march against Bulow. Vandamme's corps, in the mean time, maintained the attack on Wavres and on the mill of Bielge, whence the enemy showed an intention to debouch, but which I did not conceive he was capable of effecting, the position and courage of our troops being pledges that he could not. My movement on Limale required time in proportion to the distance: I however arrived, executed the passage, and the

heights were carried by Vichery's division and the cavalry. Night did not permit us to advance farther, and I no longer heard the cannon on the side where your Majesty was engaged.

I halted in this situation until day-light. Wavres and Bielge were occupied by the Prussians; who, at three in the morning of the 19th, attacked in their turn, wishing to take advantage of the bad position in which I was, and expecting to drive me into the defile, and take the artillery which had debouched, and make me repass the Dyle. Their efforts were fruitless; the intrepidity of the troops enabled me to repel all their attacks, to overwhelm the Prussians, and to carry the village of Bielge by Teste's division. The brave General Penney was killed.

General Vandamme then passed one of his divisions by Bielge, and carried with ease the heights of Wavres, and, along the whole of my line, the success was complete. I was in front of Rozierne, preparing to march on Brussels, when I received the sad intelligence of the loss of the battle of Waterloo. The officer who brought it informed me that your Majesty was retreating on the Sambre, without being able to indicate any particular point on which I should direct my march. While engaged on the whole of my line I ceased to pursue, and began my retrograde movement. The retreating army did

not think of following me. I marched to Temploux and Gembloux, and had my light cavalry at Marc de St. Denis, and my dragoons on Namur. Learning that the enemy had already passed the Sambre, and was on my flank, and not being sufficiently strong to make a diversion in favour of your Majesty without compromising the army which I commanded, I marched on Namur; the fourth corps by the road from Namur to Charleroi, and the third by the direct road leading thither from Temploux. At this moment, the tails of the columns in the rear were attacked. That of the right made a retrograde movement sooner than was expected, which endangered for a moment the retreat of the left; but good dispositions soon repaired every thing, and two pieces which had been taken were recovered by the brave twentieth dragoons, who besides took an howitzer from the enemy. The weak squares of the .... regiment being charged by a numerous cavalry waited for their coming up within musket shot, and made them sustain a most enormous loss, and thus proved what proper dispositions, joined to coolness and a well directed fire, can accomplish. The enemy's cavalry was then charged by our first hussars headed by Camp Marshal Cleary, and left a number of prisoners in our hands. We entered Namur without loss. The long defile, which ex-

tends from this place to Dinant, in which only a single column can march, and the embarrassment arising from the numerous transports of wounded, rendered it necessary to hold for a considerable time the town, in which I had not the means of blowing up the bridge. I entrusted the defence of Namur to General Vandamme, who, with his usual intrepidity, maintained himself there till eight in the evening; so that nothing was left behind, and I occupied Dinant.

The enemy lost some thousands of men in the attack on Namur, where the contest was very obstinate. The troops have performed their duty in a manner worthy of praise.

(Signed) De Grouchy.

No. XII.

Letter from Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar to his Father.

In Bivouac near Waterloo, June 19.

Dear Father,

Thank God I am still alive and safe and sound, after two most sanguinary battles. The first was fought on the 16th, and the second yesterday. I beseech you, have Ferrary's Chart before you while you are reading my letter. I was cantoned during four weeks at

Gennape with the regiment of Orange Nassau, of which I am colonel. On the 15th, I was appointed Brigadier of the second brigade of Perponcher's division, my predecessor having unfortunately had his leg broken. By this appointment, I had, besides my two battalions of Orange Nassau, three battalions of the Duchy of Nassau placed under my command. My brigade then consisted of *four thousand men;* now I have only *twelve hundred* of them left!

On the 15th, the French fell upon the Prussian army, and pressed it furiously. My brigade prolonged the left wing of the Belgic army, the head quarters of which were at Braine-le-Comte; the head quarters of my division were at Nivelles. A Nassau battalion and a battery of Belgic horse artillery were stationed at Frasnes. When the Prussians retired on Fleurus, the post of Frasnes was attacked and carried. The infantry rushed into a wood on the right; the artillery retired fighting to Quatre Bras. I assembled my brigade on that important position, cannonaded the enemy, and succeeded in preventing his advance. I maintained this position throughout the whole of the night. Towards morning on the 16th, I was reinforced by a battalion of Belgic chasseurs, and a battalion of militia. Soon after this, my General of Division and the Prince of Orange arrived. I proceeded to the advanced posts with

the latter, and by his orders undertook a reconnoissance with a battalion and two pieces of cannon. Towards noon the enemy advanced strong columns, and began to cannonade us. We had only five battalions to oppose to him, and had the debouches of a wood to defend to the last extremity.

The Duke of Wellington was present at the commencement of the action; though I had but two pieces of cannon to defend myself, yet I maintained my ground for a considerable time against an army three times superior in numbers. The enemy at length gained possession of a wood opposite me, and incommoded my left flank. Without loss of time, I took with me some volunteers and a battalion of militia, and once more made myself master of the wood at the point of the bayonet. In cutting down some of the branches of the trees, I received a slight wound from my own sabre, but I never for a moment retired from the engagement. The wound is not worth noticing: I mention it only to prevent you and my dear mother from being alarmed by exaggerated reports. Whilst I was defending the wood, the enemy drove our left wing as far as Quatre Bras. At this moment the brave Duke of Brunswick was killed by a ball which entered his breast. Several strong columns turned my right flank; I applied for

orders to direct me now to proceed: but I received none. Finding that I was surrounded on all sides, and that the ammunition of my troops was exhausted, I retired in good order through the wood to the vicinity of Hautaine le Val. General Alten's Hanoverian division supported me; the wood was retaken and again lost. At length the English forced it with the loss of a considerable number of troops, and maintained themselves there throughout the night: I bivouacked there. That day the Prussians retreated on Wavres, and on hearing of this retreat, we were obliged to retire to the position near Mont St. Jean, between Gennape and Brussels: this took place on the 17th. We were under the necessity of bivouacking that night on very miry ground, and the rain poured in torrents.

Yesterday, at ten o'clock, commenced the decisive battle, which, towards evening, was completely gained by Wellington over Napoleon in person.

One hundred and sixty pieces of cannon have been gained by this sanguinary victory.

I commanded in the left wing, and was charged to preserve a village and a position: in this I succeeded, though with considerable loss. The victory was still doubtful, when, about four o'clock, the Prussians under Generals Bulow and Ziethen came up with our left flank, and

decided the battle. Unfortunately the Prussians, who were to have supported me in the village, mistook my Nassau troops for the French (for they still wear the French uniform, though in their hearts they are true Germans) and assailed them with a dreadful fire; they were driven from their position, and I rallied them at a quarter of a league from the field of battle. My General of Division, *whose first brigade is totally destroyed,* is at present with me.

I must now close my letter, for I have just received orders to march to Nivelles in pursuit of the enemy.

Adieu, dear father: salute for me my mother, my sister in law, my brother, and all my friends; and be assured that I will do all to render myself worthy of you.

Colonel and Brigadier
BERNARD OF SAXE WEIMAR.

No. XIII.

Declaration to the French People.

(Published on the 22d of June, 1815.)

FRENCHMEN;

In commencing the war for maintaining the national independance, I relied on the

union of all efforts, of all wills, and on the concurrence of all the national authorities. I had reason to hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of the powers leagued against me.

Circumstances are changed. I offer myself a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in their declarations, and may they really have no designs but against my person! My political life is at an end, and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon II, Emperor of the French.

The present members will provisionally form the council of government. The interest, which I take in my son's welfare, induces me to request the Chambers to form the regency by a law without delay. Let all unite for the public safety, and to preserve the national independance.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

No. XIV.

Malmaison, June 25, 1815.

Napoleon, to the brave Soldiers of the Army before Paris!

SOLDIERS! When I yield to the necessity, which compels me to leave the brave

French army, I carry along with me the happy assurance, that it will justify, by the eminent services the country expects from it, the eulogiums, which even our enemies cannot withhold from it.

Soldiers! Though absent, I shall follow all your steps. I know all the corps; and not one of them will obtain any signal advantage over the enemy but I shall give it credit for the courage it may have displayed. Both you and I have been calumniated. Men, incapable of appreciating your achievements, have regarded the marks of attachment, which you have given me, as a zeal of which I was the sole object. Let your future success convince them, that it was the country, above all things, which you served in obeying me; and that, if I had any share in your affection, I owed it to my ardent love for France, our common mother.

Soldiers! Some efforts more and the coalition will be dissolved. Napoleon will recognise you by the blows you are about to strike.

Save the honour and independance of the French people! Be, to the last, the same men as I have known you for twenty years, and you will be invincible.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

No. XV.

Military Convention.

This day, the 3d of July, 1815, the Commissioners named by the Commanders in Chief of the respective armies; that is to say, the Baron Bignon, holding the portefeuille of Foreign Affairs; the Count Guillemont, chief of the general staff of the French army; the Count de Bondy, Prefect of the Department of the Seine, being furnished with the full powers of his Excellency the Marshal Prince of Eckmuhl, Commander in Chief of the French army, on one side; and Major General Baron Muffling, furnished with the full powers of his Highness the Field Marshal Prince Blucher, Commander in Chief of the Prussian army; and Colonel Hervey, furnished with the full powers of his Excellency the Duke of Wellington, Commander in Chief of the English army, on the other side, have agreed to the following articles:—

Article I. There shall be a suspension of arms between the allied armies commanded by his Highness the Prince Blucher and his Grace the Duke of Wellington, and the French army under the walls of Paris.

Art. II. The French army shall put itself in

march to morrow, to take up its position behind the Loire. Paris shall be completely evacuated in three days; and the movement behind the Loire shall be effected within eight days.

Art. III. The French army shall take with it all its materiel, field artillery, military chests, horses, and property of regiments, without exception. All persons belonging to the depots shall also be removed, as well as those belonging to the different branches of administration which belong to the army.

Art. IV. The sick and wounded, and the medical officers whom it may be necessary to leave with them, are placed under the special protection of the Commanders in Chief of the English and Prussian armies.

Art. V. The military, and those holding employments to whom the foregoing article relates, shall be at liberty, immediately after their recovery, to rejoin the corps to which they belong.

Art. VI. The wives and children of all individuals belonging to the French army shall be at liberty to remain in Paris. The wives shall be allowed to quit Paris for the purpose of rejoining the army, and to carry with them their property and that of their husbands.

Art. VII. The officers of the line employed with

the federal, or with the tirailleurs of the national guard, may either join the army or return to their homes, or the places of their birth.

Art. VIII. To morrow, the 4th of July, at mid-day, St. Denis, St. Rouen, Clichy, and Neuilly shall be given up. The day after to morrow, the 5th, at the same hour, Montmartre shall be given up. The third day, the 6th, all the barriers shall be given up.

Art. IX. The duty of the city of Paris shall continue to be done by the national guard and by the corps of the municipal gendarmerie.

Art. X. The Commanders in Chief of the English and Prussian armies engage to respect, and to make those under their command respect, the actual authorites so long as they shall exist.

Art. XI. Public property, with the exception of that which relates to war, whether it belongs to the government or depends upon the municipal authority, shall be respected, and the allied powers will not interfere in any manner with its administration and management.

Art. XII. Private persons and property shall be equally respected. The inhabitants, and in general all individuals who shall be in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties without being disturbed or called to account, either as to the situations which they hold

or may have held, or as to their conduct or political opinions.

Art. XIII. The foreign troops shall not interpose any obstacles to the provisioning of the capital, and will protect, on the contrary, the arrival and free circulation of the articles which are destined for it.

Art. XIV. The present Convention shall be observed, and shall serve to regulate the mutual relations until the conclusion of peace. In case of rupture it must be denounced in the usual forms, at least ten days beforehand.

Art. XV. If difficulties arise in the execution of any one of the articles of the present Convention, the interpretation of it shall be made in favour of the French army and of the city of Paris.

Art. XVI. The present Convention is declared common to all the allied armies, provided it be ratified by the powers on which these armies are dependant.

Art. XVII. The ratifications shall be exchanged to morrow, the 4th of July, at six o'clock in the morning, at the bridge of Neuilly.

Art. XVIII. Commissioners shall be named by the respective parties, in order to watch over the execution of the present Convention.

Done and signed at St. Cloud, in triplicate,

by the Commissioners above named, the day and year before mentioned.

The Baron Bignon; Count Guillemont.

The Baron De Muffling; F. B. Hervey, Colonel.

Approved and ratified the present suspension of arms, at Paris, the 3d of July, 1815.

BLUCHER.

WELLINGTON.

Approved, MARSHAL THE PRINCE D'ECHMUHL.

No. XVI.

Attestation given to General Gourgaud by the Captain of the Bellerophon.

I, the undersigned, Post Captain in the service of his Britannic Majesty, and commanding his Majesty's ship the Bellerophon, declare upon my honour, that, being on the 14th of July last in Basque Roads, Field Marshal Baron Gourgaud, aide de camp to Napoleon, voluntarily came on board my ship, in company with Count de las Casas; the boat, which brought the said gentlemen, bearing a threecoloured flag, and a flag of truce. Baron Gourgaud delivered to me a letter from General Count Bertrand, which in-

formed me, that Napoleon had sent the said Baron Gourgaud, he being the bearer of a letter to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of England, of which he gave me a copy. I consequently directed this General Officer to be conveyed to Portsmouth, on board his Majesty's sloop the Slaney, at the same time transmitting a despatch to the Admiralty. I moreover declare, that it was agreed that General Gourgaud should have every facility for fulfilling his mission, and delivering to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent the letter, of which he was the bearer.

The winds forced the Slaney to enter Plymouth, where Admiral Keith refused General Gourgaud permission to land, though he was always considered as a flag of truce on board the sloop. The Slaney having proceeded to Torbay, I again received Baron Gourgaud on board his Majesty's ship the Bellerophon, which I command. Baron Gourgaud, as I have before stated, came voluntarily, and as a flag of truce, on board my ship. In faith of which I sign the present attestation, at the request of Baron Gourgaud, from whom my sense of honour would not suffer me to withhold it.

(Signed) MAITLAND,
Captain of his Majesty's Ship the Bellerophon;
at Sea, August 4, 1815.

No. XVII.

Protest of the Emperor Napoleon.

I hereby solemnly protest, in the face of God and man, against the violation of my most sacred rights, by the forcible disposal of my person and liberty. I came voluntarily on board the Bellerophon: I am not a prisoner; I am the guest of England.

As soon as I set foot on board the Bellerophon, I was on the threshold of the British people, and under their protection. If the government, by directing the Captain of the Bellerophon to receive me and my suite, meant only to entrap me, it has forfeited its honour, and tarnished its flag.

Should this act be carried into execution, in vain will the English boast to the rest of Europe of their good faith, their laws, and their liberty: British faith will have perished with the hospitality of the Bellerophon.

I appeal to history: it will record that an enemy, who had for twenty years waged war against the English people, came voluntarily, in his misfortunes, to seek an asylum under the protection of their laws. What greater proof could he give of his esteem and confidence? But how have the English answered such confidence

and magnanimity? they pretended to extend a friendly hand to this enemy; and, when he relied on their good faith, they sacrificed him.

NAPOLEON.

On board the Bellerophon, at Sea,
August 4, 1815.

THE END.

CHARLES WOOD, Printer,
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